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**Familialism and Welfare Regimes:
Poverty, Employment and Family Policies**

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Abstract

While many nations lay a claim to supporting "family values," these values may be interpreted in a variety of ways. How do nations support families, particularly families with children? What strategies do different nations take, and how do these strategies lead to different outcomes? In this paper, we show how different combinations of policies that support family caregiving and those that de-familialize caregiving lead to significantly different outcomes. We show that nations with stronger levels of both kinds of policies have lower poverty levels than those with weaker levels of these policies, but that strong levels of policies that support family caregiving and weak levels of de-familializing policies have more varied results, with higher levels of poverty, particularly for families headed by single mothers. In addition, this research illustrates significant variation among "continental Conservative" countries, and suggests the importance of a less static approach to welfare state regimes, which also fully recognizes the centrality of gender relations to labor market and welfare state policies.

Familialism and Welfare Regimes: Poverty, Employment, and Family Policies

Over the last several decades, advanced industrialized countries have changed in notable ways: welfare states have undergone restructuring, women have entered the labor force in growing numbers, and family forms have experienced serious alterations. A critical array of family policies has played a key role in addressing these changes and has helped balance the needs of families with the operation of both states and markets. For example, effective family policies may address families' needs by substantially lowering poverty rates for families with children, and in particular for single parent families (Bradshaw et al. 1993; Folbre 1994; McLanahan and Garfinkel 1995; Rainwater and Smeeding 2003). Family policies may also impact the family-market nexus by shaping whether women primarily pursue employment or remain in the home and provide caretaking for their families when children are young (Folbre 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003). As O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver (1999, p. 1) argue,

> Debates about the proper role of the state vis-à-vis the market and family and about the character of state policies have intensified and broadened out to consider a greater range of policy alternatives. . . Concerns of gender pervade these social policy debates – about employment opportunities and day care, about how (and even whether) to publicly support caregiving work and single parent families, about the scope of women's choices as to whether and when to be mothers.

In this study, we explore the strategies that nations take to support families, and how these strategies lead to different outcomes, particularly regarding poverty and employment, for both single and married mothers. We explore how the intersection of familialistic policies (supporting family caretaking) and de-familializing policies (undermining family caretaking) leads to different constellations of policies, and how these constellations reflect and lead to

different levels of women's labor force participation. By relating poverty rates for a variety of families – including married and single, childless, with children, and with young children – we assess the effectiveness of these policies regarding poverty prevention. In addition, we analyze how these policies impact married and single mother families, because single parent families "raise fundamental issues about the balance between family, state, and individual financial responsibilities; and about the roles of men and women as parents and workers" (Millar 1996, p. 25).

In addition, our analysis reconsiders the welfare regime approach, and how, in particular, the "continental European Conservative" regime, which is said to be particularly familialistic, operates as a policy strategy. Here, we focus upon Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. We show that there are important variations among these nations, and that these differences may point to a more dynamic model of welfare state regimes. While the welfare regime concept has led to very powerful and effective analyses of welfare states, this concept assumes that welfare states hold a fixed position over time. Yet with the dramatic changes in gender relations, welfare state policies have changed in substantial ways, leading to substantial variations within regime type. A model that better captures these transformations would be preferable.

This article begins with a discussion of the welfare regime concept and, in particular, critiques focused on familialism and de-familialization. From there, we place the Conservative continental countries within this theoretical context. Next, we examine how nations cluster regarding poverty rates and women's labor force participation rates for a variety of family types. We examine some potential explanations for these different clusters, emphasizing the

intersection of policies that support and those that destabilize family caregiving. Finally, we draw out the implications of our findings for studies of welfare regimes.

Welfare Regimes, Familialism, and De-Familialization

For comparativists, welfare state scholars over the last fifteen or so years have focused on explaining differences between "families of nations" (Castles 1993; Castles and Mitchell 1993) and "worlds of welfare capitalism" (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kolberg and Esping-Andersen 1992), showing how nations tend to cluster in certain groups in terms of policy creation and outcomes. The idea behind grouping nations in certain broad categories is that we can see qualitative differences between groups in the origins of social policies and their outcomes, which can then help us identify the different strategies nations take.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) very influential welfare state regime typology is often used to place countries into one of three diverse regime types. In the *Liberal* regime (e.g., Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States), the state avoids policy measures that tamper with the market. In the *Conservative* regime (e.g., France, Germany, Italy), the Church-shaped state uses policy to uphold status differences and preserve the traditional family. In the S*ocial Democratic* regime (e.g., Denmark, Norway, Sweden), the state uses policy to redistribute wealth and support full employment. Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 22) originally grouped countries into these clusters based on state-market relations, stratification, and social citizenship rights, including their level of de-commodification, or how state policies allow citizens to "maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market." De-commodification was measured by the generosity and availability of old age pensions, sickness benefits, and unemployment insurance payments.

Feminist scholars have roundly critiqued this model for focusing on de-commodification, particularly insofar as this model does not account for women's experience within the welfare state. Bussemaker and van Kersbergen (1994, p. 13) note that the regime approach focuses on class inequality, state provision of welfare, and the de-commodification of wage-labor, underrating gender inequalities and "analytically neglect[ing] the role of the family (and women in particular)" in care. As a result, Esping-Andersen's regimes do not always explain variations in policies directed at families, rather than those targeting workers, and do not adequately predict women's labor force participation (Langan and Ostner 1991; Taylor-Gooby 1991; Orloff 1993, 1996; Hobson 1994; Sainsbury 1995). For example, his conceptualization suggests that women's work historically has been marginalized in Conservative countries, and that welfare policies encourage women to remain in the home to preserve the traditional family structure (Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1993; Gornick et al. 1997). Yet, even within a particular regime type, there may be significant differences in levels of women's employment.

Lewis and Ostner (1991) provide an alternative typology that divides states among strong, moderate, and weak breadwinner ideologies. According to their scheme, in certain "strong breadwinner" nations, men are seen primarily as breadwinners and women as caretakers. In a moderate breadwinner state, women have somewhat more accepted roles as workers outside the home. In the weak breadwinner state, women and men are viewed as equally involved in caretaking and working outside the home. State policies support these different roles, for example through tax policies that reward single breadwinner families (Ostner 1994).

Jane Millar (1996) argues that even the male breadwinner model does not accurately capture gendered experiences, because welfare states may reinforce gender roles differently for married and single mothers (Schultheis 1992; Hobson 1994; McLanahan & Garfinkel 1995;

Lewis 1997; Hobson and Takahashi 1997; Ostner 1997; Bussemaker et al. 1997; Kiernan et al. 1998; Bussemaker 1998). Millar (1996) suggests that countries can be categorized in three ways: those which encourage employment for both single and married mothers; those which discourage employment for both single and married mothers; and those which discourage employment for married mothers, and encourage employment for single mothers. The first grouping of countries encourages employment for both groups by providing services such as childcare, employment rights such as parental leave and equal pay policies, and benefits. The second group discourages employment for both groups by providing lower levels of support for employment, and weaker benefits. As a result, women tend to work part time, and single mothers receive social benefits since mothers are not expected to work full time. Finally, the third group discourages employment for married mothers by not providing any supportive services, while encouraging employment for single mothers not through positive measures, but through a lack of alternatives such as social benefits.

Ann Orloff (1993) specifies how Esping-Andersen's model, and power resource theory more generally, should be reconceived to include attention to not only class but also gender effects. She argues that rather than simply focusing on state-market relations in providing welfare, scholars must understand that the family is a central actor in the provision of welfare. With this understanding, we can go on to explore how "[s]tate provisioning that helps to shift the burden of welfare from the family to the state, or from women to men within the family furthers women's gender interests" (Orloff 1993, p. 312). Similarly, rather than focusing on how social provision mediates or reifies class stratification, we must understand how social provision also mediates or reifies gender stratification. Social citizenship rights are different for women workers, who may not be commodified in the same way men are while also being relied upon to

provide domestic and caretaking work. By ignoring the tremendous amount of unpaid labor that many women do within the family, how this work structures women's lives, and how welfare programs target women through their family roles, Orloff claims that Esping-Andersen's model is incomplete. While recognizing that there are multiple interpretations of how to address these gendered inequalities, Orloff argues for a welfare state model that attends to women's access to paid employment and women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households.

Esping-Andersen (1999) has responded to these critiques by including in his later regime conceptualization the ideas of de-familialization and familialism. De-familialization refers to "the degree to which households' welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed – either via welfare provision or market provision," while familialism refers to a system where "public policy assumes – indeed insists – that households must carry the principal responsibility for their members' welfare" (Esping-Andersen 1999, p. 51). Familialism is strongly influenced by Catholic social teaching, particularly the principal of subsidiarity, which argues that the state and community should not undermine the autonomy and responsibility of the family. Esping-Andersen then measures de-familialization by examining public spending on family services, the percentage of children under three in childcare, and the percentage of elderly receiving public home help. He goes on to show how these measures relate to the intensity of family welfare provision, based on the percentage of the aged living with their children, unemployed youth living with parents, and women's weekly unpaid hours. Incorporating this measure of de-familialization, however, does not drastically change the original regime concept. Indeed, the Liberal regime countries continue to cluster together, and most Social Democratic countries remain clustered together, while clearer differences emerge between the countries originally defined as "Conservative."[1] Here he finds two groups – continental European countries (Austria,

Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) and southern European countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain) – with southern European countries scoring the lowest on de-familialization.

Sigrid Leitner (2003) extends this concept further with her categorization of *types* of familialization and de-familialization. Leitner agrees that there are both familialistic policies, which attempt to strengthen the family in its caring role, and de-familializing policies, which work to relieve the family of providing direct care. For example, familialistic policies might include parental or family leaves, cash benefits or tax reductions for caregivers, or social rights attached to care, such as pensions. Such policies strengthen the family's caring role, which may reinforce women's role in care, although policies may also be written to encourage men's caring roles. De-familializing policies might include the public provision of childcare, elder care, or other social services. While de-familializing policies may not directly intervene in gender relations, by relieving the family from care they may weaken male breadwinner models. According to Leitner, welfare states combine familialistic and de-familializing policies. She develops the typology illustrated in Table One.

[Table One About Here]

Optional familialism is characterized by those countries with both services for caretakers and supportive care policies for workers; explicit familialism by those countries with supportive care policies but no services; de-familialization by those countries with services but no supportive care policies; and implicit familialism by those countries with neither services nor supportive care policies. Leitner (2003) analyzes how different policy arrangements in EU member states suggest different forms of familialism and de-familialization. For example, counter to Esping-Andersen's (1999) argument, Leitner argues that Social Democratic nations appear to provide optional familialism rather than de-familialization. Similarly, Liberal countries appear to

provide both explicit familialism and de-familialization; and Conservative countries are split between explicit and implicit familialism. Leitner goes on to analyze how these different policies reinforce traditional gender roles, by looking at how these values include assumptions about men's and women's gender roles in regard to parental leave.

However, Leitner's model remains problematic. For example, the United Kingdom and Ireland are categorized as de-familializing because formal childcare is "widespread," in that a little more than one-third of children under 3 are in formal child care, while there is no paid parental leave policy. This is because Leitner's model is based on private *or* public childcare; the UK and Ireland do not subsidize childcare, but leave it to the market – making it less available for many parents (Gornick and Meyers 2003). However, Leitner does provide another important way to consider familialism.

Conservative Countries and Familialization

Despite the criticisms of Esping-Andersen's (1990) original model, many welfare state scholars continue to explore how countries within regimes share similar approaches or diverge considerably. While substantial research focuses upon variations in Liberal regime countries (O'Connor et al. 1999) and Social Democratic regime countries (Erikson et al. 1987; Leira 1992), less research explicitly focuses on variations among Conservative countries (Daly 1999, 2000). Yet, the Conservative regime should be explored more thoroughly, particularly since support for family caregiving may play an important role in shaping welfare policy in these nations (Kaufmann 1988; Lessenich and Ostner 1995; Daly 1999, 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999; Leitner 2003).

According to Esping-Andersen (1990), Conservative countries are distinct from Social Democratic and Liberal countries in part because of the focus on the traditional family, which limits women's labor force participation. As he notes:

> In most other countries, the modern welfare state was built by Social Democrats or left Liberals; welfare state consolidation in postwar Europe was dominated by rightist or centre-right coalitions – Christian Democracy in particular. Even where Christian Democratic parties were marginal, such as France or Spain, Catholic social doctrines still exert a visible influence on social policy (1996, p. 66).

Yet although Catholic social doctrine meant to support traditional family values shapes these Conservative countries, the resulting policies do not necessarily lead to higher fertility rates. Esping-Andersen argues that paradoxically "familialistic policy appears counter-productive to family formation" (1999, p. 67), noting that the de-familialized Social Democratic nations have higher fertility rates than the highly familialized southern European nations. Finally, Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that among the original Conservative regime types, continental European countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, differ from the southern European countries, such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, in their levels of familialism and de-familialization. The Mediterranean countries have extremely high levels of familialism, which has consequences both in terms of lower levels of services and benefits and in terms of women's employment. The continental Conservative countries, however, provide a closer match to the theoretical expectations of the Conservative regime.

We examine whether there are further divergences within the continental European countries, and what such divergences might indicate. We focus on the cases of Belgium, France,

Germany, and the Netherlands. In terms of our theoretical framing, the classification of these cases is explicated in Table Two.

[Table Two About Here]

Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have been identified as Conservative nations (although the Netherlands has occasionally been typed as Social Democratic) (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996, 1999; Hobson 1994; Knijn 1998; Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988). More recently, these nations have been further specified by Esping-Andersen as "continental European" Conservative nations, which are different in approach from the even more familialistic southern European nations. His conceptualization suggests that these four nations are fairly similar.[2]

According to Lewis and Ostner's (1991) typology, Germany and the Netherlands can be typed as "strong breadwinner" states, where men are seen primarily as breadwinners and women are seen as caretakers. However, France and Belgium are "moderate breadwinner" states, where women have somewhat more accepted roles as breadwinners (also see Pfau-Effinger 1999). The state uses social policies to shape these differences. For Lewis and Ostner, Esping-Andersen's regime types clearly do not adequately capture the difference in women's workforce participation among these nations.

Millar's (1996) critique argues that rather than simply looking at male breadwinning, we must also examine how policies influence both married and single mothers to work or caretake. She suggests that policies do not simply influence men's versus women's roles as breadwinners or caretakers, but may reinforce different roles for women based on whether they are married or single. Millar categorizes countries in three ways: those with high employment rates for both single and married mothers (e.g., France, Belgium); those with low employment rates for both single and married mothers (e.g., the Netherlands); and those with low employment rates for

married mothers and high employment rates for single mothers (e.g., Germany). However, Belgium appears to actually have somewhat lower employment rates for single mothers, relative to other nations, suggesting that there may potentially be a fourth category, with low employment rates for single mothers and high employment rates for married mothers. Here, as with the breadwinner typology, it appears that there are important differences among the continental Conservative countries.

Building on Ann Orloff's (1993) concept of "de-familialization" and Esping-Andersen's revision of his framework to analyze familialism and de-familialization, Leitner (2003) suggests that famialism and de-famialization may combine to lead to a number of different outcomes. Leitner finds somewhat different findings by country, depending on whether she focuses on elder care or childcare. Regarding childcare, Belgium and France could be typed as promoting "optional familialism," while Germany and the Netherlands are typed as "explicit familialism."[3] Leitner again suggests that there is significant variation among the Conservative continental countries.

There do seem to be some significant differences among Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Belgium and France are classified together in each of the theories. Germany and the Netherlands are also similarly classified, but they are more distinctive, particularly in terms of Millar's classification. Understanding these differences may help reconceptualize how we group countries, and what the underlying assumptions are behind the strategies different countries take.

Familial Outcomes

While the theoretical models provide a number of useful approaches to thinking about how welfare policies shape famialialism and de-familialization, we should also incorporate

measures of the outcomes regarding women's dependence. We highlight the differences in outcomes among Social Democratic, Liberal and Christian Democratic countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We focus first on poverty rates and then on women's labor force participation rates. Finally, we discuss the qualitative differences between policies across countries, particularly the Christian Democratic countries, to help explain variations in outcomes.

We explore these outcomes by examining poverty rates for women with and without children. Poverty rates for women may be lower both where women have greater labor market opportunities and where women receive provisioning through the state to support their caregiving roles (Orloff 1993). We use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database to develop a number of measures of poverty rates across families with and without children. We rely on LIS data because this database provides the best cross-national data for comparing income across OECD countries (OECD 1995). LIS gathers data from national surveys and harmonizes the data to ensure comparability. The data are organized into waves. We utilize data from Waves IV and V to compare poverty rates across the Conservative Democratic countries. Wave IV includes data for the mid-1990s, and Wave V represents the early 2000s (see tables for exact years). Wave V data are not yet available for Belgium and France.

Like most comparative researchers, we measure poverty rates relatively to capture the extent that families fall below 50 percent of their countries' median income (Brady 2003; Casper et al. 1994; Korpi and Palme 1998; Moller et al. 2003). We constrain our sample to working age adults to limit the number of students and pensioners in the sample. Pensioners are highly dependent on transfers. Thus, including them in our analyses overstates the extent of

redistribution and undermines our ability to examine the link between state policies and markets in terms of families (Huber et al. 2003; Moller et al. 2003).

We examine three measures of poverty. Pre-tax and transfer poverty rates represent market-based income. They are calculated as the percentage of households with working age adults, 25-59, with market incomes below 50 percent of median income. Market income includes total household income from wages and salaries, property income, private pension income, and self-employment income.[4] Post-tax and transfer poverty rates represent total income including governmental transfers. We calculate post-tax and transfer poverty rates as the percentage of households headed by working age adults, 25-59, with disposable incomes below 50 percent of median income. Disposable income includes market income, governmental transfers, and taxes.[5]

To examine how state policies affect the poverty rates of families, we further disaggregate our sample by family type and the presence of children. This disaggregation is necessary because understanding single mothers' experiences with poverty may be crucial. As Orloff (1993) argues, a central component to welfare state provision may be women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households. If single mothers face significantly higher levels of poverty, this capacity is clearly undermined.[6]

Following Karen Christopher (2002), we calculate poverty rates separately for households headed by married and single mothers. We define married couple families broadly to include cohabitating and married couples. All unmarried, separated, or divorced women who do not live with an adult of the opposite sex are categorized as "single." We also distinguish between women without children under 18, mothers with children under 18, and those with children under 6, although the data for families with children under 6 is based on fewer cases and

may not be as reliable for single mothers.[7] We present the number of cases in the calculations of pre-tax and transfer poverty rates in Appendix A. We begin by examining pre-tax and transfer poverty levels for married and single women in households without children, with children under 18, and with children under 6, before any tax and transfer programs are put into place. Table Three summarizes these data.[8]

[Table Three About Here]

First, it should be evident that married women face significantly less poverty than single women. Overall, single women appear three to four times more likely than married women to fall into poverty. This is dramatically true even for women *without* children. For example, during the most recent period, almost 22% of single women without children are poor on average, compared to 7% of married women without children. Women are not necessarily able to stave off poverty in any of these nations by relying on their wages through the labor market. Marriage still appears to be *the* solution to poverty for many women.

Poverty rates are also substantially higher for women with children, particularly when these children are young (under 6). For example, during the most recent wave of data, 7% of married women without children, on average, faced poverty, compared to 11% of married women with children, and 14% of married women with young children. Similarly, on average, 22% of single women faced poverty, compared to 52% of single women with children, and 69% of single women with young children. The presence of children, particularly young children, plays a key role in whether women experience poverty (Folbre 2001). Looking at changes over time, average poverty rates appear to be somewhat lower in many of these nations in the more recent wave of data, perhaps due to the economic recovery after the recession of the early to mid-1990s.

We can also examine the rankings of countries to discover interesting patterns. Countries are ranked by poverty rate from lowest to highest; difference less than .3 share a rank. Thus, for married women without children in the mid-1990s, Norway had the lowest market-based poverty rates, followed by Sweden. The Conservative countries, in contrast, have the highest poverty rates for married mothers without children. These rates remain high circa 2000; however, there is little variation in childless married women's poverty rates during this period. Pre-tax and transfer poverty rates for married women with children (and with young children) are the lowest in the Conservative regime, and the worst in the Liberal regime during the 1990s. By the 2000s, the distinction between the Conservative and Social Democratic regimes is minimized by overlapping poverty rates.

The market-based poverty rates for single women without children follow less distinguishable patterns. Among single women with children, Belgium and France have particularly low pre-tax and transfer poverty rates and Germany and the Netherlands have remarkably high rates. This pattern follows Lewis and Ostner's insights that Belgium and France are moderate breadwinner countries, while Germany and the Netherlands have a strong breadwinner ideology. It also corresponds with Leitner's observation that Germany and the Netherlands offer limited services to permit work among single mothers. Interestingly, this hypothesis does not hold up during the 2000 period because single women households with children in Germany and the Netherlands have lower poverty rates than those households in the Social Democratic and Liberal nations (excluding Finland).

While this data suggests some interesting differences between countries, it does not capture how tax and welfare programs attempt to ameliorate poverty for these groups. Since we are most interested in how welfare states, or the complex of welfare policies, shape the

experiences of families, it is crucial to examine post-tax and transfer poverty rates and reductions in poverty due to the tax and transfer systems. How do these countries use taxation and welfare policies to bring families out of poverty? Are families with children *less* likely to fall into poverty, once we account for transfers? Table Four summarizes post-tax and transfer poverty rates across these countries.

[Table Four About Here]

In most countries, poverty rates drop significantly when taking the effect of welfare and tax policies into account. After tax and welfare policies have done their work, poverty rates drop from 7%, on average, for married childless women to 3.3 %; from 22%, on average, for single childless women to 12%. Perhaps even more impressive, poverty rates for women with young children drop from 14% and 69% for married and single women, respectively, to 7% and 32% for married and single women respectively. While poverty rates for single women, particularly those with children, remain disturbingly high, they are much lower than pre-tax and transfer (although this drop is less remarkable for the United States).

As in Table Three, these data suggest that marriage remains a key route out of poverty for many women. Married women have much lower levels of poverty both pre- and post-tax and transfer. Perhaps because women's wages are lower in the labor market, marriage appears to strongly lower poverty rates for women *in every nation*. Unpartnered women still run a higher risk of living in poverty, whether they have children or not. Indeed, single childless women both pre- and post-tax and transfer are more likely to live in poverty, on average, than married women with young children. Women appear constrained in their ability to form autonomous households without slipping into poverty (Orloff 1993).

In addition, having children, particularly young children, continues to increase the chance of poverty significantly. For example, 3.3% of married women without children live in poverty, on average, compared to 5.2% of married women with children, and 6.7% of married women with young children. Differences in poverty rates based on having children remain, but they are clearly ameliorated somewhat by tax and transfer. Because of the effect of the presence of children and being unmarried, single mothers with children remain vulnerable – on average, 23% of single women with children and 32% of single women with young children live in poverty.

Yet in addition to understanding the overall trends among groups of women across these nations, we are *most* interested in determining whether these nations seem to cluster together in groups in terms of poverty rates for married and single women. These clusters may provide some evidence for different kinds of strategies. We see in Table Four that countries in the Social Democratic regime generally have the lowest overall poverty rates, and those in the Liberal regime generally have the highest. However, there are differences across regimes. To ease interpretation of these statistics, we categorize countries as rising above the mean poverty rate (high) and falling below the mean poverty rate (low) during the earlier period (when we have more countries available). Here we compare poverty rates for mothers with children under 18, since the data on poverty rates for mothers with young children are based on substantially fewer cases.

[Table Five About Here]

Table Five summarizes these post-tax and transfer poverty rates. For some countries, poverty rates appear somewhat consistent with expectations based on Esping-Andersen's regime groupings. Here the Social Democratic countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) cluster together, with lower poverty rates for both single and married mothers. Also, the Liberal

countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) cluster together, with higher poverty rates for both single and married mothers. These groupings clearly fall where expected by Esping-Andersen. Social Democratic countries do appear to use tax and transfer policies to redistribute income in ways that reduce poverty for both married and single mother families. Liberal countries do appear to be less generous in their attempts to reduce poverty, relying instead on the market.

Yet as various critics suggest, the continental Conservative countries, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, do not group together effectively. France can be clustered with the Social Democratic countries, Germany has higher poverty rates for single mothers and lower for married, Belgium has lower poverty rates for single mothers but higher rates for married mothers, and the Netherlands can be clustered with Liberal countries. This table provides strong support for Millar's arguments about the differential effects of welfare and tax policies on married and single mothers.

Historically, France has taken an active labor market policy approach to women's employment that may be more in consonance with the strategies taken by Social Democratic countries. Germany, on the other hand, has attempted to support traditional marriage, with the outcome of higher poverty levels of single mothers. Belgium has, like France, taken an active labor market approach, but perhaps particularly effectively for single mothers. Finally, the Netherlands, particularly since its recent round of (somewhat ambivalently implemented) welfare reform, has provided less support for families with children than it once did (Knijn and van Wel 2001). Indeed, as Table Five suggests, the trend between 1994 and 1999 is unmistakable. Dutch programmatic changes appear to be leading to significantly higher poverty rates, except for single childless women.[9]

Employment, Family Policies, and Support for Family Caregiving

What might explain the differences we observe, particularly among the continental Conservative countries? Clearly, these nations cluster in different ways based on poverty rates. While many of the findings we observe can be explained by the differences in welfare regimes – for example the redistributive Social Democratic countries versus the market-oriented Liberal countries – regime differences provide a less compelling explanation for the continental Conservative nations. These countries vary substantially in their poverty rates for married and single women and mothers.

One explanation may be in differences in women's employment rates. As the "male breadwinner" typology suggests, women's labor market engagement varies by country. Particularly if the tax and transfer system is connected to employment, in order to reward workers, we may find that countries with low levels of women's employment have significantly higher levels of poverty for women and their families. To explore these possibilities, we highlight differences in women's labor force participation rates by country in the early 1990s in Table Six. These data, developed by Saraceno (1997), are unavailable for Denmark, Finland, and Canada. However, they are available for each of the Conservative states, permitting us to determine if these states truly form a cluster, as Esping-Andersen would predict. Again, the data are disaggregated by family type, comparing single mothers to married and cohabitating mothers. It is also disaggregated by hours of employment, comparing full-time to part-time.

[Table Six About Here]

As Ostner and Lewis's male breadwinner typology suggests, there are different levels of women's employment across these countries, particularly when we attend to part-time

employment as a share of total employment. In most countries, single mothers are more likely to work full time than married mothers; married mothers are more likely to work part time. However, in a number of countries, single mothers are *less* likely to be employed than married mothers, reflecting the constraints single mothers may face balancing employment and caretaking. Full-time employment for married mothers varies from 13% in the Netherlands to 62% in Finland; similarly, for married mothers, full-time employment as a share of total employment varies from 25% in the Netherlands to 89% in Finland. Full-time employment for single mothers varies from 16% in the Netherlands to 67% in France; similarly, for single mothers, full-time employment as a share of total employment varies from 40% in the Netherlands to 94% in Finland.

Table Seven summarizes overall employment trends. Indeed, Finland, France, and Sweden, three of the countries that tend to have lower levels of poverty for families with children, also have high levels of employment for mothers, including single mothers. As Table Six suggests, women in Finland and France are more likely to work full time, while many Swedish women work part time. Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, with their higher levels of poverty for families with children, also have lower levels of employment for mothers, and higher levels of part-time employment. Belgium, which consistently showed somewhat lower poverty rates for single parent families relative to other countries, also shows higher levels of employment for single mothers, and lower levels of part-time employment.

[Table Seven About Here]

It is interesting to note that these trends support Millar's (1996) arguments about France as promoting work for both married and single parents, while the Netherlands promotes caretaking for both married and single parents. However, Millar's model does not fully fit the

German case, where married and single parents both seem to have fairly low levels of employment, although single mothers are more likely to be employed full time. Belgium, as noted above, also seems to belong to a fourth category, where married mothers are somewhat more likely than single mothers to be employed at higher levels.

However, employment clearly does not explain all of the differences we see in poverty rates. While the United States has unusually high poverty rates for both married and single mother families, it also has unusually high employment rates, and full-time employment rates, for both groups. Employment may be part of the story, but it clearly is not all of it.

Policies that Support and Limit Family Caregiving

To highlight the extent to which policies vary in tandem with poverty rates and women's labor force participation rates, we explore two different types of family policies: parental leave policies and childcare policies. In keeping with Orloff's suggestions, and Esping-Andersen's revised model, we expect that parental leave policies might promote family caretaking, while childcare policies may promote de-familialization. Following Leitner, we are also interested in how famialialism and de-familialization intersect in these nations.

Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers (2003) have developed a number of indices, which tap into the strength of various family policies, including parental leave and childcare for children at different ages. Table Eight summarizes their findings, regarding the strength of family policies in these nations. Once again, the Social Democratic countries fall where we would expect and in keeping with the poverty rates for families with children; family policies support families with children through paid parental leaves and subsidized childcare. Similarly, the Liberal countries

generally fall where we would expect, providing very limited support for childcare or parental leave. What about the continental Conservative countries?

[Table Eight About Here]

All four countries provide quite supportive parental leave policies. These countries provide between 12 and 16 weeks of paid leave for mothers around the birth or adoption of a child (Gornick and Meyers 2003). In Belgium, the leave is paid for 15 weeks, with 82% of wages paid for the first 4 weeks (no ceiling), and 75% of wages paid for the following 11 weeks, with a ceiling. In addition, *each* parent is entitled to 3 months of full-time leave or 6 months of half-time leave at a flat-rate benefit level, until their child reaches the age of 4. In the Netherlands, maternity leave is 16 weeks at full pay, with a ceiling. *Each* parent is entitled to 3 months of full-time unpaid leave or 6 months of half-time unpaid leave, until their child reaches the age of 8. In Germany, maternity leave is 100% of wages for 14 weeks; parents may also share up to 3 years of leave, with 2 years of paid leave, for a means-tested flat rate benefit for which most families qualify. Paid leave is valid until the child is 2; the third year of unpaid leave must be used before a child turns 8. Finally, France provides 100% of wages for 16 weeks of maternity leave with a ceiling; this leave is extended to 26 weeks for third and subsequent children. Parents may share up to 3 years of a flat-rate parental leave for 2 or more children through the youngest child's third birthday (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Table 5.1).

All four countries also provide a paid sick child benefit. In Belgium, the benefit is 100% of wages for up to 10 days a year. In the Netherlands, the benefit is either minimum wage or 70% of the workers' wage (whichever is higher) for up to 10 days a year. In Germany, the benefit is 100% for up to 10 days a year per child for married parents (maximum 25 days/year), 100% of 20 days a year per child for single parents (maximum 50 days/year). Finally, in France,

sick child benefits are more limited – a 100% benefit for up to 3 days/year, or 5 days/year for families with children under 1, or 3 children (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Table 5.2).

These parental leave policies, as noted by Leitner (2003), are familialistic in that they encourage families to provide care for family members. In addition, the policies may support gendered familialism, insofar that women are more likely to take off time from work to provide care. While sick child benefits and parental leave are nominally gender-neutral, maternity leave is not. However, Belgium offers a 3-4 day nontransferable paternity benefit at 100% wages; the Netherlands offers a 2-day nontransferable paternity benefit at 100% wages; and France offers a 2-week paternity benefit at 100% wages, up to a certain ceiling. Germany does not offer paternity benefits (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Table 5.3). While paternity benefits in no way come close to maternity benefits, there seems to be a minor attempt to encourage fathers' roles in caregiving in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.

Childcare policy differentiates these nations more strongly. None of these four countries provide entitlements for public supported early childhood education for children under 2. However, France provides entitlements from 2 ½, Germany and Belgium from 3, and the Netherlands from 4. In Belgium, approximately 15% of children under 1, 42% of children under 3, and 99% of children between 3 and 6 are in publicly financed care. In France, approximately 9% of children under 3 are in crèche and 11% are in école, while 99% of children between 3 and 6 are in publicly financed care. In the Netherlands, 17% of children 3 and under 3, and 99% of 4- and 5-year-olds are in publicly financed childcare. In Germany, 5% of children between 1 and 2, and 77% of children 3 to 5 are in publicly financed childcare, although 80% of these children are in childcare part time (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Table 7.2).

These childcare polices are more de-familializing in approach, since they provide care outside the home. While the policies are not explicitly directed at women, the effects are quite powerful. With high-quality subsidized childcare available, mothers are much more likely to join the labor force, or make a decision to work full time. Childcare policies and parental leave surely work in concert; parents turn to childcare after using parental leave. However, in France and particularly Belgium, the policies encourage parents to enter children into publicly supported childcare earlier.

Constellations of Family Policies and Their Outcomes

What do these differences in family policies suggest about how countries cluster? Table Nine summarizes these findings in terms of Leitner's familialistic and de-familializing framework. While this model may simplify some of the complexity in differences between, for example, French and Belgian or Dutch and German policies, it does place the range of countries in recognizable clusters, and in clusters that connect at least in part with the patterns of post-tax and transfer poverty rates.

[Table Nine About Here]

In the policies that matter most to maternal employment, France and Belgium share more in common with the Social Democratic countries; as a result, poverty rates tend to be somewhat lower. There is strong pressure on women in these countries to work. However, policies in these nations do not simply de-familialize caring. They provide support for some caring inside the home as well as services for care outside the home, as families may choose to provide care, particularly for infants. On the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands have policies that are

more clearly familializing, providing support for caring inside the home, without the same degree of commitment to care outside the home.

Of course, we must be cautious about how assertive we are in arguing that nations form distinct clusters. While German and Dutch childcare services are not as well developed as services in France and Belgium, they are clearly better than in many southern European nations, or, for example, the United States. Particularly in the Netherlands, where 99% of 4- and 5-year-olds are in publicly supported care, it is more useful to think of these nations as falling along a continuum, rather than in clear dichotomous groupings. In addition, we focus on services and support for care of children; incorporating measures for care of the elderly might significantly change these groupings (Leitner 2003).

Despite these provisos, we believe that it is imperative to try to understand how policies that encourage family caregiving and those that relieve family caregiving responsibilities combine to result in different patterns of support for families, particularly insofar that these patterns are linked to differences in poverty rates for families with children. As Table Four suggests, post-tax and transfer poverty rates remain remarkably high in many nations, particularly for single mothers with children. However, these poverty rates are much higher in countries that rely primarily on policies supporting family caregiving. Figure One describes these trends.

[Figure One About Here]

Clearly, the optional familialism model is most effective at lowering poverty rates among families with children. Countries with models of explicit familialism also show lower levels of poverty for married mothers with children, compared to the implicit familialism model, although these levels are higher than for the optional familialism model. However, neither explicit nor

implicit familialism models appear to address poverty effectively for single mothers with children. As Hobson noted in her analysis of single mothers in a variety of countries, in nations such as Germany, "Solo mothers have no policy domain as either full-time carers or as paid workers. Within the gender logic of the German policy constellation that is organized around marital status or paid work, solo mothers are a residual category" (1994, p. 182). In keeping with earlier arguments about the ability of women to form autonomous households, our findings suggest that family policies shape the experiences of single and married mothers in different ways, and that de-familializing policies may be particularly important in allowing all women greater autonomy.

Conclusion

Our research suggests that it is critical to examine family policies in terms of the dimensions of familialism and de-familialization and to understand the distinct policy constellations created by combinations of familialistic and de-familializing policies. We show that these constellations lead to very different outcomes, with regard to poverty rates, for families with children and, particularly, for families with children headed by single mothers.

While our research supports Esping-Andersen's basic regime groupings for Social Democratic and Liberal regimes, it also suggests that even his revised (1999) understanding of the Conservative regime does not recognize the important variation among family policies within these nations. Our findings *are* in keeping with the suggestions of many of Esping-Andersen's critics, particularly in our emphasis that maternal employment may be supported in different ways, and our findings that policies address the needs of single and married mothers in different ways.

While it is certainly important to recognize that southern European Conservative countries, such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy, provide significantly less explicit family support, there is also marked variation among the continental Conservative countries, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. While Esping-Andersen (1999) notes that familialism is less dominant in France and Belgium, he does not reconceptualize his "regimes" to reflect this difference, in part because he views it as a minor issue relative to the overall forces driving welfare regime differences.

Historically, these Conservative nations may appear to group together. Social Catholicism, and its doctrine of subsidiarity, clearly has shaped some of these nations' policies (though less so in France, with its history of republican anti-clericalism) (van Kersbergen 1994, 1995; Esping-Andersen 1999). As Ilona Ostner (1994) has argued, social Catholic values, while emphasizing the interdependence of individuals, families, community, and the state, support maintaining the autonomy of these units. Within social Catholicism, the state must not undermine the strength, responsibility, and autonomy of the family. Yet, as suggested by Anttonen and Sipila (1996), France and Belgium are quite different from the other Conservative regime countries regarding how the state intervenes via family policy. While Esping-Andersen (1999) suggests that this difference is not significant enough to warrant a rethinking of the typology, we argue that such a reconceptualization remains important.

Esping-Andersen (1999) maintains that the main features of the Conservative welfare regime, including labor market regulation and welfare provisioning, center around the family and protecting the role of the male breadwinner. Yet, our analysis suggests that France and Belgium have effectively replaced the male-breadwinner model with a model that supports and expects women's employment. Higher levels of de-familialization for Belgium and France are not

simply a hiccup in an otherwise smooth regime categorization, but a symptom of larger, more sustained differences between nations. As Bussemaker and van Kersbergen (1999) note, since 1980, Conservative regime countries have faced changing demographic, social, and economic situations, which have led to a variety of policy changes. High levels of incorporation of women into the labor market lead to very different models of labor market regulation and welfare provisioning. Recognizing this difference leads to recognizing the importance of taking a more dynamic, and less static, approach to welfare state regimes. While earlier, France and Belgium more effectively fit with the Netherlands and Germany, since the 1980s the divergences among these countries have become more marked.

Similarly, while in earlier periods Dutch and German policy differed significantly, recent policy changes have led to some degree of convergence between these nations. As Hobson (1994) has argued, in Germany the male-breadwinner model was instituted in a way that covered women only through their claims as wives. Single mothers received low levels of benefits and were pushed into the labor market. In the Dutch model, on the other hand, Hobson argues that a "mother-carer-citizen" model gave single mothers a social wage to support their caretaking. Yet, since the 1996 Dutch welfare reform, single mothers are no longer supported in the same way (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1999; Knijn 1994). As a result, poverty rates have increased dramatically for Dutch single mothers, and the Dutch and Germany policy contexts appear more comparable.

Taking a welfare regime perspective can be extremely powerful. While we do not call for disbanding the study of welfare state regimes, we do call for a more flexible, and more dynamic, approach to welfare state regimes, one that recognizes the unmistakable centrality of gender to the form of welfare state regimes. While welfare states shape demographic changes, such as

levels of women's labor market participation, demographic changes also shape welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001). The origins of welfare states, whether primarily shaped by Liberal, Social Democratic, or Christian Democratic parties, continue to affect the logic of welfare state provisioning, but restructuring can occur in ways that blur the boundaries between regimes. In particular, we argue that continuing to focus attention primarily on differences between regimes misses important changes occurring within regimes. As Bussemaker and van Kersbergen (1999) argue, although historical legacies and institutional arrangements certainly play an important role in how countries deal with gender issues, a variety of other political factors (including women's movements, perceptions of gender equality, EU directives, fiscal crises, changes in governments, etc.) shape policy responses in important ways.

By placing women's experiences at the center of our analyses, and examining how welfare state regimes support women's positions as workers and/or caretakers, differentiated by marital status, we develop a better understanding of how policy constellations reflect conceptions of the state, market, and family. We must be willing to reconceptualize welfare state regimes to better capture welfare states' dynamic approach to balancing state, market, and family.

Endnotes

1. However, Esping-Andersen does suggest that the outcomes in terms of the burden of care is not so different among the Liberal and continental European countries.

2. Esping-Andersen (1999) does note that Anttonen and Sipila (1996) have shown that for caring and services Belgium and France "break ranks" with other Conservative nations. Yet he suggests that this is only a minor aberration, and does not have a notable impact on these countries' placement within the Conservative welfare regime.

3. However, when she focuses on elder care, Leitner instead types Belgium, France, and Germany as "explicit familialism" and the Netherlands as "implicit familialism."

4. We adjust income based on household size to account for resource sharing. We utilize a common equivalence scale: the square root of the number of persons in the household (see OECD 1995 for an overview of equivalence scales).

5. Since some families rely solely on the state for income, we include households without market income in the creation of pre-tax and transfer poverty. However, we exclude households without disposable income in the creation of post-tax and transfer poverty rates.

6. As Hobson argues, "Solo motherhood is the reflector or rearview mirror for the dynamics of power and dependency – the more difficult and stigmatized solo motherhood is in a society, the greater the barriers against opting out of a bad marriage. From this standpoint, the kinds of state support solo mothers receive can be employed as a barometer of the strength or weakness of social rights of women with families" (1994, p. 176).

7. One problem in dividing women into these groups is that they may not be comparable. For example, when we compared the average age of women in these different groups, we found that

"childless" women were somewhat older than women with children; these "childless" women may simply be mothers whose children have grown up.

8. Some of these numbers must be viewed with caution. While we have taken out any calculations based on fewer than 50 cases, almost all of the data examining poverty rates for single mothers is based on small numbers of cases (on average, fewer than 1,000 cases for single mothers with children under 18; on average, fewer than 300 cases for single mothers with children under 6).

9. Bussemaker and van Kersbergen (1999) also note that despite recent increases, through the early 1990s poverty among Dutch single mother families was relatively low as a result of generous social transfer.

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Table 1. Leitner's Combinations of Familialization and De-Familialization

	Defamilialization	
Familialization	Strong	Weak
Strong	Optional Familialism	Explicit Familialism
Weak	De-Familialism	Implicit Familialism

Table 2. Classifications of Continental European "Conservative" Nations

Researcher	Belgium	France	Germany	Netherlands
Esping-Andersen	Conservative	Conservative	Conservative	Conservative
Lewis & Ostner	Moderate Breadwinner	Moderate Breadwinner	Strong Breadwinner	Strong Breadwinner
Millar	High Employment for Married & Single Mothers	High Employment for Married & Single Mothers	High Employment for Single Mothers; Low Employment for Married Mothers	Low Employment for Married & Single Mothers
Leitner	Optional Familialism	Optional Familialism	Explicit Familialism	Explicit Familialism

Table 3. Pre-Tax and Transfer Poverty Rates for Married and Lone Women with No Children, Children, and Young Children

		Married Women			Single Women		
	Year	without children	with children	with young children	without children	with children	with young children
Conservative Regime							
Belgium	1997	13.1 (9)	13.9 (7)	14.5 (3a)	34.5 (9)	50.1 (3)	-
France	1994	10.2 (7b)	12.1 (3)	16.7 (6)	27.0 (5a)	44.7 (2)	64.5 (1)
Germany	1994	7.2 (4)	11.6 (2)	14.6 (3b)	26.6 (4)	62.5 (8)	-
Netherlands	1994	14.7 (10)	12.5 (4a)	9.8 (2)	35.4 (10)	77.9 (9)	-
Social Democratic Regime							
Finland	1995	9.3 (6)	13.3 (6)	19.0 (8a)	25.8 (3)	41.4 (1)	-
Norway	1995	5.5 (1)	7.8 (1)	9.1 (1)	23.6 (2)	59.3 (5)	76.9 (5)
Sweden	1995	6.0 (2)	12.7 (4b)	16.2 (5)	28.9 (7)	50.8 (4)	65.5 (2)
Liberal Regime							
Canada	1994	8.8 (5)	16.5 (9)	19.2 (8b)	29.1 (8)	59.6 (6)	71.7 (3)
United Kingdom	1995	10.1 (7a)	21.0 (10)	25.7 (10)	27.2 (5b)	79.1 (10)	89.0 (6)
United States	1994	6.9 (3)	15.1 (8)	18.1 (7)	23.1 (1)	60.3 (7)	72.6 (4)
AVERAGE		9.2	13.6	16.3	28.1	58.6	73.4
Conservative Regime							
Germany	2000	7.0 (2d)	9.3 (3a)	11.1 (3)	23.3 (5a)	50.6 (3)	-
Netherlands	1999	9.7 (7)	8.6 (2)	8.2 (1)	21.1 (3)	48.7 (2)	-
Social Democratic Regime							
Finland	2000	7.1 (2e)	12.4 (5)	17.0 (5)	22.2 (4)	40.2 (1)	-
Norway	2000	5.0 (1)	6.8 (1)	8.9 (2)	23.5 (5b)	54.4 (6)	73.8 (3)
Sweden	2000	6.5 (2a)	9.4 (3b)	13.3 (4)	24.7 (7)	52.0 (4)	65.6 (2)
Liberal Regime							
United Kingdom	1999	6.8 (2c)	15.9 (7)	19.8 (7)	19.7 (2)	65.8 (7)	77.4 (4)
United States	2000	6.7 (2b)	15.6 (6)	19.3 (6)	17.7 (1)	53.5 (5)	58.0 (1)
AVERAGE		7.0	11.1	13.9	21.7	52.2	68.7

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent country rank from lowest poverty rate (1) to the highest

Table 4. Post-Tax and Transfer Poverty Rates for Married and Lone Women with No Children, Children, and Young Children

		Married Women			Single Women		
	Year	without children	with children	with young children	without children	with children	with young children
Conservative Regime							
Belgium	1997	3.6 (5)	6.4 (6)	9.0 (7)	16.1 (8)	11.6 (4)	-
France	1994	3.9 (6)	5.6 (5)	6.9 (6)	11.7 (6)	22.8 (5)	33.9 (3)
Germany	1994	1.8 (4)	5.2 (4)	6.4 (4a)	13.7 (7)	43.1 (9)	-
Netherlands	1994	4.6 (8)	6.9 (7)	6.4 (4b)	9.2 (4)	25.0 (6)	-
Social Democratic Regime							
Finland	1995	1.3 (1b)	1.5 (1b)	1.6 (1a)	6.7 (2a)	3.2 (1)	-
Norway	1995	1.2 (1a)	1.7 (1c)	2.0 (3)	6.9 (2b)	10.9 (3)	13.7 (2)
Sweden	1995	1.5 (1c)	1.4 (1a)	1.7 (1b)	4.9 (1)	5.7 (2)	9.0 (1)
Liberal Regime							
Canada	1994	4.2 (7)	8.7 (8)	10.7 (8)	17.4 (9)	39.7 (8)	52.2 (5)
United Kingdom	1995	5.3 (10)	11.9 (9a)	15.1 (9)	10.6 (5)	38.5 (7)	50.0 (4)
United States	1994	4.9 (9)	12.1 (9b)	15.4 (10)	18.6 (10)	48.9 (10)	61.1 (6)
AVERAGE		3.2	6.2	7.5	11.6	24.9	36.7
Conservative Regime							
Germany	2000	2.5 (4)	2.2 (1d)	4.1 (4)	18.8 (7)	31.6 (6)	-
Netherlands	1999	6.4 (7)	7.7 (5)	8.7 (5)	9.1 (2b)	30.9 (5)	-
Social Democratic Regime							
Finland	2000	1.1 (1)	1.9 (1a)	2.1 (1a)	8.1 (1)	7.7 (1)	-
Norway	2000	1.4 (2)	1.9 (1b)	2.3 (1b)	9.1 (2a)	10.5 (2a)	19.5 (1)
Sweden	2000	2.1 (3)	2.1 (1c)	3.1 (3)	9.4 (4)	10.5 (2b)	21.9 (2)
Liberal Regime							
United Kingdom	1999	4.0 (5)	8.7 (6)	11.6 (6)	11.9 (5)	29.2 (4)	38.3 (3)
United States	2000	5.3 (6)	12.1 (7)	15.1 (7)	18.1 (6)	42.8 (7)	48.7 (4)
AVERAGE		3.3	5.2	6.7	12.1	23.3	32.1

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent country rank from lowest poverty rate (1) to the highest

Table 5. Post-Tax-and-Transfer Poverty Rates

	Lower for Single Mothers	Higher for Single Mothers
Lower for Married Mothers	Finland, France, Norway, Sweden	Germany
Higher for Married Mothers	Belgium	Canada, Netherlands, UK, US

Table 6: Employment Rates for Married and Single Mothers, Early 1990s

		Married/Cohabiting Mothers				Single Mothers			
		Full-time	Part-time	All employed	% Employed who are Full-time	Full-time	Part-time	All employed	% Employed who are Full-time
Conservative Regime									
Belgium	1992	36	22	61	59	52	16	68	76
Finland	1993	62	8	70	89	61	4	65	94
France	1992	49	20	68	72	67	15	82	82
Germany	1992	21	20	41	51	28	12	40	70
Netherlands	1994	13	39	52	25	16	24	40	40
Social Democratic Regime									
Norway	1991	40	37	77	52	44	7	51	72
Sweden	1994	42	38	80	53	41	29	70	59
Liberal Regime									
United Kingdom	1990-92	21	41	62	34	17	24	41	41
United States	1992	45	19	64	70	47	13	60	78
AVERAGE		36.56	27.11	63.89	56.11	41.44	16.00	57.44	68.00

Source: Chiara Saraceno. 1997. "Family Change, Family Policies and the Restructuring of Welfare." *Family, Market, and Community: Equity and Efficiency in Social Policy*. OECD.

Table 7. Labor Participation Rates for Mothers

	High for Single Mothers	Low for Single Mothers
High for Married Mothers	Finland, France, Sweden, US	Norway
Low for Married Mothers	Belgium	Germany, Netherlands, UK

Table 8. The Strength of Family Policies

Strength of Policy	*Parental Leave*	*Childcare Policy for Children <3*	*Childcare Policy for Children 3-6*
Weak	Canada UK US	Canada Germany Netherlands UK US	Canada Germany Netherlands UK US
Strong	Belgium Finland France Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden	Belgium Finland France Norway Sweden	Belgium Finland France Norway Sweden

Source: Janet C. Gornick, Marcia K. Meyers, and Katherin E. Ross. 1997. "Supporting the Employment of Mothers: Policy Variation Across Fourteen Welfare States." *Journal of European Social Policy.* 7(1): 45-70 and Janet Gornick and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. *Families that Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment*. New York: Russell Sage.

Table 9. Leitner's Model of De-Familialization and Familialism

	Defamilialization	
Familialization	Strong	Weak
Strong	Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden, Norway	Netherlands, Germany
Weak		Canada, US, UK

Figure One: Poverty Rates by Policy Approach



Appendix A: Numbers of Cases for Categories by Nation

Country	Year	Married/ Cohabiting Women Without Children	Married/ Cohabiting Women With Children	Married/ Cohabiting Women With Young Children	Single Women Without Children	Single Women With Children	Single Women With Young Children
Belgium	1997	(1061)	(1261)	(541)	(35)	(111)	(19)
Canada	1994	(6864)	(10771)	(4859)	(2744)	(1958)	(702)
Finland	1995	(1908)	(3297)	(1406)	(539)	(287)	(50)
France	1994	(1885)	(3506)	(1641)	(754)	(393)	(107)
Germany	1994	(1333)	(1899)	(738)	(363)	(186)	(45)
Netherland	1994	(1171)	(1569)	(715)	(356)	(130)	(27)
Norway	1995	(1964)	(2979)	(1261)	(454)	(267)	(82)
Sweden	1995	(2492)	(3899)	(2001)	(885)	(471)	(194)
United Kindom	1995	(1202)	(1747)	(863)	(434)	(398)	(144)
United States	1994	(8540)	(14817)	(7087)	(4489)	(4081)	(1453)
AVERAGE		(2842)	(4575)	(2111)	(1105)	(828)	(282)
Finland	2000	(2396)	(3411)	(1384)	(544)	(255)	(46)
Germany	2000	(1228)	(1660)	(678)	(384)	(180)	(41)
Netherland	1999	(1132)	(1437)	(663)	(294)	(104)	(13)
Norway	2000	(2857)	(4282)	(1862)	(712)	(428)	(102)
Sweden	2000	(2371)	(3349)	(1388)	(846)	(400)	(89)
United Kingdom	1999	(4173)	(5376)	(2497)	(1351)	(1000)	(292)
United States	2000	(7915)	(12673)	(5838)	(3910)	(2706)	(886)
AVERAGE		(3717)	(5731)	(2612)	(1515)	(725)	(210)