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**Electoral Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties:
A Subnational Analysis of
Western European Elections in the 1990s**

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ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR EXTREME RIGHT-WING PARTIES: A SUB-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN THE 1990s

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INTRODUCTION

The recent successes of Jean Marie Le Pen's National Front, Jörg Haider's Freedom Party and Pim Fortuyn's "List" Party, to name just a few, have generated a great deal of anxiety among those concerned about the maintenance of liberal values in European societies. In particular, many commentators point to the xenophobic rhetoric these politicians and their supporters espouse, including Fortuyn's book entitled *Against the Islamisation of Dutch Culture* and Le Pen's claim that France's economic problems are linked to immigration. Others suggest that these electoral successes spring from poor economic performance or the weakening of Europe's established political parties on the left and the right. Whatever the explanation, the sudden surge of support for extreme right parties (ERPs) since the 1980s challenges our understanding of democratic politics in Europe, presenting researchers with the task of formulating new hypotheses seeking to explain these developments.

Although existing research contributes a great deal to our understanding of the rise of ERPs, no single theory has come to dominate the academic literature. At least three major weaknesses exist in most of the work to date. First, quantitative comparative studies focus almost exclusively on the nation-state, obscuring critical intra-country variance in votes for ERPs, concentrations of immigrants, economic conditions and other significant variables. It is well-known, for example, that the spatial distribution of electoral support for Austria's Freedom Party, Italy's Northern League and the Flemish Block in Belgium varies widely, yet few studies explore this dimension. Even those studies that do examine intra-national variation in support for ERPs tend to focus on single countries (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989) or at most a handful (Givens, 2000 and

2002). Second, although much of the literature finds a link between national economic conditions, immigration and support for ERPs, studies to date have focused exclusively on unemployment, neglecting other measures of economic distress such as poverty and income inequality (see Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, 1993; Anderson, 1996; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Givens, 2002; and Golder, 2003a). Finally, despite recent evidence suggesting that welfare-state generosity reduces support for ERPs (Swank and Betz, 2003), little effort has been made to confirm these findings at the regional level. This last point is particularly relevant since ERPs often espouse "welfare chauvinism," seeking to limit the benefits of the social welfare state to the native-born population (Kitschelt, 1995).

In addressing these gaps in the literature, we take advantage of constituency-level electoral data (from Caramani, 2000) to compute regional vote shares for ERPs in national elections in nine countries in the 1990s: Austria (1995), Belgium (1995), Denmark (1994), Finland (1995), France (1997), Germany (1994), Italy (1996), Spain (1993) and the U.K. (1997). These data enable us to measure institutional factors such as the proportionality of electoral systems at the regional level, factors which previous research suggests are positively associated with electoral support for ERPs. In addition, we estimate sub-national levels of poverty, income inequality and welfare generosity as well as such widely examined variables as immigration and percent unemployed. With respect to methods, we employ Tobit analysis, which accounts for the "left-censoring" of the dependent variable (see Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 513; Golder, 2003a: 435), and include country dummy variables to capture unspecified country-level effects manifested in spatial autocorrelation.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In seeking to explain electoral support for ERPs, researchers have identified four major variables: foreign immigration; economic distress, most commonly estimated by levels of unemployment; institutional factors such as the proportionality of electoral systems and the weakening of established party systems; and the policies of the social welfare state.

Immigration

The most widely accepted explanation for the success of ERPs suggests that they are a response to the growing "multi-culturalization" of West European societies (see Kitschelt, 1995: 1). In this view, the rise of the extreme right is a response to the perceived threat to national identity caused by rising numbers of immigrants. In a more complex formulation, levels of immigration are linked to levels of unemployment in such a way that high immigration favors the electoral success of ERPs only when economic conditions are negative.[1] A few other scholars, however, have hypothesized that high levels of immigration in a country or region might actually dampen support for ERPs (see Perrineau, 1985). This argument is based on the "contact hypothesis," which suggests that individuals living in areas with high concentrations of immigrants view them as less threatening than residents of regions who rarely have the opportunity to interact with immigrants on a personal level (see Husbands, 2003: 57).

Most of these conclusions have, of course, been based on national-level studies. Of the relatively few empirical studies that have been conducted at the regional level, none has found an unambiguous link between immigration and ERPs (see Golder, 2003a: 440-441). For example, Givens (2002: 153) finds that support for ERPs is greater in

[1] Golder terms this the "materialist" hypothesis (2003a: 439).

Austrian and French regions having higher numbers of immigrants, but not in German states. In a review of the regional-level literature, Mudde (1999) comments on the "absence of a clear cut relation between the number of immigrants and the electoral success of ERPs in certain territorial units" (185).

In addition to these mixed empirical findings, especially at the sub-national level (see Mayer and Perrineau, 1989; Martin, 1996), there are other reasons to question previous studies showing a direct link between immigration and support for ERPs. One of the weaknesses of prior research in this area is that it relies exclusively on a single measure of immigration: the percent of the population that is foreign-born. Such measures of stocks make no distinction between newly arriving immigrants and persons who arrived in earlier waves of migration, often decades ago, and have long since become citizens. An alternative measure taps immigration flows rather than stocks, capturing only the proportion of the population that has recently arrived. If support for ERPs were partially a response to increasing ethnic diversity it would seem to be more theoretically defensible to examine immigration flows rather than stocks, although the vast majority of research in this area fails to make any distinction. Furthermore, neither immigration stocks nor flows assess individuals' attitudes towards immigration; studies in this area assume that such demographic trends affect individual opinions. Accordingly, this study will focus on immigration flows and, for a subset of regions, explore the relationship between attitudes towards immigration and support for ERPs.

Economic Distress

It has been widely argued that the rise of the extreme right can be traced to the growth of unemployment in Western Europe since the 1970s. Empirical tests of this

hypothesis are ubiquitous. While this argument has some intuitive appeal and the rhetoric used by extreme-right political leaders such as Le Pen often highlights unemployment, theorizing about the linkage between unemployment levels and support for ERPs has also been somewhat questionable. Some researchers suggest that high unemployment rates "reveal mediocre economic performance that provides an especially propitious context for political crusades of the form favoured by the extreme right, whose electoral support we therefore expect to increase directly with unemployment" (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 508). However, the question remains why voters would choose to support the extreme right over social democratic parties, whose core message has always been full employment. Some researchers cite literature on economic voting, which finds a linkage between poor national economic conditions and lack of support for incumbent parties (Lewis-Beck, 1988). However, as Golder (2003a: 439) argues, such findings "do not explain why voters who wish to punish incumbent parties should vote for extreme right parties over any other opposition party." The most recent theorizing in this area argues that unemployment, and presumably negative economic conditions in general, only matter when they occur *along with* high levels of immigration from abroad (Golder, 2003a: 439).[2] Indeed, this approach is more consistent with the political rhetoric of the extreme right, which often blames negative economic condition on foreign migrants.

This sometimes tortured theorizing is matched by contradictory empirical findings. For example, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 516) examine 103 Western European elections between 1970 and 1990 in 16 countries and conclude that "support for the extreme right wing is a function of electoral threshold, the effective number of

[2] Jackman and Volpert do argue that immigration is of theoretical importance but fail to investigate any direct effects on support of ERPs (1996: 507-508).

parties, and the rate of unemployment." Other scholars, however, find no—and even contradictory—support for these conclusions, and a large debate has erupted (see Knigge, 1998; Swank and Betz, 1996; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, 1993). Recently, Golder (2003a) examined 165 elections in Western Europe between 1970 and 2000 and, through the introduction of an interaction term, found that high unemployment stimulates support for ERPs only when immigration is also high. In a regional-level study, Givens (2002: 153) found that unemployment is associated with higher support for ERPs in Austria and France but not in Germany. She did not, however, include a broadly comparative fixed-effects model that pools all the regions together.

Despite the attention that economic crises receive in this literature, there has been little effort to determine whether negative economic conditions other than unemployment, either alone or in conjunction with high immigration, are associated with support for ERPs. For example, no studies have, to our knowledge, examined whether higher poverty or income inequality are associated with support for right-wing extremism.

Political Explanations

While structural factors such as unemployment and immigration loom large in the literature, there is no dearth of political explanations for the rise of ERPs in the 1980s. The most prominent explore the proportionality of the electoral system and the weakening of European party systems.

"Duverger's Law" states that single-member majoritarian districts tend to foster a two-party system while proportional representation fosters multipartism (Duverger, 1954). In this vein, researchers have examined the relationship between the

proportionality of electoral systems and support for ERPs, hypothesizing that the more proportional the system the greater the electoral support for ERPs. The logic behind this hypothesis is well established: it simply states that incentives for political elites to form ERPs and for voters to cast their ballots for them are greater when the probability of winning a seat is higher. Thus, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 516) find that lower "effective electoral thresholds," defined as the minimum percentage of the vote a party needs to win a seat in the legislature, are associated with increased support for ERPs.[3] In a similar vein, Golder (2003a) concludes that the number of seats allocated at the first tier of an electoral system (known as district magnitude) and the number of seats allocated at the upper tier are positively associated with electoral support for ERPs (see also Swank and Betz, 2003). However, all of these studies operate at the national level: sub-national studies on this topic have yet to include measures of electoral proportionality in their models (Golder, 2003a: 461).

Another political explanation of the rise of ERPs relates to the weakening of European party systems beginning in the 1970s, resulting in a strategic shift of left and right parties toward the center in many countries and the alleged growing alienation of voters at either extreme of the ideological spectrum (Kitschelt, 1995: 17-18). This newly opened ideological "space" within electorates has, it is claimed, altered the strategic calculus of political elites and provided an opportunity for ERPs. As put by Schain, Zolberg and Hossay (2002: 12), "weaknesses in the party system, marked by a decline of confidence by voters in existing parties…may be exploited by far-right parties." In this

[3] Via the construction of an interaction between electoral thresholds and the number of parties in the system, they find that electoral thresholds are only relevant when the number of parties is higher (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 515-516). Golder challenges this interpretation, arguing that proportionality does not affect support for ERPs (2003b).

view, it is impossible to explain the rise and continued success of right-wing extreme parties without reference to political factors; structural variables are "necessary but not sufficient for the emergence of radical right parties" (Schain, Zolberg and Hossay, 2002: 6). Although the effect of political variables has mostly been tested at the individual level using survey data, Swank and Betz's cross-national pooled time-series found that the weakness of moderate right parties is linked to higher support for ERPs (2003: 239). In a somewhat related argument, Givens notes that the demise of established party systems coincides with demobilization of European electorates and suggests that "[a] radical right party offers an option for those who might otherwise abstain from voting…Thus, regions with high levels of abstention may also have high levels of support for the radical right" (2002: 149). In fact, in her sub-national study of Austrian, French and German regions, Givens (2002: 156) found that higher rates of non-voting are associated with higher support for ERPs. In sum, this body of research would lead us to expect that the electoral weakness of left and moderate right parties and higher levels of non-voting are all positively associated with the electoral strength of ERPs.

Welfare Generosity

Kitschelt (1995) suggests that a significant source of support for the extreme right arises from voters' fears about the future of the social welfare state. In his view, "welfare chauvinism" manifests itself politically in the form of nativist and ultra-nationalist ideologies and movements that arise when levels of welfare generosity and foreign migration are simultaneously high: "The welfare state is presented as a system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it. Immigrants are depicted as free-loaders who do not contribute to the

system but claim its benefits" (Kitschelt, 1995: 22). Following the logic of this view, it could be argued that when one has little to lose from immigration in terms of social transfers (since what one receives from the state is relatively small), one has little to fear, and thus may find extreme right-wing appeals less enticing. Recent research, however, concludes the opposite, that "universalistic, generous and employment-oriented welfare states directly depress RRWP [radical right wing populist] party political support" (Swank and Betz, 2003: 239). In short, there are competing hypotheses about the role of the social welfare state in the ERP literature. Significantly, little effort has been made to test these hypotheses using measures that directly assess welfare state generosity, creating a considerable gap within this literature. Accordingly, this study estimates the degree to which public policies redistribute income from the rich to the poor.

DATA AND METHODS

Identifying Extreme Right Parties

It has been suggested that ERPs "present as many differences as similarities" (Schain, Zolberg and Hossay, 2002: 6). The chief distinction that is often made is between "neofascist" parties, which trace their origins to the prewar period, and "populist" or "postindustrial" parties that emerged in the 1980s (Ignazi, 2002: 27-28). Since recent research suggests that the motivations of voters for populist and neofascist parties differ (Golder, 2003a: 460), we focus on both ERPs as a whole and on each of these sub-varieties in the empirical analysis that follows. Our classification scheme is listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The percentage of valid votes cast for these parties is calculated for each region in our study. Ideally, we would focus on the lowest level (first tier) of the electoral system. Unfortunately, economic and demographic data are unavailable for most of our countries at this level. These data are, however, available according to the 'Niveaux d'Unités Territoriales Statistiques' (NUTS) used by the EU, which in most cases allow us to measure support for ERPs at a higher level of aggregation. Accordingly, we examine ERP vote shares in Austrian Regions, Belgian Federal States, Danish, Finnish and French Regions, German "Länder," Italian Regions, Spanish Autonomous Communities and Great British Administrative Regions.

Electoral Proportionality: District Magnitude and Upper-tier seats

Since we do not have data for all of our variables at the first tier of the electoral system, we compute the *average magnitude* as the total number of first-tier seats allocated in the region divided by the number of electoral districts comprising the region. For example, there were 20 first-tier electoral districts (*circonscription*) in Belgium in 1995. The number of seats allocated in each district varied from 22 in Brussels to 2 in Waremme. Since we must aggregate at the level of the Belgian Federal State, we simply take the average number of seats (magnitude) of all the first-tier electoral districts located in the state or region. Brussels is a first-tier district and thus its average district magnitude is equal to 22, the number of seats allocated at that level. Waremme is part of Wallonia and thus we average its number of seats along with the other first-tier districts in that region, which equals 5.9 (59 total seats divided by 10 districts). In the explanatory analyses that follow we take the log of this value. Using this approach, which is similar to other definitions (see Golder, 2003a), all single-member plurality systems have average

district magnitudes equal to one. These data have been collected from various national sources, listed in our references.

Computing the number of seats allocated at the *upper tier* of the electoral system is straightforward in Germany, since our regional observations match the boundaries of upper-tier electoral districts--the German "Länder."[4] In Italy, these boundaries are often exact, but in cases having more than one upper-level district in a region, such as Lombardy and Sicily, we simply take the average. We also do this for Austria. Denmark is the only difficult case we faced in calculating upper tier seats. It is only divided into 3 upper-tier districts, although we have comparable information for 14 regions according to the NUTS scheme. Accordingly, we distributed upper-tier seats among the 14 regions according to the average number of lower-tier seats that are allocated within them.[5] We do not make any distinction between automatic allocation of seats and use of a remainder system. Belgium, Finland, France, Spain and the U.K. do not allocate any seats at the upper-level.

Party System Weakness

Testing many of Kitschelt's and others' hypotheses concerning the relationship between strategic ideological shifts and party competitiveness poses some challenges in a region-level study such as ours. Nonetheless, we seek to tap this dimension by measuring the strength of "established" or "moderate" *right parties* and *left parties*, hypothesizing that lower levels of support for these parties will be associated with greater support for ERPs. We report the list of parties in Table A1 in our Appendix.

[4] For the case of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, we were forced to add them together and then compute the average.
[5] We also added Fredricksbourg Counties to Copenhagen & Fredicksbourg Metro areas.

Finally, we measure a region's rate of *voter abstention* as the percentage of eligible voters who did not participate in the national election by casting either valid, invalid or blank ballots.[6]

Foreign and Domestic Migration

We use two different indicators of immigration in our analyses, both of which measure flows, not stocks, in the year of the national election.[7] The first is annual *immigration* from abroad. Unfortunately, these data are missing for France, the UK and most of the Finnish regions, and the analyses including this variable necessarily exclude these regions. In addition to this direct measure, we also employ a variable measuring the regional *net migration rate*, which is computed as the percentage of a region's population not attributable to natural factors, i.e. birth and death rates (Eurostat, 2002: 45-46). *Net migration* rates have the advantage of being available for all of our countries. Although this variable, by including inter-regional population movements, does not directly measure immigration from abroad, it does capture demographic change that may be an important determinant of rising support for populist parties. Indeed, increasing levels of domestic migration in northern Italy prompted the Northern League to employ an anti-southerner, not strictly anti-foreigner, rhetoric to attract supporters. The data are from Eurostat's New Chronos REGIO series (2003).[8]

Attitudes towards immigration

[6] The denominator in this measure differs from that used in our measure of votes for ERPs, which was total votes cast, since protest voters often indicate their frustrations by casting blank ballots.
[7] Due to missing data, we had to use the previous year's figures for immigration from abroad for Austria and Germany.
[8] Data were accessed with the support of the Government of Luxembourg's Central Service for Statistics and Economic Studies (STATEC), June 2003.

The *Special Release of the Eurobarometer Survey: European Election Studies 1994* includes several questions gauging individual attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. We selected the most direct question concerning immigration: "Do you think immigrants and/or political asylum seekers are a big problem for (OUR COUNTRY), or are they not a big problem?"[9] We recoded these responses so that a *"big problem"* was equal to "1" while all other valid responses were recoded to zero. This survey also includes information about respondents' regions of residence according to the NUTS statistical scheme. Unfortunately, we were unable to include Austria, Denmark or Finland in our exploratory attitudinal analyses, since they were not members of the European Union at the time the survey was conducted. Moreover, regional data for the United Kingdom were not sufficiently comparable to be included.[10] Finally, due to the small number of observations within some of the regions, we were unable to include all of the regions examined in our previous analyses.[11]

Measures of Economic Distress

Regional *unemployment* rates are defined as the percentage of the economically active population that is currently unemployed, as measured in the year of the national election.[12] These data were computed using Eurostat's New Chronos REGIO series (2003).

[9] We also initially included the following question in our analyses: "Generally speaking, how do you feel about foreigners living in (OUR COUNTRY): are there too many, a lot but not too many, or not many?" We found that the two questions were highly correlated ($r > .80$) and since our results are similar whichever question we used we only report results for immigration as a "big problem."

[10] We decided to include Spain despite that fact that the survey was conducted once year prior to the national election we examine (1993).

[11] We selected regions where the unweighted number of observations was greater than 20, which resulted in 8 regions being excluded. The median number of regional observations thus equaled 61 while the mean equaled 94.

[12] In Finland, we had to use the previous year's figures.

The measures of *poverty* and *income inequality* used in this paper were estimated from the Luxembourg Income Study's (LIS) microdata archive (see http://www.lisproject.org).[13] Data are available for Austria (1994), Belgium (1992), Denmark (1994), Finland (1995), France (1994), Germany (1994), Italy (1995), Spain (1990) and the United Kingdom (1995). In this paper we adopt a national-relative standard for determining the poverty line, which is computed as the proportion of the region's population below 50% of the national median income.[14]

In addition to our measure of poverty, we estimate income inequality within regions using the Gini coefficient computed at the regional level. Unlike poverty rates, which focus on the low end of the income distribution, the Gini coefficient has the advantage of focusing on the entire distribution (see Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995). It ranges between zero, which denotes perfect equality, and one, which indicates perfect inequality.

In assessing welfare state generosity, we measure poverty rates and Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers and then compute the percent reduction in these values via government intervention. More specifically, *poverty reduction* is computed as the pre-tax and -transfer poverty rate (market income poverty) minus the post-tax and –transfer poverty rate (disposable income poverty) divided by the market

[13] All of these measures are based on total non-zero disposable income at the household level. This includes gross wages and earnings, earnings from self-employment, cash property income, pensions and social transfers, and deducts taxes and mandatory employee contributions. In order to account for differences in household size, we transform total household incomes into equivalent incomes by dividing the former by the square root of the number of household members (see Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995: 21). Furthermore, as we are concerned with distribution of incomes among persons, rather than households, the results refer to 'person weights,' which equal the household weight times the number of household members. For more information, see the discussion of LIS income variables and methods at http://www.lisproject.org/.

[14] For a summary discussion of the merits of relative versus absolute measures of poverty, see Brady (2003). See Jesuit, Rainwater and Smeeding for a discussion of regional poverty measures (2003).

income poverty rate, yielding what we call the *percent reduction in poverty*. *Income redistribution* is measured in the same fashion, as the percent reduction in the Gini coefficient resulting from taxes and government transfers.

Interaction Effects

As noted previously, a few recent studies find support for the notion that there is an interaction between levels of immigration and unemployment such that when the two are combined, support for ERPs increases. Accordingly, we compute multiplicative interactions between each of our immigration and economic distress variables and include them in our models.

Methods

In our empirical analyses we employ Tobit maximum likelihood estimations, which account for the "left-censoring" of the dependent variable at zero, since most of the regions we examine did not record at votes for ERPs (see Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 513; Golder, 2003a: 435), and include country dummy variables to capture unspecified country-level effects that would otherwise be manifested in spatial autocorrelation. More specifically, we estimate the following models predicting regional vote shares for populist parties, neofascist parties and their combined total share. We interchange *net migration* and *immigration* so that they are not simultaneously included in the models. We begin with a "base model" excluding our alternative measures of economic distress and welfare generosity and add these variables individually in separate equations.[15]

$$VOTESHARE_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UPPERTIER_i + \beta_2 LOGMAG_i +$$
$$\beta_3 ABSTENT_i + \beta_4 LEFTVOTE_i + \beta_5 MODRIGHT_i + \beta_6 UNEMP_i +$$

[15] We do not report the results of all the following equations in our discussion for sake of clarity. All of our findings, however, are included in the Appendix.

$\beta_7 IMMIG_i \mid \beta_7 NETMIG_i +$

$\beta_8 BIGPROBLEM_i +$

$\beta_9 UNEMPIMMIG_i \mid \beta_9 UNEMPNETMIG_i +$

$\beta_{10\text{-}17} COUNTRYDUMMIES_i + \varepsilon_i$

BASE MODELS PLUS LIS VARIABLES:

$+ \beta_{18} INEQUAL_i \mid \beta_{18} INCOMERED_i \mid \beta_{18} POVERTY_i \mid {}_{18} POVRED_i$

VOTESHARE, our dependent variable, measures the percentage of valid votes cast for populist parties, neofascist parties and their combined total within a region. UPPERTIER measures the number of seats allocated at the upper tier of the region while LOGMAG is the logged value of the average number of seats allocated at the first tier. The percentage of the eligible population who did not vote is measured by the variable ABSTENT. LEFTVOTE measures the percentage of votes cast for left parties and MODRIGHT measures the share of votes cast for moderate right parties in the region. UNEMP estimates regional unemployment as a percentage of the economically active population. IMMIG measures the percentage of the region's population comprised of immigrants from abroad while NETMIG estimates the share of a region's population comprised of foreign and domestic migrants. BIGPROBLEM is the percentage of respondents who said that immigrants and/or asylum seekers were a "big problem" in their country. Due to missing data, this variable is only included for a subset of regions. UNEMPIMMIG and UNEMPNETMIG are multiplicative interactions between UNEMP and IMMIG and UNEMP and NETMIG. We include country dummy variables, termed COUNTRYDUMMIES, in our analysis with Italy being the reference country. In

analyses including IMMIG, we exclude the dummy variables for France and the UK, since we are missing data for those cases. INEQUAL measures the regional Gini coefficient and INCOMERED estimates the percentage reduction in the Gini coefficient due to government transfers and taxes. POVERTY calculates the percentage of persons within a region having incomes equal to less than half of the national median income and POVRED estimates the percent reduction in POVERTY due to taxes and transfers.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the percentage of votes cast for populist and neofascist parties for our sample of countries. The number of regions examined within each country is also reported. As shown in this table, there was considerable variation in the level of support for ERPs both between and within countries in the mid-1990s. For example, there was no support for either populist or neofascist ERPs in Finland and Spain in the mid-1990s. In Austria, on the other hand, populist ERPs averaged 29.4% of the vote across the three regions,[16] ranging from 25% in the West to almost 34% in South Austria, which is Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party's electoral stronghold. Regional differences in support for populist parties were highest in Italy, ranging from no support for the Northern League outside northern Italy to almost a third of the votes in Veneto. The average percentage of valid votes cast across the 116 regions we examine is 5.9%.

The bottom half of Table 2 indicates that electoral support for neofascist ERPs is not nearly as strong as support for the populist ERPs. In fact, only two countries in our

[16] The national averages of the regions do not equal the national percentage vote total since we do not weight regions by population size.

sample recorded any significant votes at all for these parties: Italy and the UK.[17] In the former case, support for neofascist parties averaged 2.2%, with a maximum level of support of 7.9% in Molise. The average level of support for neofascism in the UK was much lower, averaging just over one-tenth of one percent.[18]

Before turning to our explanatory analysis, we present summary statistics for our measures of immigration in Table 3. The top half of the table reports regional Net Migration Rates and indicates that, on average, just over one-tenth of one percent of the population is comprised of recent migrants in the 115 regions we examine. Germany reported the largest average level of positive net migration while Finnish regions, on average, experienced net migration outflows. Of more interest is the fact that there was a good deal of variation in migration rates within the countries we examine. For example, the net migration rate in Languedoc-Roussillon in the south of France was positive and equaled about one and one-half percent (the highest rate among the regions we examine) while the capital region of Ile-de-France experienced a population loss of just under one percent due to migration.

The bottom half of Table 3 focuses specifically on immigration from abroad, for which data are available for 74 regions we examine. Rioja, Spain, which had an immigration rate equal to 0.01 percent, experienced the lowest level of recent immigration from abroad of any region in our sample. At the other extreme, the immigration rate in the German state of Schleswig-Holstein was equal to almost two and half percent in 1994. This table also shows that immigration from abroad varied

[17] According to official sources, no votes for the German or Spanish neofascist parties listed in Table 1 were recorded in Spain (1993) or Germany (1994).
[18] Unfortunately, data on immigration and migration are missing for London and thus it is excluded from the following analyses.

considerably within each of the countries we examine. For example, the rate of immigration in Mecklenburg, an east German Land, was almost two percentage points lower than in Schleswig-Holstein. In sum, national estimates of net migration and immigration from abroad, as well as variation in support for ERPs, fail to capture substantial spatial variation within countries.[19]

Tobit Analyses

Table 4 reports the results of the Tobit maximum-likelihood estimations with the combined share of votes for ERPs as the dependent variable. We report the results of four equations, beginning with the "baseline" models in the first two columns of the table. The results for all of our equations are reported in the Appendix. All of the reported equations include country dummy variables (with Italy as the reference country). For the sake of presentation, we do not report each of the coefficients for these variables. The overall explanatory power of the models is rather moderate, explaining roughly one-third of the variance in regional support for ERPs.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

We find no evidence that greater proportionality of electoral systems within regions positively affect vote shares for ERPs. Few coefficients approached statistical significance and when they did so in our exploratory analyses of attitudes towards immigration, the relationship was in the opposite of the predicted direction. This finding was somewhat surprising, given the conclusions of recent research at the national level (see Golder, 2003a). One possibility is that electoral proportionality enables ERPs to achieve an electoral breakthrough, which happened in the 1980s, but does not necessarily

[19] We report summary figures for all of our variables in the Appendix.

nurture the continued success and expansion of these parties captured in our 1990s analysis.

On the other hand, our results in Table 4 indicate that the shares of the left vote and moderate right vote are negatively associated with support for ERPs, lending support to the "party system weakness" hypothesis. This conclusion is slightly tempered by the fact that the moderate right party vote is not a statistically significant predictor in either of the equations including immigration rather than net migration, probably due to the exclusion of the French, British and most of the Finnish regions (equations (2) and (4)).[20] Interestingly, the regional results also suggest that immigration flows and, to some extent, unemployment are negatively associated with support for ERPs. Regarding unemployment, it seems reasonable that support for socialist and other leftist parties rather than votes for ERPs are higher in these regions, although we do control for the electoral strength of left-parties and still find a negative association. In order to test this hypothesis, we also predicted vote shares for left parties in regression analyses (not shown). In fact, our analyses confirm that higher levels of regional unemployment are associated with larger vote shares for left parties.

The negative relationship between our immigration variables and the vote share for ERPs is more difficult to interpret. It would suggest support for a "social contact" hypothesis and thus indicate that once native-born persons come into contact with immigrants they become less likely to support xenophobic political agendas. It could also mean that a phenomenon similar to "white flight" in many US cities is occurring such that those persons most hostile towards immigrants simply relocate to other communities

[20] Multicollinearity poses a potential problem to our analyses. We discuss this along with other diagnostics in the Appendix.

where fewer reside (Husbands, 2002: 56-57). However, as our exploratory analysis of attitudes towards immigration will demonstrate (see Table 7), these conclusions are improbable since we do find evidence that higher rates of immigration are linked to negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Interestingly, the interaction terms between *unemployment* and each of our immigration variables do lend some support to previous findings indicating that when unemployment and immigration are both high, support for ERPs tends to be greater. In this type of interactive effect, known as "interference interaction" (see Neter et al., 1996: 310-11), the effect of variables individually is mitigated when they occur together.

Finally, examining equations (3) and (4) in Table 4 there is some evidence that the generosity of the social welfare state affects support for ERPs since regions where the social welfare state is most successful at reducing poverty tend to vote for ERPs in larger percentages than those less-generous regions. The results in the following table, which examines populist and neofascist parties separately, lend further weight to this conclusion. This offers some support to Kitschelt's notion of "welfare-chauvinism" and contradicts the claim that the more generous social welfare systems tend to dampen support for ERPs.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Table 5 includes the results of equations predicting support for populist and neofascist parties separately. As is evident in this table, when we examine populist and neofascist parties independently we find that the political factors promoting greater support for these parties differ considerably. For example, vote shares for populist parties seem to come at the expense of both the right and the left while neofascist parties do not

similarly challenge the established right for votes. Separate analyses for France, Italy and the UK (not shown) lend support to these findings. This would seem to indicate that populists do, in fact, fare better where the party system is weaker; they are taking advantage of the political opening to which Kitschelt refers. In addition, higher rates of non-voting are associated with lower support for populist parties, while the opposite effect is evident for neofascist ones. In other words, populist parties are stronger in highly mobilized regions; neofascist parties do better when fewer people participate in elections. Finally, although our models do a better job of explaining regional variation in vote shares for neofascist parties than for populist ones or the two combined (since the explained variance for the first is roughly twice as much as for the latter two), this is most likely due to mulitcollinearity, which is discussed in more detail in our Appendix. Overall, these findings indicate that the regional political factors underlying support for these types of ERPs differ considerably and that distinguishing between the two types is thus essential for empirical analyses (see also Golder, 2003a). Indeed, the mere fact that the historical timing of the emergence of these parties, though not necessarily the timing of their electoral breakthroughs, often differs by decades supports our general interpretation.

Immigration and economic distress, as evidenced in unemployment, are also related to the strength of populist and neofascist parties in different ways. Findings for populist parties alone mirror findings for the two parties combined, as shown in Table 4: higher immigration and unemployment are associated with less support for populist parties. However, when both immigration and unemployment are higher, measured by the interaction between the two, vote shares for populist parties tend to be larger than

they would be without the interaction. In other words, the negative effects of immigration and unemployment on populist parties' vote shares are less sizeable when both these variables are higher. None of the coefficients for this interactive term and none of their additive components attain statistical significance when examining support for neofascist parties. In short, it does not seem that these factors have any influence whatsoever on votes for neofascist parties.

The results in equations (3) and (4) of Table 5 suggest that the generosity of the social welfare state, measured by the percent reduction in poverty, is positively associated with support for populist parties but unrelated to support for neofascist ones. This would seem to indicate that as the economic benefits at stake increase, the "welfare chauvinist" appeals by populist parties become more appealing. Once again, however, this is not true for neofascist parties, furthering the notion that the underlying political support for these two types of parties differs.

Thus far we have examined the effects of immigration and migration levels on support for extreme right parties. One possible line of criticism of our approach suggests that the crucial link between support for ERPs and immigration is voters' attitudes towards immigration and immigrants, which are largely independent of actual immigration stocks (see e.g., Citrin and Sides, 2004). Indeed, the literature to date in this area simply assumes that immigration levels and flows are linked to individual attitudes (see e.g. Golder, 2003: 440-41) such that higher levels of immigration foster anti-immigrant attitudes. Is this really the case? In the following analysis we seek to address these concerns by directly measuring attitudes towards immigration. These analyses will show that voters' attitudes are linked to immigration flows, though only to a moderate

degree, but that unlike actual immigration rates, negative orientations towards immigration tend to foster support for ERPs.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

As indicated in Table 6, in general Europeans were strongly opposed to immigration in 1994 as just more than two-thirds indicated that immigration was a "big problem." There was, however, a good deal of variance in attitudes towards immigration both between and within countries. For example, across the countries the percentage of persons indicating that immigration was a "big problem" ranged from a high of 80.5 percent in Belgium to a low of 40.2 percent in Spain. Within countries, regional attitudes towards immigration varied the most in France, where about half of respondents living in Ile-de-France said that immigration was a "big problem" while 89.4 percent of respondents in Nord-Pas de Calais responded the same way.

Table 7 reports a bivariate correlation matrix between our three measures of immigration and vote shares for ERPs. As shown in this table, negative attitudes towards immigration are related to higher vote shares for ERPs, though only to a modest degree. Moreover, the table also indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment is only moderately related to actual immigration flows, as some previous research suggests, and contradicts the "social contact" hypothesis. This relationship is only evidenced with the variable directly measuring immigration.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

The results of our Tobit analyses including the attitudinal measure of support for immigration are presented in Table 8. Due to severe problems associated with multicollinearity, we are only able to present results for the models including *net*

migration, rather than *immigration*, and we are unable to estimate equations predicting vote shares for neofascist parties.[21] Nonetheless, the results provide some support for the notion that vote shares tend to be higher in regions where larger percentages of people view immigration as a "*big problem."* This is true only when populist and neofascist parties' vote shares are combined and is not evidenced in the separate analysis of populist parties' shares. Furthermore, the results in Table 8 generally support our previous findings reported in Tables 4 and 5. Namely, vote shares for ERPs in general and populist parties in particular come at the expense of established parties on the *left* and the *moderate right* since they tend to be higher in regions where the established parties receive fewer votes. In addition, we find more evidence that higher turnout is associated with support for populist parties, although the *abstention rate* is only significant in one equation. We also find greater evidence that higher *net migration* flows are negatively associated with vote shares for ERPs but that when both *unemployment* and *net migration* are higher, as measured by our interaction, vote shares for ERPs also tend to be larger. Furthermore, these results lend some further support for the claim that welfare generosity tends to stimulate support for anti-immigrant parties, since regions having larger reductions their poverty rates via social welfare policies demonstrate greater electoral support for ERPs. Finally, our exploratory analysis finds evidence that larger district magnitudes actually damper support for ERPs, contradicting a recent study.

[21] We previously indicated that multicollinearity poses problems for our analyses and discuss this issue further in our Appendix. Equations including the *immigration* measure failed to converge in the Tobit maximum likelihood estimations while standard errors could not be computed for some of the country dummy variables in the equations predicting support for neofascist parties (thus we chose not to report the results). The fact that we were forced to drop numerous observations from our analyses examining attitudes towards immigration is most likely the source of the more significant problems posed by multicollinearity in this extension of our previous analyses.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of our explanatory analyses suggest that electoral proportionality is unrelated to votes for either populist or neofascist parties. We also find that weak party systems are associated with greater support for populist parties but that neofascist parties are stronger in regions where support for the moderate right is also stronger. This would seem to indicate that populists do, in fact, fare better where the party system is weaker; they are taking advantage of the political opening to which Kitschelt and others refer. In addition, the results show that high rates of non-voting dampen support for populist parties but are associated with greater support for neofascist ones. We suggest that this indicates that neofascist parties remain protest parties but that the populist parties had become embedded within the established party system by the mid- 1990s. This conclusion is supported by the fact that no neofascist party has participated in a governing coalition to this point while several populist parties, such as the Northern League and Freedom Party, have done so.

We also find no evidence that higher unemployment or higher rates of immigration engender support for ERPs. Indeed, both relationships are in the opposite of the expected direction. We do, however, confirm previous findings indicating that there is an interactive effect between unemployment and immigration such that when both factors are high within a region, vote shares for populist parties tend to be larger than they otherwise would be. In addition, our examination of regional attitudes towards immigration, though limited by methodological problems, suggests that there is some merit to the conventional claim that extreme right parties derive some of their support from anti-immigrant sentiment.

We find no relationship between vote shares for ERPs and income inequality or income redistribution but some limited evidence that higher rates of poverty are associated with less support for populist parties (reported in the Appendix). Finally, we find support for the notion that populist parties derive some of their support from appeals threatening continued welfare generosity, since vote shares for these parties are higher in regions which reduce poverty the most.

There are a number of broader implications of our findings. First, it does not appear that the successes of ERPs are still linked, if they ever were, to the proportionality of electoral systems. This finding is consistent with much previous research, but contradicts a recent study that reports such a relationship and implies that a policy remedy may be available (Golder, 2003a). Second, while it is possible that increased immigration and simultaneous economic crises will lead to more votes for populist parties, this relationship is strongly conditioned by findings that the two trends depress support for these parties in general. Regardless of demographic or economic changes, however, the growth of xenophobia in Europe should be viewed with concern, not least because such attitudes find their expressions in populist political parties that are participating in governing coalitions with greater frequency. Finally, the most troublesome implication of our analysis is that were the European party systems to continue to weaken, it seems quite possible that populist parties and their xenophobic illiberal agendas will one day prevail, signaling the demise of liberal society. That outcome will, however, most likely be determined by political forces, not larger numbers of immigrants or unfavorable economic conditions.

Table 1. Populist and Neofascist Parties

Country	**Populist Party**	**Neofascist Party**
Austria	Freedom Party	None
Belgium	Flemish Block, National Front	None
Denmark	Progress Party	None
Finland	None	None
France	National Front	None
Germany	Republicans	National Democratic Party, German People's Union
Italy	Northern League	Tricolor Flame
Spain	None	National Alliance, National Union
UK	None	National Front, British National Party

Table 2. Votes for Extreme Right Parties (ERPs)

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Percent Vote for Populist Parties and year of national election					
Austria, 1995	3	29.41	4.23	25.15	33.61
Belgium, 1995	3	9.90	3.84	5.47	12.25
Denmark, 1994	14	6.69	1.22	5.04	8.75
Finland, 1995	12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
France, 1997	21	14.76	4.40	7.20	23.29
Germany, 1994	15	1.67	0.65	0.98	3.10
Italy, 1996	19	7.26	10.80	0.00	32.82
Spain, 1993	18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UK, 1997	11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	116	5.90	8.17	0.00	33.61
Percent Vote for Neofascist Parties and year of national election					
Austria, 1995	3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Belgium, 1995	3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Denmark, 1994	14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Finland, 1995	12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
France, 1997	21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Germany, 1994	15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Italy, 1996	19	2.20	2.32	0.00	7.93
Spain, 1993	18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UK, 1997	11	0.12	0.13	0.00	0.47
Total	116	0.37	1.23	0.00	7.93

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Migration and Immigration

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Net Migration Rate					
Austria	3	0.06	0.17	-0.13	0.21
Belgium	3	0.01	0.19	-0.21	0.13
Denmark	14	0.19	0.16	0.00	0.48
Finland	12	-0.11	0.38	-0.69	0.64
France	21	0.07	0.46	-0.66	1.46
Germany	15	0.36	0.31	-0.22	0.86
Italy	19	0.22	0.32	-0.36	0.76
Spain	18	0.09	0.18	-0.27	0.39
UK*	10	0.24	0.34	-0.20	0.73
Total	115	0.14	0.34	-0.69	1.46
Immigration Flow, Percent Population					
Austria	3	1.13	0.27	0.86	1.39
Belgium	3	0.97	0.82	0.45	1.92
Denmark	14	0.78	0.19	0.58	1.26
Finland†	2	0.51	0.15	0.40	0.62
France	0	.	.	.	.
Germany	15	1.51	0.65	0.59	2.41
Italy	19	0.29	0.08	0.16	0.43
Spain	18	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.19
UK	0	.	.	.	.
Total	74	0.65	0.63	0.01	2.41

*Data missing for Greater London.

†Data available only for Aland Islands and Uusima.

Table 4. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Combined Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Upper Tier	-0.027 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.011 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.055)
District Magnitude	0.811 (1.508)	0.612 (1.758)	0.360 (1.476)	0.387 (1.750)
Abstention Rate	-0.118 (0.138)	-0.028 (0.162)	-0.034 (0.139)	0.030 (0.168)
Left Vote	**-0.417 (0.062)	**-0.419 (0.078)	**-0.445 (0.062)	**-0.441 (0.080)
Moderate Right Vote	**-0.352 (0.088)	-0.188 (0.138)	**-0.324 (0.086)	-0.187 (0.136)
Unemployment Rate	-0.198 (0.165)	**-0.656 (0.249)	-0.017 (0.178)	-0.483 (0.290)
Net Migration	*-8.230 (3.924)		-5.687 (3.963)	
Immigration		**-7.829 (2.850)		-6.131 (3.194)
Unemployment * Net Migration	*0.627 (0.288)		0.450 (0.290)	
Unemployment * Immigration		*0.690 (0.341)		0.538 (0.363)
Poverty Reduction			*0.121 (0.052)	0.080 (0.071)
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-228.326	-149.901	-225.720	-149.272
Pseudo R2	.331	.313	.338	.316
Observations	115 [31]	74 [20]	115 [31]	74 [20]

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is the standard error.
Italy is the reference country.
[n] left-censored observations
*p<.05 **p<.01

Table 5. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Populist and Neofascist Parties

	Populist Parties				Neofascist Parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Upper Tier	0.058 (-0.560)	-0.025 (0.064)	-0.022 (0.055)	-0.023 (0.062)	0.043 (0.116)	0.117 (0.138)	0.022 (0.124)	0.097 (0.172)
District Magnitude	0.884 (1.743)	0.643 (2.057)	-0.050 (1.647)	0.172 (2.002)	0.117 (133.629)	1.026 (52.783)	0.101 (52.449)	1.130 (60.675)
Abstention Rate	*-0.511 (0.209)	-0.476 (0.281)	*-0.478 (0.209)	-0.434 (0.285)	**0.218 (0.072)	**0.238 (0.093)	*0.197 (0.086)	0.220 (0.132)
Left Vote	**-0.442 (0.076)	**-0.426 (0.095)	**-0.513 (0.074)	**-0.474 (0.095)	0.028 (0.027)	0.023 (0.036)	0.035 (0.031)	0.029 (0.047)
Moderate Right Vote	**-0.508 (0.113)	-0.255 (0.170)	**-0.433 (0.108)	-0.269 (0.165)	**0.168 (0.058)	*0.271 (0.123)	**0.163 (0.057)	0.260 (0.135)
Unemployment Rate	-0.221 (0.231)	*-0.859 (0.413)	0.172 (0.248)	-0.445 (0.451)	**-0.252 (0.083)	-0.220 (0.425)	**-0.270 (0.093)	-0.255 (0.465)
Net Migration	*-12.523 (5.606)		-5.772 (5.615)		-2.503 (1.898)		-2.504 (1.880)	
Immigration		**-11.313 (3.652)		-7.642 (3.942)		-4.538 (29.438)		-6.267 (30.985)
Unemployment * Net Migration	*0.912 (0.401)		0.453 (0.399)		-0.010 (0.167)		-0.006 (0.166)	
Unemployment * Immigration		*0.984 (0.431)		0.641 (0.448)		-0.383 (1.836)		-0.272 (1.934)
Poverty Reduction			**0.233 (0.068)	*0.181 (0.088)			-0.017 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.060)
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-192.984	-134.818	-187.166	-132.715	-38.346	-26.902	-38.247	-26.883
Pseudo R2	.351	.313	.371	.324	.612	.600	.613	.600
Observations	115 [49]	74 [29]	115 [49]	74 [29]	115 [91]	74 [59]	115 [91]	74 [91]

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is the standard error.
Italy is the reference country.
[n] left-censored observations
*p<.05 **p<.01

Table 6. Summary Statistics of Attitudes toward immigration

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Percent responding immigration is a "big problem"					
Belgium	3	80.5	8.41	72.3	89.1
France	19	75.5	11.43	51.3	89.4
Germany	14	73.5	8.07	56.9	84.6
Italy	16	76.5	9.40	60.9	90.2
Spain	15	40.2	9.31	21.7	54.2
Total	67	67.6	17.65	21.7	90.2

Table 7. Correlation Matrix between Votes for ERPs and Immigration Variables

	1 Combined Parties	2 Populist Parties	3 Fascist Parties	4 Net Migration	5 Immigration Rate	6 Immigration "Big Problem"
1	1.000					
2	**0.989	1.000				
3	-0.038	-0.188	1.000			
4	0.030	0.040	-0.071	1.000		
5	0.078	0.120	*-0.243	**0.417	1.000	
6	**0.494	**0.435	*0.251	0.198	**0.429	1.000

*p<.05 **p<.01.

Table 8. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Combined and Populist Parties.

	Combined		Populist	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
District Magnitude	*-6.074 (2.775)	**-7.394 (2.702)	-5.386 (3.406)	*-7.547 (3.165)
Upper Tier	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.053 (0.036)	-0.084 (0.047)	-0.078 (0.043)
Abstention Rate	-0.041 (0.110)	0.042 (0.111)	*-0.428 (0.191)	-0.372 (0.193)
Left Vote	**-0.668 (0.058)	**-0.707 (0.057)	**-0.675 (0.072)	**-0.744 (0.068)
Moderate Right Vote	**-0.829 (0.095)	**-0.791 (0.092)	**-0.885 (0.122)	**-0.818 (0.114)
Unemployment Rate	*-0.250 (0.126)	-0.017 (0.156)	*-0.382 (0.191)	0.052 (0.216)
Immigration is "Big Problem"	**0.117 (0.039)	**0.121 (0.037)	0.087 (0.050)	-8.271 (6.101)
Net Migration	**-10.945 (3.968)	-5.283 (4.496)	**-17.759 (5.893)	0.553 (0.402)
Unemployment * Net Migration	**0.721 (0.264)	0.368 (0.294)	**1.151 (0.394)	0.088 (0.046)
Poverty Reduction		*0.113 (0.049)		**0.200 (0.062)
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-123.012	-120.451	-116.692	-111.654
Pseudo R2	.407	.420	.386	.412
Observations	67 [15]	67 [15]	67 [23]	67 [23]

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is the standard error.
Spain is the reference country.
[n] left-censored observations
*p<.05 **p<.01

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http://www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen/nationalratswahl_1995_ergebnis.asp

Belgium
http://www.vub.ac.be/belgianelections/El321051995.html

Denmark, Adam Carr's Electoral Archive
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/denmark/denmark2.txt

Finland, Adam Carr's Electoral Archive
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/finland/finlandleg.txt

Germany, Lijphart's Electoral Archive-Seats
http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/westeurope/germany/election94.html
Federal Returning Officer, German Ministry of the Interior
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/ergeb94/e/lan94u.htm

Spain, Adam Carr's Electoral Archive

http://psephos.adam-carr.net/spain/spain2000index.html
Ministry of the Interior
http://www.elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp/resultados/index.htm

UK
United Kingdom Election Results
http://www.election.demon.co.uk/election.html

APPENDIX

Tobit Diagnostics

The most problematic statistical problem we confronted had to do with the multicollinearity between our interaction terms, their additive components and the country dummy variables. Multicollinearity may result in unreliable estimates having large standard errors, which decreases the likelihood of obtaining statistically significant results (Berry and Feldman, 1985: 58-59). In order to assess this problem we computed variance inflation factors (VIFs), which equal the number of times the variance of the corresponding parameter estimate is increased due to MC compared to if there were none (thus, it is always equal to or greater than one). While there is no definitive threshold that determines MC, it is generally accepted that values in excess of 10 indicate problems (see Chen et al., 2002). In fact, we do find values greater than 10 in many of our equations, including values in excess of 15 for country dummy variables in those equations including the attitudinal predictor. Furthermore, the interaction terms themselves also approach values of 10. When we exclude the interaction terms from our analyses, our conclusions with respect to its additive components, immigration and unemployment, remain unchanged. However, when we exclude the additive components of the interaction but keep the interaction term itself, the coefficients for this variable no longer attain statistical significance. Removing the additive components of the interaction term is not an option as the results of the interaction would be "nonsensical" (Golder, 2003a: 436).

In order to detect the presence of influential cases and outliers, we examined plots of the residuals and predicted values. There were a handful of cases with standardized

residuals outside two and a few outside three standard deviations, which is not problematic. We also performed our analyses using OLS, which enabled us to compute Cook's distances for each of the equations. In no case did an observation approach the 'rule-of thumb' value of .5 that would raise suspicions about the influence of the case on the results much less the value of 1.0, in which case the observation would be considered 'problematic' (Cook and Weisberg, 1999: 358). In addition, the results of the multiple regression analyses confirm the findings in our Tobit analyses, lending greater support to our findings.

Table A1. List of Left Parties and Moderate Right Parties by Country

Country	**Left Parties**	**Moderate Right Parties**
Austria	Social Democratic Party	People's Party
Belgium	Socialist Party, Belgian Socialist Party	Social-Christian Party, Christian People's Party
Denmark	Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party	Conservative People's Party
Finland	Social Democratic Party, Left-Wing Alliance	National Coalition Party
France	Socialist Party, Communist Party	Union for French Democracy, Rally for the Republic
Germany	Social Democratic Party	Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union
Italy	Communist Party, Communist Refoundation	Go Italy, National Alliance
Spain	Communist Party, Socialist Workers' Party, Basque Left, United People	People's Party
UK	Labour Party, Socialist Labour Party, Socialists, Communist Party, Workers' Revolutionary Party	Conservative Party

Table A2. Summary Statistics of Political Predictor Variables

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
		Abstention Rate			
Austria	3	16.59	2.56	14.25	19.33
Belgium	3	16.97	3.01	13.91	19.92
Denmark	14	16.57	1.42	14.53	18.58
Finland	12	34.87	8.03	28.96	59.68
France	21	34.34	2.00	30.63	37.22
Germany	15	23.38	4.25	18.75	30.39
Italy	19	25.78	9.27	14.13	45.58
Spain	18	25.26	5.21	19.01	36.98
UK	11	28.69	1.97	25.53	31.52
Total	116	26.58	8.06	13.91	59.68
		Left Party Vote Share			
Austria	3	35.69	8.88	25.92	43.28
Belgium	3	24.21	8.31	18.22	33.70
Denmark	14	41.42	4.13	33.05	48.25
Finland	12	36.29	13.05	0.00	45.46
France	21	36.65	5.57	20.62	43.42
Germany	15	44.26	8.48	30.19	64.34
Italy	19	32.68	9.94	11.96	50.22
Spain	18	49.16	7.42	35.05	63.88
UK	11	45.91	7.53	33.98	57.46
Total	116	40.00	10.10	0.00	64.34
		Moderate Right Party Vote Share			
Austria	3	28.08	6.23	20.91	32.19
Belgium	3	22.86	4.59	18.45	27.62
Denmark	14	14.03	3.17	7.74	20.86
Finland	12	14.99	7.12	0.00	23.87
France	21	30.72	3.64	21.87	37.59
Germany	15	39.28	6.25	28.12	51.21
Italy	19	40.78	6.80	24.31	52.87
Spain	18	38.38	10.00	14.92	48.60
UK	11	30.52	7.14	17.53	39.43
Total	116	30.73	11.73	0.00	52.87

Table A3. Summary Statistics of Electoral Proportionality

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
		Upper Tier Seats			
Austria	3	20.67	5.51	17.00	27.00
Belgium	3	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Denmark	14	2.86	1.41	1.00	6.00
Finland	12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
France	21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	15	22.23	20.30	3.00	77.00
Italy	19	5.55	3.08	1.00	11.00
Spain	18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
UK	11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	116	4.67	10.59	0.00	77.00
		District Magnitude (Logged)			
Austria	3	2.91	0.25	2.64	3.14
Belgium	3	2.30	0.70	1.78	3.09
Denmark	14	2.24	0.61	0.69	3.09
Finland	12	2.30	0.82	0.00	3.22
France	21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Italy	19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spain	18	1.86	0.72	0.00	3.53
UK	11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	116	0.93	1.17	0.00	3.53

Table A4. Summary Statistics of Economic Predictor Variables

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
		Unemployment Rate			
Austria	3	3.88	0.69	3.16	4.54
Belgium	3	11.26	3.60	7.10	13.47
Denmark	14	7.65	1.41	5.69	9.95
Finland	12	14.85	4.51	4.80	20.39
France	21	11.96	2.61	7.83	17.97
Germany	15	9.60	3.98	4.61	16.02
Italy	19	12.93	7.47	3.52	25.31
Spain	18	20.72	5.27	12.84	31.89
UK	11	7.22	1.85	4.34	10.03
Total	116	12.28	6.20	3.16	31.89
		Poverty Rate			
Austria	3	8.36	1.59	7.02	10.12
Belgium	3	4.78	2.45	2.55	7.40
Denmark	14	7.08	1.87	4.73	11.87
Finland	12	5.11	1.77	0.72	8.21
France	21	8.48	2.45	4.44	12.67
Germany	15	7.79	2.54	4.30	14.16
Italy	19	14.40	11.12	4.51	41.96
Spain	18	10.27	5.78	3.55	22.21
UK	11	13.95	2.60	9.30	18.70
Total	116	9.54	6.12	0.72	41.96
		Gini Coefficient			
Austria	3	27.76	1.07	26.64	28.76
Belgium	3	22.63	1.13	21.38	23.58
Denmark	14	22.55	2.75	16.34	28.93
Finland	12	22.11	1.16	20.01	23.73
France	21	27.09	2.30	23.18	33.77
Germany	15	23.94	3.47	19.10	29.84
Italy	19	31.76	3.67	24.30	38.92
Spain	18	29.41	2.61	24.26	35.41
UK	11	33.88	1.80	31.62	37.54
Total	116	27.29	4.75	16.34	38.92

Table A5. Summary Statistics of Policy Predictor Variables

Country	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Percent Reduction in the Poverty Rate					
Austria	3	68.07	5.55	64.21	74.43
Belgium	3	83.95	4.80	80.39	89.41
Denmark	14	75.00	4.00	65.55	81.40
Finland	12	78.02	6.78	69.50	93.30
France	21	73.31	4.74	66.20	85.30
Germany	15	74.13	9.99	55.70	87.40
Italy	19	54.62	21.38	16.70	79.60
Spain	18	59.29	14.60	36.30	82.90
UK	11	58.90	3.87	51.32	65.26
Total	116	67.65	14.49	16.70	93.30
Percent Reduction in the Gini Coefficient					
Austria	3	37.16	3.15	34.69	40.71
Belgium	3	49.79	4.33	46.12	54.56
Denmark	14	44.99	3.89	38.27	51.00
Finland	12	42.24	4.52	33.53	48.48
France	21	43.60	4.07	31.90	49.18
Germany	15	46.00	9.88	30.92	58.96
Italy	19	30.17	4.98	22.28	43.96
Spain	18	28.87	4.94	21.60	40.60
UK	11	32.61	4.07	26.90	37.50
Total	116	38.40	8.90	21.60	58.96

Table A6. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Combined Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Upper Tier	-0.027 0.049	-0.015 0.055	-0.022 0.050	-0.019 0.056	-0.024 0.051	-0.015 0.057	-0.016 0.049	-0.013 0.055	-0.011 0.048	-0.012 0.055
District Magnitude	0.811 1.508	0.612 1.758	0.994 1.539	0.373 1.807	0.856 1.517	0.602 1.773	0.713 1.485	0.606 1.748	0.360 1.476	0.387 1.750
Abstention Rate	-0.118 0.138	-0.028 0.162	-0.105 0.140	-0.048 0.165	-0.117 0.138	-0.029 0.162	-0.044 0.143	0.018 0.170	-0.034 0.139	0.030 0.168
Left Vote	**-0.417 0.062	**-0.419 0.078	**-0.423 0.063	**-0.408 0.080	**-0.420 0.063	**-0.418 0.079	**-0.426 0.061	**-0.432 0.080	**-0.445 0.062	**-0.441 0.080
Moderate Right Vote	**-0.352 0.088	-0.188 0.138	**-0.351 0.088	-0.185 0.138	**-0.347 0.090	-0.189 0.139	**-0.343 0.087	-0.186 0.137	**-0.324 0.086	-0.187 0.136
Unemployment Rate	-0.198 0.165	**-0.656 0.249	-0.188 0.166	**-0.689 0.255	-0.201 0.165	**-0.656 0.249	-0.028 0.192	-0.527 0.292	-0.017 0.178	-0.483 0.290
Net Migration	*-8.230 3.924		*-7.890 3.962		*-8.289 3.929		-6.000 4.084		-5.687 3.963	
Immigration		**-7.829 2.850		**-8.495 3.088		**-7.828 2.851		*-6.892 3.053		-6.131 3.194
Unemployment * Net Migration	*0.627 0.288		*0.601 0.291		*0.628 0.288		0.477 0.297		0.450 0.290	
Unemployment * Immigration		*0.690 0.341		*0.740 0.352		*0.690 0.341		0.602 0.355		0.538 0.363
Income Inequality			-0.095 0.165	0.126 0.229						
Income Redistribution					0.022 0.082	-0.005 0.096				
Poverty Rate							-0.199 0.119	-0.125 0.152		
Poverty Reduction									*0.121 0.052	0.080 0.071
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-228.326	-149.901	-228.160	-149.749	-228.289	-149.899	-226.941	-149.564	-225.720	-149.272
Pseudo R2	.331	.313	.331	.314	.331	.313	.335	.314	.338	.316
Observations	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is standard error.
*p<.05 **p<.01.

Table A7. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Populist Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Upper Tier	0.058 -0.560	-0.025 0.064	-0.021 0.058	-0.024 0.065	-0.036 0.060	-0.034 0.067	-0.035 0.055	-0.033 0.062	-0.022 0.055	-0.023 0.062
District Magnitude	0.884 1.743	0.643 2.057	1.485 1.765	0.735 2.131	0.831 1.757	0.501 2.072	0.560 1.628	0.918 1.980	-0.050 1.647	0.172 2.002
Abstention Rate	*-0.511 0.209	-0.476 0.281	*-0.526 0.215	-0.478 0.282	*-0.515 0.210	-0.491 0.284	*-0.486 0.214	-0.422 0.289	*-0.478 0.209	-0.434 0.285
Left Vote	**-0.442 0.076	**-0.426 0.095	**-0.471 0.078	**-0.430 0.098	**-0.439 0.077	**-0.418 0.097	**-0.486 0.073	**-0.462 0.094	**-0.513 0.074	**-0.474 0.095
Moderate Right Vote	**-0.508 0.113	-0.255 0.170	**-0.500 0.112	-0.258 0.171	**-0.514 0.116	-0.268 0.172	**-0.447 0.107	-0.285 0.164	**-0.433 0.108	-0.269 0.165
Unemployment Rate	-0.221 0.231	*-0.859 0.413	-0.172 0.233	*-0.839 0.428	-0.214 0.233	*-0.854 0.416	0.348 0.274	-0.319 0.470	0.172 0.248	-0.445 0.451
Net Migration	*-12.523 5.606		*-11.337 5.619		*-12.343 5.655		-3.245 5.893		-5.772 5.615	
Immigration		**-11.313 3.652		**-11.059 3.952		**-11.309 3.653		-7.543 3.895		-7.642 3.942
Unemployment * Net Migration	*0.912 0.401		*0.824 0.402		*0.902 0.403		0.321 0.413		0.453 0.399	
Unemployment * Immigration		*0.984 0.431		*0.964 0.448		*0.989 0.431		0.565 0.454		0.641 0.448
Income Inequality			-0.321 0.208	-0.048 0.290						
Income Redistribution					-0.024 0.099	-0.060 0.114				
Poverty Rate							**-0.718 0.210	*-0.622 0.276		
Poverty Reduction									**0.233 0.068	*0.181 0.088
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-192.984	-134.818	-191.792	-134.804	-132.956	-134.678	-187.010	-132.200	-187.166	-132.715
Pseudo R2	.351	.313	.355	.313	.352	.314	.372	.326	.371	.324
Observations	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is standard error.
*p<.05 **p<.01.

Table A8. Dependent Variable is Percent Vote for Neofascist Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Upper Tier	0.043 0.116	0.117 0.138	0.035 0.137	-0.013 0.205	-0.044 0.132	0.082 0.144	0.139 0.125	0.300 0.162	0.022 0.124	0.097 0.172
District Magnitude	0.117 133.629	1.026 52.783	0.077 71.759	0.841 273.472	-0.671 86.671	1.279 48.102	0.037 227.505	-5.120 139.978	0.101 52.449	1.130 60.675
Abstention Rate	**0.218 0.072	**0.238 0.093	*0.213 0.089	0.141 0.150	*0.178 0.078	*0.231 0.092	**0.306 0.085	**0.414 0.128	*0.197 0.086	0.220 0.132
Left Vote	0.028 0.027	0.023 0.036	0.029 0.032	0.059 0.057	0.025 0.026	0.018 0.036	0.016 0.027	-0.013 0.038	0.035 0.031	0.029 0.047
Moderate Right Vote	**0.168 0.058	*0.271 0.123	**0.168 0.057	*0.266 0.118	**0.198 0.061	*0.274 0.121	**0.157 0.056	**0.300 0.114	**0.163 0.057	0.260 0.135
Unemployment Rate	**-0.252 0.083	-0.220 0.425	**-0.251 0.083	-0.261 0.422	**-0.241 0.081	-0.207 0.421	*-0.183 0.087	0.045 0.403	**-0.270 0.093	-0.255 0.465
Net Migration	-2.503 1.898		-2.508 1.895		-1.792 1.914		-1.972 1.840		-2.504 1.880	
Immigration		-4.538 29.438		-10.706 30.187		-4.084 29.180		13.489 27.826		-6.267 30.985
Unemployment * Net Migration	-0.010 0.167		-0.010 0.167		-0.127 0.188		-0.037 0.159		-0.006 0.166	
Unemployment * Immigration		-0.383 1.836		-0.207 1.814		-0.375 1.819		-1.030 1.671		-0.272 1.934
Income Inequality			0.013 0.134	0.207 0.254						
Income Redistribution					0.075 0.060	0.047 0.067				
Poverty Rate							-0.106 0.061	-0.162 0.090		
Poverty Reduction									-0.017 0.039	-0.012 0.060
Country Dummies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	-38.346	-26.902	-38.341	-26.579	-37.562	-26.665	-36.909	-25.469	-38.247	-26.883
Pseudo R2	.612	.600	.612	.605	.620	.603	.627	.621	.613	.600
Observations	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74	115	74

Top number is Tobit slope coefficient; bottom number is standard error.
*p<.05 **p<.01.

Table A9. Correlation Matrix

	1 Populist Parties	2 Fascist Parties	3 Combined Parties	4 Upper Tier Seats	5 Log District Mag.	6 Absten-tion Rate	7 Left Parties	8 Mod. Right Parties	9 Net Migra-tion	10 Immigra-tion Rate	11 Unem-ployment	12 Gini	13 Gini Reduc-tion	14 Poverty Rate	15 Poverty Reduc-tion	16 Unem. * Migr.	17 Unem. * Immig.
1	1.000																
2	-0.173	1.000															
3	**0.989	-0.023	1.000														
4	0.030	-0.002	0.030	1.000													
5	-0.089	**-0.243	-0.128	-0.158	1.000												
6	-0.107	**0.244	-0.071	**-0.283	**-0.338	1.000											
7	**-0.437	*-0.191	**-0.472	-0.040	0.127	*-0.184	1.000										
8	-0.127	**0.372	-0.072	**0.260	**-0.479	0.037	0.043	1.000									
9	0.016	-0.106	0.000	**0.260	*-0.217	**-0.311	-0.026	*0.209	1.000								
10	0.130	*-0.241	0.086	**0.549	-0.134	*-0.258	-0.079	-0.157	**0.367	1.000							
11	**-0.361	*0.218	**-0.333	**-0.271	*0.185	**0.343	**0.294	*0.224	**-0.368	**-0.552	1.000						
12	-0.054	**0.415	0.009	-0.082	**-0.385	*0.191	-0.030	**0.521	0.044	**-0.409	0.174	1.000					
13	0.178	**-0.294	0.136	0.068	0.031	-0.061	0.012	**-0.443	-0.007	**0.596	**-0.244	**-0.598	1.000				
14	**-0.234	**0.545	-0.154	-0.044	**-0.273	**0.257	0.064	**0.415	-0.075	*-0.262	**0.436	**0.664	**-0.286	1.000			
15	**0.268	**-0.555	*0.187	0.047	*0.183	-0.170	-0.067	**-0.510	0.024	**0.373	**-0.458	**-0.721	**0.446	**-0.902	1.000		
16	0.052	-0.141	0.031	0.123	-0.121	**-0.233	0.076	*0.208	**0.900	0.151	-0.155	0.037	0.002	-0.045	-0.018	1.000	
17	-0.060	-0.129	-0.085	**0.337	-0.161	-0.072	0.038	-0.106	0.155	**0.838	*-0.240	**-0.394	**0.599	-0.123	**0.289	0.062	1.000