Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series

Working Paper No. 301

Strong Families or Patriarchal Economies? "Familial" Labor Markets and Welfare States in Comparative Perspective

Mary King

January 2002

Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), asbl

Strong Families or Patriarchal Economies?
"Familial" Labor Markets and Welfare States in Comparative Perspective

Mary C. King

Economics Department
Portland State University
P.O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207
(503) 725-3940
fax: (503) 725-3945
kingm@pdx.edu

January 21, 2002

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, March 21–25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and at the Annual Conference of the International Association for Feminist Economics in Oslo, June 22nd-24th, 2001.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Jennifer Olmsted and Tarik Yousef for organizing the superb workshop for which this paper was originally written, Heather Joshi and Dennis Sullivan for their constructive comments, Sylvia Melchiorri for excellent research assistance with Italian sources, and Clifford Lehman for his analytical critique.

Abstract:
Strong family networks in Southern Europe are often credited with protecting people from poverty in circumstances where both employment and social benefits are limited. However it may well be that the economies frequently described as "familial" are more strongly patriarchal than other market economies, concentrating income in the hands of older, married men through both the labor market and welfare state, and creating the combination of weak welfare states, strong family networks, low female labor force participation, and the concentration of unemployment among young men. This paper uses Luxembourg Income Study micro-data to assess the degree to which the "familial" economies of Italy and Taiwan may be said to be more patriarchal than those of OECD countries with liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes. A picture of two types of patriarchal economies emerges. The first is the familial economy and the second is the liberal, American economy where weak social welfare programs are combined with low wages for women and worsening market prospects of the young.

Introduction

It is often said that strong family networks contribute to social welfare. For instance, it is suggested that strong family networks ameliorate the potentially extremely destructive combination of high unemployment rates and weak welfare states in Southern Europe. Caspar, Garfinkel and McLanahan (1994) have shown that Italy's high rates of marriage and low rates of single motherhood prevent the gender disparities in the incidence of poverty found elsewhere, a result echoed for Spain (Fernandez-Morales and de Haro-Garcia 1998). De la Rica and Lemieux (1994) assert that family ties are key to the workability of the Spanish labor market, which combines expensive, mandated health benefits in the formal sector with a large informal sector; married women and young, single people work disproportionately in the informal sector, gaining their health benefits through a covered worker in the family and providing the "flexibility" in the Spanish labor market.

Indeed, Francesca Bettio and Paola Villa (1998) go further, arguing that not only do family networks compensate for weak welfare states in Southern Europe, but that the family plays a large role in service provision in place of a more developed tertiary sector—both public and private.

The "Mediterranean Model" proposed by Bettio and Villa (1998) may be increasingly descriptive of the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, which are distinguished by several of it's attributes: high youth unemployment rates, low rates of female labor force participation, weak welfare states, a high reliance on family networks for social insurance and—recently—declining fertility rates (Yousef 2001, Olmsted 2001). It may also fit the Asian economies, also perceived as "familial economies."[1]

However, a less benign characterization of strong family networks is possible. It may be that in societies where patriarchal legacies are particularly durable, neither labor markets nor welfare states offer much for women or young men, whose allegiance is demanded by the family. If income is concentrated in the hands of older, married men, women and young men may have to stay firmly attached to the family, enjoy less personal autonomy, and perhaps "pay" for their keep by providing unpaid labor to the family unit. In other words, it may be contemporary patriarchal economies that simultaneously create the package of weak welfare states, strong family networks, low female labor force participation and the concentration of unemployment among the young seen in Mediterranean economies.

This is an exploratory foray to assess which economies might be considered to be particularly patriarchal, to be characterized by a concentration of income in the hands of older, married men. Included are a theoretical context for understanding a "patriarchal economy," evidence on social welfare regimes in different countries, comparative labor market information, and the author's calculations of income concentration in eight nations, using Luxembourg Income Study microdata.

I. Theoretical Context

A leading feminist economist defined patriarchy as materially based on "men's control over women's labor power "(Hartmann 1981, p. 15). Preceding capitalism, patriarchy was an economic system in which "men controlled the labor of women and children in the family" (Hartmann 1976, p. 138). Now, in much of the world, the two systems of patriarchy and capitalism exist in relations of "mutual accommodation" (Hartmann, 1976, p. 139).

> Job segregation by sex…is the primary mechanism in capitalist society that maintains the superiority of men over women, because it enforces lower wages for women in the labor market. Low wages keep women dependent on men because they encourage women to marry. Married women must perform domestic chores for their husbands. Men benefit, then, from both higher wages and the domestic division of labor. This domestic division of labor, in turn, acts to weaken women's position in the labor market. Thus the hierarchical domestic division of labor is perpetuated by the labor market, and vice versa (Hartmann 1976, p. 139).

Occupational segregation by sex, then, reflects the continuing operation of a patriarchal economic system, neither necessary to nor created by the dynamics of a market economy—though in the analysis of Marxist political economy, hierarchical social divisions in the labor force such as gender or race are functional for capital (e.g. Reich 1981). It is sex segregation in the labor market that creates lower wages for women, weakening their bargaining position in the family with the result that women provide the vast preponderance of unpaid reproductive work, including childcare, eldercare, cooking, cleaning and marketing.

A weak welfare state, one that does little to socialize either the costs or the work of social reproduction born disproportionately by women, then also functions to sustain a patriarchal economic system. This is particularly true if the welfare state programs that do exist are geared primarily to the needs of men, via the provision of old age pensions or unemployment insurance, rather than mothers' allowances, subsidized childcare, public health care or income maintenance programs tied more to the exigencies of childrearing than to the potential problems of wage-earners.

The particular evolution of social institutions in the context of a patriarchal economic system may reinforce the economically marginal position of women. For instance school and shop hours that are incompatible with most work schedules serve to keep low earners—frequently women—out of the labor market in order to accomplish key reproductive tasks such as childcare and shopping. Similarly the lack of part-time employment may keep people charged with reproductive tasks—women--from participating in the labor market.

Patriarchal economic systems may include "relations of domination between fathers and sons as well as between men and women (Folbre 1980, p. 5)." Historically, in the agricultural economies of Europe and the U.S., young men were tied to their fathers' farms, effectively trading their adolescent and young adult labor for inheritance of the land. Improved land represented both the essential capital stake for setting up an independent household and the specific investment of considerable labor on the part of the sons. The clear connection between the age of inheritance and the age of marriage in the historical record demonstrates the degree to which concentration of family wealth in the hands of fathers held sons as laborers in the patriarchal household (Folbre 1980, Tilly and Scott 1978).

In short then, relations of patriarchal economic domination of women and young men have been maintained historically through the sexual division of labor and inheritance practices. They are now sustained by women's low wages and limited job opportunities, high unemployment rates for young men, welfare states that are weak or geared primarily to male breadwinners, and the familial social systems characteristic of—but not exclusive to—the Mediterranean.

II. Comparing Welfare States

Classification of welfare states by type and level of generosity has intrigued a number of scholars, creating a substantial literature. Prominent in this field is Gosta Esping-Andersen, upon whose work this paper will rely for measures of the strength of the welfare state in different countries. Esping-Andersen (1990), created an index by which to judge the strength and type of welfare state evident in different countries, which he termed a de-commodification score.

> In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labor power. It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping Andersen 1990, pp. 21-22).

Esping-Andersen based his de-commodification score upon the generosity and availability of old age pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance payments. His method yields the scores and ranking that appear in Table 1 below. The scores represent only an index number, nothing further, and higher scores indicate greater de-commodification.

Esping-Andersen (1990) categorizes the three groupings of countries generated by the de-commodification scores as

(a) liberal states, where de-commodification is minimal and the market holds sway;

(b) conservative states, where a moderate amount of de-commodification has occurred as a result of conservative or Catholic reformism, bounded by "powerful social-control devices, such as a proven record of strong employment attachment or strong familial obligations" (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 53); and

(c) social democratic states, where de-commodification has preceded to the greatest degree, in previously liberal states that labor has captured for social democracy.

Table 1: Esping-Andersen's De-Commodification Scores for Welfare States, 1980

Country	**Score**
Australia	13.0
United States	13.8
New Zealand	17.1
Canada	22.0
Ireland	23.3
United Kingdom	23.4
Italy	24.1
Japan	27.1
France	27.5
Germany	27.7
Finland	29.2
Switzerland	29.8
Austria	31.1
Belgium	32.4
Netherlands	32.4
Denmark	38.1
Norway	38.3
Sweden	39.1

Source: Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 52.

In this categorization, we do not see a familial type. Italy is the lone example of a Mediterranean nation among countries investigated, and it appears to have the weakest welfare state of the conservative group, influenced in Esping-Andersen's account both by Catholicism and by Fascism.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) categorization was tremendously influential, and also much criticized. Feminists in particular found his account of the welfare state and de-commodification to be exclusively and inexplicably focused on the male experience. Esping-Andersen's implicit model citizen clearly worked for pay, unless old, sick or unemployed, and did not seem to bear any responsibility for child or eldercare.

In response to criticism, Esping-Andersen then examined the extent to which different welfare state regimes had pursued "defamilialization," a term first proposed by his critics and understood by Esping-Andersen as a course that would "unburden the household and diminish individuals' welfare dependence on kinship (Esping-Andersen 1999)." Interestingly, de-familialization reduces women's dependence upon marriage as an economic strategy for a decent livelihood, often promoting their commodification through increased participation in the labor market. As framed by Orloff (1993), two key elements of any gender-sensitive assessment of welfare states are (1) access to paid work, for married women as well as other citizens, and (2) women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households, so that women have viable alternatives to marriage, even—or especially—if they have children.

Table 2 presents Esping-Andersen's measures of the degree to which welfare states attempt de-familialization. This analysis has prompted him to separate the "conservative" category into two: (a) Continental Europe including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands and (b) Southern Europe, here comprised of Italy, Portugal and Spain. His aim in distinguishing Southern Europe from Continental Europe is to assess the degree to which the Mediterranean nations are more familial than others, as is often asserted.

Table 2: Esping-Andersen's De-Familialization Measures for Welfare States

	Public spending on family services (% GDP) 1992	Percent of children <3 in public childcare 1980s	Percent of elderly receiving public home-help 1990
Social democratic regimes			
Denmark	1.98	48	22
Finland	1.53	22	24
Norway	1.31	12	16
Sweden	2.57	29	16
Liberal regimes			
Australia	0.15	2	7
Canada	0.08	4	2
Ireland	0.06	1	3
United Kingdom	0.48	2	9
United States	0.28	1	4
Continental Europe			
Austria	0.25	2	3
Belgium	0.10	20	6
France	0.37	20	7
Germany	0.54	3	2
Netherlands	0.57	2	8
Southern Europe			
Italy	0.08	5	1
Portugal	0.16	4	1
Spain	0.04	3	2
Japan	0.22	n.a.	1

Source: Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 71.

Clearly the countries that spend the lowest proportion of their GDP on publicly provided family services are Italy and Spain, in the familial grouping, and Canada and Ireland, in the liberal category. Public childcare for children younger than three is provided to the greatest extent in social democratic regimes and in "conservative" continental Europe.[2] Interestingly, child benefits—cash payments or tax reductions for families with children—are also highest in social democratic and conservative, continental nations, and lowest in the Mediterranean

(Esping Andersen 1999, p. 72) Public assistance with in-home care of the elderly is lowest in Southern Europe, though relatively high only in Scandinavia. By these measures, de-familialization is a strategy pursued by the social democratic and conservative, continental nations, and least evident in Southern Europe.

One caveat may call into question the degree to which defamilization has proceeded in the liberal regimes, at least with regard to state support for reproduction. While the United States appears to devote a much larger proportion of GDP to social spending than do Spain and Italy, in fact much of this spending occurs in the form of tax expenditures, tax reductions for families with children. To the degree that these increase with income, greater support is provided to families with higher earnings, far disproportionately those that include a male earner (Folbre 2001). In practice, to receive this state support women must remain married.

And finally, we should note that while differences among nations appear significant, in fact none of them is spending even three percent of GDP on family services. We may be making too much of the distinctions between them.

Defamilialization analysis focused on women, assessing the degree to which the state takes responsibility for reproduction. However, unemployed young men are also dependent upon the family unless the state provides for them. For completeness, this analysis must include the extent to which welfare states are compensating for youth unemployment in different countries. This data is important for assessing the patriarchal nature of different welfare state regimes. While I do not have direct or comprehensive evidence on this point, Italy, Greece and Spain appear to spend the highest proportion of their social transfers on old age pensions of 15 European countries and to be among the lowest third in the proportion of social transfers devoted to unemployment insurance (ISTAT 2000). Italian households headed by someone over 65 receive 57 percent of public transfers, while those headed by someone between the ages of 51 and 65 receive 27 percent, leaving a very small portion for younger families (Banca D'Italia 2000)

III. Comparing Labor Markets & Family Divisions of Labor

This section of the paper examines published, statistical evidence from the labor market and the family division of labor to assess the degree to which the familial economies of Southern Europe and Asia may be said to be particularly patriarchal.

The Labor Market

Access to the labor market is a crucial component of economic autonomy in a market economy. To explore the degree to which older men enjoy greater access to the labor market than do women and younger men, we examine ratios of labor force participation rates and unemployment rates.[3] Table 3 presents the ratio of women's labor force participation to that of men's, as well as the ratio of the labor force participation rate of men in their early twenties to men in their late forties and early fifties. In addition, the relative unemployment rates of men in these same age categories is included. The data on unemployment and that on labor force participation are both provided in an attempt to include the experience of young men who may not be looking for work because they believe that none is available.

In Table 3, these ratios are organized into country groups as suggested by Esping-Andersen's categories, with the addition of some potentially "familial" Asian nations. A clear divide emerges between the familial economies of southern Europe and Asia and the other regime types represented. Women's labor force participation rates relative to those of men are clearly lowest in the "familial" European nations, followed by the Asian countries, the continental, the liberal and finally the social democratic countries, where they reach their peak at 93 percent of men's in Sweden.

Table 3: Relative Employment Outcomes for Women and Men, and for Younger Men and Older Men, 1997*

	Relative labor force participation rates of women and men	Relative labor force participation rates of younger and older men	Relative unemployment rates of younger and older men
Familial			
Greece	0.59	.72	6.1
Italy	0.61	.61	7.5
Portugal[a]	0.79	.76	2.9
Spain	0.62	.72	2.9
Turkey	0.37	.98	4.0
Asian			
Japan	0.69	.77	3.0
Korea	0.65	.61	5.9
Continental Europe			
Austria	0.76	.82	1.4
Belgium	0.73	.70	2.9
France	0.81	.58	3.3
Germany	0.77	.83	1.4
Social Democratic			
Denmark	0.87	.94	1.5
Finland	0.91	.83	1.9
Norway	0.88	.86	1.9
Sweden	0.93	.76	3.0
Liberal			
Australia	0.76	.97	2.6
Canada	0.82	.89	2.2
United States	0.83	.92	2.9
United Kingdom	0.80	.94	2.3

* Ratios are rates for men aged 20-24 as a proportion of rates for men aged 45-54, except in the case of Italy where ratios are rates for men aged 20-24 as a proportion of rates for men aged 40-49.

[a] Data for Portugal are from the year 1996.

Source: Author's calculations from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1999. *Labour Force Statistics 1977-1997*. Paris: OECD.

Patterns are a bit more muddled for young men vis a vis older men, but it does appear that unemployment is relatively concentrated among the young in the nations deemed more familial, including those in Asia. By far the highest concentration of unemployment among the young is found in Italy, Greece and Korea. Further, it is not true that high youth unemployment is a simple function of higher overall unemployment; the nations with the highest male unemployment rates in 1997—Spain, Finland, France, Sweden and Ireland—do not show particularly high concentrations of unemployment among the young.[4]

This pattern re-appears in the male labor force participation ratios, though the familial, Asian and conservative nations appear more similar than in the relative incidence of male unemployment. The liberal states are at the other extreme, with nearly comparable rates of labor force participation for young and middle-aged men. The social democracies are in the middle on this measure.

Thus far, it does appear that the "strong family" of the Mediterranean and Asia is characterized by the economic dependence of women and young men on older, married men. Neither labor markets nor welfare states in the "familial" nations offer as much for women or young men as they do elsewhere. And economic dependence may be expected to entail reduced personal autonomy, deference to patriarchal authority, and greater obligations in the form of unpaid work.

The unpaid obligations of women to the family are clear, and obvious in the premise of a family-based social insurance system. Women are providing the bulk of the childcare, elder care, health care and other services that might otherwise be supplemented by a strong social welfare system. Table 4 presents Esping-Andersen's data on the degree to which families are providing key social services.

As shown, women's unpaid workweeks are quite high in Italy and Spain relative to other European countries, to North America or even to Japan. It's also clear that a far higher

Table 4: Esping-Andersen's Data on Family Welfare Provision

	Percentage of aged living with children (mid 1980s)	Percentage of unemployed youth living with parents (1991-93)	Women's weekly unpaid household hours (1985-1990)
Southern Europe			
Italy	39	81	45.4
Spain	37	63	45.8
Continental Europe			
France	20	42	36.0
Germany	14	11	35.0
Netherlands	8	28	38.7
Social Democracies			
Denmark	4	8	24.6
Norway	11	-	31.6
Sweden	5	-	34.2
Liberal Regimes			
Canada	-	27	32.8
United Kingdom	16	35	30.0
United States	15	28	31.9
Asia			
Japan	65	-	33.1

Source: Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 63.

proportion of elderly people and unemployed young people are living in a multi-generational household in Southern Europe. (However, as Esping-Andersen (1999) points out, in many countries where the aged tend not to live with their children, they are still cared for by their children; the price of housing and other factors are presumably influential as well.)

It may also be true that in the familial economies young men are expected to make significant contributions of unpaid, or poorly paid, labor in the home or in family enterprises, as was true historically on the farms of Europe and the U.S; this point requires further research.

IV. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study Microdata

As a first step in investigating the degree to which the labor market and welfare programs in different countries might be said to favor older married men--to demonstrate more patriarchal characteristics--Luxembourg Income Study micro-data were examined for eight different countries. These eight countries were chosen to include two representative of each national type considered by Esping-Andersen and other scholars to be familial, conservative, social democratic and liberal. Italy and Taiwan represent familial nations, France and Germany conservative ones, Norway and Denmark are social democratic, and the U.S. and Australia represent liberal economies.[5] All data are from 1994 or 1995.

The population over fifteen years of age in each country were divided into categories by age, sex and marital status. The sources of market income identifiable as accruing to a particular individual include wages, as well as public and private pensions, but not self-employment income.[6] Benefit income identifiable with an individual includes both social retirement and unemployment benefits. Though reported as household benefits, child and maternity allowances were credited to women, while military benefits were attributed to men. Other sources of income reported only at the household level were omitted.

The proportions of market and benefit income received by each group divided by the proportion of that group within each country's population are presented in Table 5. If a group received the exact proportion of market income as it represented in the population, the number reported will be 1.00.

The working hypothesis is that the "familial" nations will demonstrate a patriarchal concentration of market and benefit income on older, married men, as compared with countries with other regimes.

Table 5: Concentration of Wage and Benefit Income by Sex, Age and Marital Status

% Income type/ % Population	"Familial" Italy ('95)	Taiwan ('95)	Conservative France ('94)	Germany ('94)	Social-Democratic Norway ('95)	Denmark ('95)	Liberal U.S. ('94)	Australia ('94)
Market Income								
Single men 15-65	0.86	1.03	1.00	1.20	0.97	1.01	0.76	1.02
Single Women 15-65	0.68	0.90	0.87	1.05	0.71	0.72	0.60	0.83
Div./wid. Men 15-65	1.45	0.86	1.66	0.69	1.59	1.01	1.01	1.00
Div./wid. Women 15-65	0.98	0.61	0.93	0.68	1.06	0.56	0.94	0.71
Married men 15-29	1.80	1.18	1.43	1.77	1.53	1.53	1.29	1.59
Married women 15-29	0.80	0.87	0.92	0.82	0.80	0.88	0.65	0.91
Married men 30-65	**2.05**	**1.21**	**1.73**	**2.24**	**1.89**	**1.54**	**2.11**	**1.83**
Married women 30-65	0.80	0.92	1.13	0.71	0.99	0.89	0.87	0.75
Ever married men >65	0.20	0.37	0.01	0.29	0.38	0.41	0.51	0.26
Ever married women>65	0.22	0.10	0.01	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.06
Single men >65	0.36	0.38	0.06	1.11	0.13	0.17	0.40	0.13
Single women >65	0.10	NA	0.00	0.87	0.19	0.25	0.29	0.10
Benefit Income								
Single men 15-65	0.16	0.97	0.16	0.24	3.12	0.37	0.35	0.65
Single Women 15-65	0.17	0.86	0.37	0.78	0.88	0.65	0.25	0.91
Div./wid. Men 15-65	3.81	1.19	0.65	2.93	0.55	1.09	1.51	1.29
Div./wid. Women 15-65	4.19	1.17	1.01	2.91	1.26	2.54	0.93	2.47
Married men 15-29	0.19	1.16	0.09	0.14	0.22	0.95	0.24	0.59
Married women 15-29	0.02	1.00	0.49	0.77	1.32	1.16	0.13	0.96
Married men 30-65	2.62	1.26	0.72	0.69	0.26	0.95	0.96	0.44
Married women 30-65	0.82	0.88	0.60	0.66	0.79	1.16	0.41	0.94
Ever married men >65	**8.33**	**0.68**	**3.74**	**5.69**	**4.34**	**3.00**	**9.15**	**4.87**
Ever married women >65	6.93	0.66	2.07	0.35	3.09	3.30	6.38	3.73
Single men >65	9.51	0.04	2.08	0.23	3.64	3.78	7.06	4.41
Single women >65	3.52	NA	2.59	0.99	3.63	3.68	5.54	4.70

Notes: Market income sources include wages and public and private pensions, except for Taiwan, Norway, and Australia for which public pension data is not available and France, for which no pension data is available. Benefit income includes social retirement and unemployment benefits, as well as public child allowances, maternity benefits and veterans' benefits, to the extent these are reported by individual countries.[7]

Concentration of Market Income

Everywhere married men earn a disproportionate share of market income; the relative proportions are highest in Germany, the United States and Italy. Older married men fare particularly well in the U.S., where the gaps between them and other categories are quite large.

Of the working age population, divorced and widowed women's market incomes are lowest, particularly in Denmark, Taiwan and Australia.

Single men in the U.S. and Italy earn the lowest share of wages of any of the nations investigated. The Taiwanese numbers belie the idea that familial nations are necessarily more patriarchal. The relatively low earnings of young married men in the U.S. flags the seriously declining prospects of the young there, connected with the large increase in earnings inequality in that nation. While youth unemployment figures do not approach those of Greece, Italy or Turkey, as shown in Table 1, the earnings of young Americans declined significantly over the last twenty years (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000).

Interestingly young, married men in Italy appear to be doing exceptionally well, though it may well be that only the small minority of young Italian men who are doing well are marrying, as the age of first marriage is now quite high in Italy.

Benefit Income

Benefit income is particularly concentrated in a patriarchal pattern in the U.S. where older married men do by far the best. Older married men are particularly privileged in Italy and Germany as well, but in these nations, divorced and widowed women and men also qualify for a noticeable share of social benefits which is not true in the United States. However, divorced and widowed men of working age are the only group under 65 to obtain a greater proportion of benefits than their share in the population in the United States. All other nations show a greater level of support for divorced and widowed women of working age than does the U.S., indicating some level of state support for reproduction, or defamilialization. Norway is alone in supporting single men, presumable many of them young and unemployed, and in this way defamilializing young men.

This analysis is suffers from all the usual limitations of any international comparisons based on micro-data (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). Particularly problematic is the inability to further attribute income streams to particular individuals in the household. Self-employment income is omitted, and particularly important in the case of Italy. Also, as Esping-Andersen (1990) has pointed out, it is not clear whether household members perceive benefits income as accruing to women or to men in situations where benefit checks for child allowances are paid to the male head of household. While the researcher may understand such a benefit to be directed toward subsidizing reproduction—traditionally women's work—men to whom the checks are mailed may view the money as income accruing to family heads. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) and others have demonstrated that who the check is made out to matters for family spending patterns.

V. CONCLUSION

The evidence marshaled thus far does suggest that the familial economies of Southern Europe and Asia are distinctively familial—or patriarchal—in their concentration of income, employment and benefits upon older married men. Young men are disproportionately unemployed or out of the labor force in Southern Europe and Asia, as compared with Scandinavia, Central Europe and the liberal, English speaking nations. Never married men's incomes are low in Italy. Women's labor force participation rates are relatively low, and women's unpaid workweeks are high in Italy and Spain. Public welfare programs are limited in Southern Europe and benefits are focused on the elderly.

However, it's also clear that the familial economies are not the only ones that could be described as patriarchal. Both the United States and Germany in particular appear to concentrate market and benefit income on older, married men. In the case of the U.S., this results from a concentration of women and young men in the lower rungs of an unusually and increasingly unequal labor market and a weak welfare system whose single effective program is the insurance of retired men.

One of the most important and interesting consequences of a modern patriarchal economy may be the pressure exerted on fertility. Presumably Italy and Japan are facing the consequences of being in the vanguard of what Nancy Folbre (1994) has identified as a world-wide shift of the cost and responsibilities of children from men to women as children as economic development makes children more expensive. The United States continues to avert a birthstrike with ongoing immigration, which may be the only alternative to defamilialization, or more state support for reproduction.

Notes

1. The “Mediterranean” label itself is not precise, given the character of the French welfare state. Clearly the distinction must rest upon political philosophy.
2. According to Barbara Bergmann (1996), the motivation of the French is acculturation of young children.
3. Another indicator of a patriarchal economy might be large wage differentials. While the gender wage gap is not large in Southern Europe, it is difficult to have confidence in this measure, given the size of the informal sector in both Italy and Spain and the concentration of women there (Blau and Kahn 2000, Rubery 1998, Rubery et al 1998).
4. These differences are set in an environment in which relative youth unemployment is rising generally in the advanced countries, despite their relatively small numbers and high levels of education (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000).
5. Sweden and Spain had to be omitted, due to data limitations.
6. Public pension data are not available for Taiwan, Norway or Australia, and no pension information is available for France. Also problematically, wage data for France and Italy are net of taxes; in all other nations wage data are gross.
7. Social retirement benefits are reported for all 8 countries; unemployment benefits are reported for all but Taiwan. Veterans’ benefits are reported by Italy, France, the U.S. and Australia; child allowances of some form are reported by all nations except Italy, Taiwan and the U. S.; and maternity allowances are reported only by France, Germany and Norway.

References:

Atkinson, Anthony B. and Andrea Brandolini. 2001. "Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of 'Secondary" Data-Sets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study." *Journal of Economic Literature*. 39 (3): 771-799.

Banca D'Italia. 2000. Supplementi al Bollettino Statistico, Note metodologiche e informazioni statistiche: I balanci delle famiglie italiane nee'anno 1998. Anno X, Numero 22. www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/statische/ibf/microdati/dati/archivi_annuali.

Bergmann, Barbara. 1996. *Saving Our Children from Poverty: What the United States Can Learn From France*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Bertola, Giuseppe and Andrea Ichino. 1995. "Wage Inequality and Unemployment: United States vs. Europe." in Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg (eds.) *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 13-54.

Bettio, Francesca and Paola Villa. 1998. "A Mediterranean Perspective on the Breakdown of the Relationship Between Participation and Fertility." *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. 22 (2): 137-171.

Blanchflower, David G. and Richard B. Freeman. 2000. "The Declining Economic Status of Young Workers in OECD Countries." *Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 19-55.

Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2000. "Gender Differences in Pay." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 14 (4):75-99.

Caspar, Lynne M., Irwin Garfinkel and Sara S. McLanahan. 1994. "The Gender-Poverty Gap: What We Can Learn From Other Countries." *American Sociological Review*. 59 (4): 594-605.

de la Rica, Sara and Thomas Lemieux. 1994. "Does Public Health Insurance Reduce Labor Market Flexibility or Encourage the Underground Economy? Evidence from Spain and the United States." in Rebecca M. Blank (ed.) *Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 265-299.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fernandez-Morales, Antonio and Julia de haro-Garcia. 1998. "A Note on Poverty and Gender in Spain." *Journal of Income Distribution*. 8: 235-239.

Folbre, Nancy. 1980. "Patriarchy in Colonial New England." *The Review of Radical Political Economics*. 12 (2): 4-13.

Folbre, Nancy. 1994. *Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint*. London: Routledge.

Folbre, Nancy. 2001. "Public Support for Parents." in Mary C. King (ed.) *Squaring Up: Policy Strategies for Raising Women's Incomes in the United States*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Heidi Hartmann. 1976. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex," in Martha Blaxall and Barbara Reagan (eds.) *Women and the Workplace: The Implications of Occupational Segregation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hartmann, Heidi. 1981. "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union." in Lydia Sargent (ed.) *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism*. Boston: South End Press, pp. 1-41.

ISTAT. 2000. Rapporto Annuale: La situazione del Paese nel 1999. www.istat.it/Aproserv/noved/rapann99/index.html.

Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert Pollak and Terence J. Wales. 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the U.K. Child Benefit." *Journal of Human Resources* 32 (3): 463-480.

Nickell, Stephen. 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 11 (3): 55-74.

Olmsted, Jennifer. 2001. "Gendered Social Safety Nets in a Period of Demographic Transition: A Focus on the MENA Region." Unpublished paper, presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1999. *Labour Force Statistics 1977-1997*. Paris: OECD.

Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States." *American Sociological Review* 58 (3): 303-328.

Reich, Michael. 1981. *Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rubery, Jill. 1998. "Women in the Labour Market: A Gender Equality Perspective." OECD Working Paper 6 (75).

Rubery, Jill with Francesca Bettio, Marilyn Carroll, Colette Fagan, Damian Grimshaw, Friederike Maier, Sigrid Quack and Paloa Villa. 1998. *Equal Pay in Europe? Closing the Gender Wage Gap*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Tilly, Louise A. and Joan W. Scott. 1978. *Women, Work and Family*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Yousef, Tarik. 2001. "Demography, Inequality and Intergenerational Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa." Unpublished paper, presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March.