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**Income Distribution and Redistribution** 

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#### LIS-CEPS WORKING PAPER 3

## INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION: A MICRODATA ANALYSIS FOR SEVEN COUNTRIES

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#### INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF LIS

Most comparisons of the distribution and redistribution of income across countries have had to rely on using already-published data, a procedure which has a range of readily apparent weaknesses. Such data are presented in groups which may vary from country to country, and may differ from the groupings which might be desired by any particular researcher. Their choice of income concept and of income unit may be similarly variable and unsuitable, and the issues of how to rank incomes and how to weight both income and the income unit are rarely mentioned. The restrictions imposed by pre-structured data both distort empirical comparisons and render almost futile (and, therefore, often neglected) any methodological discussion; at most, methodological issues tend to be raised as apologetic caveats rather than in the context of analytical choices.

The effects of some of these weaknesses may be illustrated by outlining some of the limitations imposed by then-available data on the much-quoted OECD study carried out by Sawyer (1976). According to his account, Sawyer had to derive pre-tax data for Canada, Germany and Sweden by adding the average amount of tax paid within income classes to post-tax data; similarly he had to derive post-tax data for France, Japan, the UK and the USA by deducting average tax payments from pre-tax data (procedures in which, as he acknowledges, "inequality tends to be underestimated since households have not been [re]ranked by the derived income concept" (1976, p.12)). This procedure also means that the income variation within income classes is not captured in summary measures of inequality. Furthermore, in his data for some countries (such as Norway), some taxes deducted at source (e.g., employee social security contributions), were not included in the pre-tax income concept, so that the data actually represent an intermediate income stage between the pre- and post-tax concepts. In addition, "many of the estimates are subject to .... error arising from interpolation" (1976, p.12), since the published data had to be rearranged (for example, from fixedinterval income classes) in order to be presented in the common form of decile shares. Finally, it may be noted that while Sawyer attempts to take account of the impact of differences in household size and composition on the distribution of economic welfare, his transformations are apparently based on adjustments within pre-structured income classes, and, although he comments on the impact of such transformations on the identity of the people in the various deciles, no information, apart from a slight Swedish example, is actually given on the identities of those in the various deciles after such transformations -- presumably because the data could not be reordered so as to permit this.

More recently, as microdata have become available, some international comparisons have involved individual researchers in different countries trying to derive comparable concepts from their own microdata sets. On the basis of such separately gathered data, joint analyses have then been carried out (see, for example, Smolensky, Pommerehne and Dalrymple, 1979; Ruggles and O'Higgins, 1981 and O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981).

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) seeks to move beyond either of these approaches by gathering in one location (Luxembourg) sets of microdata for different countries, and reorganizing these data so that they conform to certain common standards, concepts and structures. This does not, of course, mean that every item in every tape is rendered comparable; it does mean that if LIS variable X exists on the tape for country A, it should be comparable to variable X on any other country tape. It will not be possible to create a complete set of common variables, each represented on every tape, but it is possible to ensure that such basic items as gross income, factor income and cash income, or per capita, equivalent or unadjusted income, are defined to common standards.

This paper reports the results, in respect of international comparisons of income distribution and redistribution, of the first stage of the LIS project. Microdata tapes for seven countries -- Canada, the USA, the UK, West Germany, Sweden, Norway and Israel -- have been organized in the manner summarized above, and described in more detail in the technical paper by Smeeding, Schmaus and Allegrezza (1985). As the later parts of this paper will demonstrate, the use of consistently-organized microdata allows comparisons of inequality in respect of similarly-defined variables, permits methodological alternatives to be used to

This is not explicitly stated in Sawyer's paper, but is strongly suggested by a reading of the manner in which other adjustments
were made.

indicate data sensitivity to such alternatives, and allows distributional data to be examined in relation to a wide range of socio-economic and demographic variables in each country, thus facilitating the understanding of the reasons for and implications of inequality differences among the countries. Furthermore, they allow the countries to be compared on aspects of income ranking and policy equity in ways which would not be possible without consistently-organized microdata.

Before presenting the preliminary results of the empirical analyses, the data should be described and a number of important issues of methodology discussed.

#### LIS DATASETS

The main criterion for entering datasets in the first stage of the LIS exercise was the availability of datatapes with adequate details on income. Whilst seven datasets were eventually included, it became apparent after the deadline for inclusion in this stage of the analysis that a number of other countries (especially Australia, Switzerland and Finland) also had appropriate datasets; it is hoped to include those in future phases of analysis.

The datasets which are included differ in sample size and source, and are described and discussed in detail in Smeeding, Schmaus and Allegreza (1985). In brief, they are the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances, 1981 (sample size 37,900), the USA Current Population Survey, 1979 (69,000), the UK Family Expenditure Survey, 1979 (6,900), the German Transfer Survey, 1979 (2,800), the Swedish Income Distribution and Level of Living Survey, 1979 (9,600), the Norwegian Tax Files, 1979 (10,400) and the Israeli Income Survey, 1979 (2,270). Some of the datasets acquired include modifications or additional analyses from the original (e.g., the USA CPS includes Smeeding's estimates of the value of inkind benefits, and the UK FES includes the official Central Statistical Office estimates of the incidence of certain indirect taxes, subsidies and benefits in-kind), but the analyses reported here use only the original data. Comparative investigation of the distribution of indirect taxes and non-cash benefits within the LIS framework must await a further stage of the project.

The data are thus drawn from a mixture of income, expenditure and administrative surveys, but all except the German and Israeli are intended to be comprehensive studies of the household population. The German data exclude families headed by a foreigner (thus excluding 8% of the population), whilst the Israeli data cover just under 90% of the household population, the major exclusions being rural households and inhabitants of kibbutzim. With the exception of the UK data, the survey results are weighted to adjust for differential non-response within the intended sample. (For a discussion of the degree and impact of differential non-response, see Smeeding, Schmaus and Allegreza, 1985).

The countries differ, however, in how they define and categorize income units. Broadly speaking, three types of income unit may be used: the household, the family and the individual. (The US practice of using families and unrelated individuals is a subset of the second of these.) The datatapes in this exercise originally used either families or households -- but those which used only households (Germany and Israel) did not permit us to deconstruct these households into their family subcomponents or subunits. Furthermore, definitions of what constituted a family differed from country to country, reflecting not so much different statistical conventions, as conventions which followed the different social and cultural customs of each country. For example, in Sweden households consist either of individual adults or couples (with or without children); an adult child living with his or her parents constitutes a separate income unit, and several adults sharing a living unit constitute several income units. The Swedish data reported later therefore show no multi-adult units (other than couples), unlike other countries.

In practice, this meant that if we focussed on either the household or the family as the basic unit of analysis we would be using concepts whose meaning varied from country to country; however, as Smeeding et. al. (1985, p.5) emphasize, Canada, the UK and the USA have comparable family units, and the other countries either have closely-similar concepts (Sweden and Norway), or use a household concept which produces relatively few multi-family units (Germany and Israel). In later analyses, the term family therefore refers to this slightly variably-defined income unit. For many purposes, however, the individual is both

a more comparable and, as argued below, a more appropriate focus of analysis, particularly when measuring income shares or the characteristics of those in different parts of the distribution. The empirical analyses thus use the 'family' as the unit whose pooled income is being measured (in a range of ways), but tend to use the individual as the core variable when measuring and describing the distribution.

A particular data issue which should be mentioned at this stage affects the German results. Whilst a number of countries report some income units with zero or negative incomes, the proportion of such units is usually slight, ranging from 0.0% in Israel to 1.2% in the USA; in Germany, however, 2.7% of units report zero incomes, which has obvious effects on the measures of income inequality in Germany. Most of the calculations reported here (including the quintile shares analysis) accepted these income units at face value; the only "correction" attempted gives additional values of the Gini coefficient, calculated with all the zero income households excluded.<sup>2</sup>

# METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE LIS ANALYSES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION

As argued earlier, issues of methodology often bear little relation to issues of data analysis in international income distribution studies because the available data simply do not allow presentational choices based on methodological preferences. In this case, however, not only was such choice possible, it was essential in order to deal with the mass of data presented by the availability of seven relatively consistent microdata sets: for whilst the tapes had been rendered consistent, this had deliberately been done in a way which left methodological decisions to the individual researcher. This variety led to what Stark has termed an international learning process:

We came across many different concepts, locations of data, methods of

<sup>2.</sup> It now seems that these zero income households are a consequence of a procedure used in the original formulation of the German datatape, whereby income units who gave a minimally positive response to the survey (e.g., information on family size, or family members' ages), but refused to provide income data, were regarded as respondents but simply assigned zero values for the income variables. Corrected quintile shares are not yet available.

collection etc. These created quite a long period of learning and familiarisation ..... Whilst standardisation of the precise meaning of concepts would be very valuable it is to be hoped that this would not lead to the restriction in the variety of concepts. An "international learning process" undoubtedly encompasses the benefits of comprehending income distributions beyond the normal presentation available in any one country (1977, p.2).

The major methodological issues may be summarised as relating to the measure of income, the unit value of the income, the weighting of the units in measuring inequality and the method by which income units were ranked in order to create an income hierarchy prior to measuring inequality. Each may be discussed in turn.

#### The Measure of Income

The analysis in this paper focusses on two primary measures of income -- gross income and net cash income. Gross income is close to the US concept of total money income, and to Sawyer's (1976) concept of pre-tax income; it includes all income from employment and self-employment, property income, occupational pensions, state and private cash transfers, as well as other cash incomes. The sum of employment, self-employment and property incomes is labelled factor income, and market income is factor income plus occupational pensions. Net cash income is gross income less direct taxes (both income taxes and employee social insurance levies), and is similar to Sawyer's post-tax income concept.

Many previous inequality analyses, particularly those with a focus on income redistribution, have chosen a concept of "original" or pre-transfer income as the primary income concept, and then gone on to use this as a base or counterfactual against which to measure the redistributive impact of transfers or taxes. While measures of pre-transfer income are relevant to those whose immediate policy concern is to examine how and from whom transfer payments could be financed, their use as a counterfactual appears to assume that in the absence of government tax and transfer programs the income distribution would be as represented by the "original" or market distribution. Plainly this is not the case,

particularly when some of the government programs (e.g., pensions) have existed for so long that individuals have taken them into account when planning and anticipating their future income needs. In addition, since some of the "market" income may be mandated by government legislation (sickness absence payments in Germany, some pension provision in the UK), the distinction is inaccurate even as a static separation of the transfer and pre-transfer elements of gross income. Since different countries have chosen different balances of governmental direct transfers, provision, mandating and regulation in their social programs, such a distinction could be especially inaccurate in a comparative study. Furthermore, government programs themselves affect the distribution of factor income, even in a static analysis, through the incomes which they pay to service providers, such as doctors and teachers, rendering the pre-transfer measure even less appropriate as a counterfactual.<sup>3</sup>

The use of gross income as the first main income concept avoids these difficulties by allowing prior elements of income to be examined in terms either of their own distribution or of their contribution to gross income in different parts of the distribution, without making any assumption about what the distribution might otherwise have been.

The use of net cash income is slightly more problematical. Whilst the counterfactual problem is less significant (though not totally absent -- the shape of the gross distribution may be affected by the pre-existing structure of taxation), governments may and do alter the balance between direct and indirect taxes in their revenue-raising. Some differences between countries in these results may therefore reflect such policy choices, since the analyses do not at this stage take any account of indirect taxes. However, comparisons of the distribution of gross incomes are affected by the different balances between employer and employee social insurance contributions and payroll taxes in different countries (since gross income only includes employee contributions), whereas net cash incomes are not affected by this policy choice. The balance between direct and

<sup>3.</sup> It would be interesting in a future stage of analysis to separate out the factor income received from governmental programs in order to examine the factor beneficiaries of social and other public provision. Even this, however, would not capture the benefits of public spending to private sector sub-contractors, nor the cases where private sector providers are paid by individuals who are subsequently reimbursed, in whole or in part, from public funds.

indirect taxes may, therefore, affect the explanation of the net cash data, but not their accuracy as measures of the distribution of "spendable" income in the different countries: in other words, whilst comparisons of gross and net cash income are only limited and qualified measures of the impact of taxation, the net cash measure clearly portrays an important stage in the process of income distribution.

#### The Unit Value of the Income

The units in which people live, and of which income is therefore measured, differ in size and composition. This gives rise, as Atkinson notes, to two important questions:

First, how should we adjust measured income to obtain a comparable, or "equivalent", indicator of welfare? Second, how should we weight income units of different sizes when making judgements about overall dispersion? (1983, p.48)

Whilst per capita income is sometimes used to adjust measured income, a measure of equivalent income -- the standard of living available to each member of the unit, assuming income pooling -- better represents the level of economic welfare which each unit's measured income allows it. This raises the question of determining the equivalence factor -- the relationship between measured income and standard of living -- for units of varying sizes and compositions. Two related questions are salient here:

- 1. What equivalence scale is appropriate for each data set?
- 2. Should a common scale be used across the seven countries?

In principle, the answer to the second question is "no": the relationship between income level, unit size and composition, and levels of economic welfare is prima facie likely to differ from country to country (and over time in any one country). However, to use a different scale for each country would be to invite the response that any inter-country differences emerging in the consequent results simply reflected these equivalence scale differences. Whilst sensitivity analyses

would, in due course, overcome such responses, it was decided to use a common scale at this stage of the LIS project, with varying scales and sensitivity work planned for a future stage.

Given the decision to use a common scale, which could not claim precisely to represent the scale appropriate to any one country, it was then decided to use an explicitly approximate scale, rather than appear to claim any spurious degree of validity or precision for any more "refined" scale. The scale therefore allocated a value of 0.5 to the first individual in any unit, a value of 0.25 for each individual from the second to the ninth (so that a 9-person unit had an equivalence factor of 2.5), and a value of 3.0 to all units with 10 or more members. Each unit's equivalent income was then calculated by dividing its measured income by the appropriate equivalence factor.

The empirical results present data on both equivalent and unadjusted measured income so that the impact of this procedure can be examined.

#### The Weighting of Income Units

Since income units are of different sizes, it is not obvious that they should be counted equally when measuring income inequality or dispersion, although this has been the conventional practice. As Danziger and Taussig point out:

The pooling of income by family members, however, does not mean that each family unit should be given equal weight in the construction of the size distribution. In fact, conventional size distributions that weight each family equally violate the requirements for individualistic social welfare functions because they implicitly weight the welfare of an individual inversely to the size of the unit in which he or she lives (1979, p.366).

In considering this issue, Atkinson suggests that combining the choices of how to value unit income and how to weight the units allows nine different presentational and inequality-measuring procedures:

<sup>1.</sup> This scale is close to a range of scales used by analysts in the various countries, as is demonstrated in Smeeding et.al., 1985, Table A1.

Suppose that the income of a family (or household) is Y and that the family has n members. Then we could treat the family as 1 unit with income Y, ... or as 1 unit with income (Y/n), or with income  $(Y/n^*)$ , where  $n^*$  is the "equivalent" number of adults. On the other hand, we could treat the family as n units, each with income Y, or each with income (Y/n), or each with income  $(Y/n^*)$ . Finally, we could treat the family as  $n^*$  units, with again three possible measures of income (1983, p.52).

Danziger and Taussig (1979) demonstrated that the choice among the possible procedures is important for the image of inequality which emerges from the data, both cross-sectionally and over time. Which should be used?

Of the 9 possibilities in Atkinson's example, there seems little point in considering the final three -- those treating the family as n\* units -- since this appears to suggest that the importance of an individual's economic welfare is a function of the equivalence scale value of the unit in which he or she resides, and thus is subject to a version of the weakness which Danziger and Taussig's criticism identifies in conventional data. Equivalent adults do not exist, unlike families or individuals, although a family or individual may have an equivalent income. If the family is to be treated as one unit, measuring the distribution of Y/n, or of Y/n\* (each a variation on individual income), tells one something about the economic differences between families, but begs the question of the number of people affected by those differences. If the family is treated as n units, there is no real basis for assuming that each has an income of Y, since this measures neither the income nor the standard of living available to each of them.

This would appear to leave three formulations -- family income among families, per capita income among persons and equivalent income among persons -- but despite its complexity and apparent comprehensiveness, Atkinson's formulation requires one further element if it is fully to represent the choice of measures

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<sup>5.</sup> O'Higgins (1985a) argues and empirically demonstrates that for the UK the details of inequality are, in practice, little different whether measured by equivalent income per family or equivalent income per individual. Whilst the argument is generalizable to most conventional patterns of income distribution, little differences within one dataset may be more significant across seven sets, and, since equivalent income per person is conceptually superior, it is preferable to use it where possible.

This would be less true in measuring the distribution of wealth, since the control or power, as distinct from consumption possibilities, which wealth conveys is not reduced if it benefits several individuals.

available in assessing income dispersion -- the method whereby income units are rank ordered.<sup>7</sup>

#### The Rank Order of Income Units

If we return to the 9-procedure example used by Atkinson, the additional role of the rank order of units may be illustrated with the cases where the family is treated as n units, with income being either Y or Y/n. One formulation would presumably rank the units by Y, a second by Y/n; but a third procedure could rank the units by Y while measuring, effectively, Y/n when calculating inequality. This third formulation measures the share of total income going to each quantile of persons in the distribution, the persons being ranked by their family income. This would be equivalent to regarding the bottom 20% of the distribution as those 20% of persons living in the units with the lowest incomes. If economic status is commonly perceived in terms of family income, which is the rank ordering implicit in conventional measures of income inequality, then this formulation is at least as appropriate as the measure of the distribution of family income among family units which is the most commonly used measure of income inequality.

The inclusion of rank order as a specific additional aspect to be considered in approaching the measurement of income inequality does not lead to the replacement of Atkinson's 3 x 3 matrix of procedures with an even more complex 4 x 4 matrix: just as some of the apparent possibilities in the 3 x 3 formulation have no real claim to being used, so the choice of rank order will often follow logically from the other choices made. This is most clearly so in the case of measuring the inequality of equivalent income: since equivalent income is intended as a measure of the standard of living available to each individual, it is most appropriately used when each individual is weighted equally (n units), with an income valued at Y/n\*, and ranked by Y/n\*. But while the choices may often be aligned, the conceptual difference can be important, as the example in the previous paragraph suggests.<sup>8</sup>

This element is usually ignored. Even Danziger and Taussig's sensitive treatment of this issue (1979, esp. pp.369-370), does not separate the income ranking question from the measuring and weighting issues.

The discussion therefore suggests the use of three measures of income inequality: the measure of equivalent income just outlined and two measures of unadjusted income -- the distribution of family income among families, and its distribution among persons ranked by family income. The first of these unadjusted measures allows comparability with previous studies, both among and within countries, whilst the second is an equally valid measure of the inequality of unadjusted income and serves as a useful corrective to the first; since there is no unique truth in these data, it would be inappropriate, however tempting, to argue that the truth may lie in between these two measures.

A further issue of methodology emerges when the question of the rank order of income units is considered. It concerns the level or stage of income from which the rank order should be established -- if indeed it should remain fixed through the various stages of analysis. One effect of successive additions to income (e.g., from cash transfers) or of taxes may be to change the rank order of income units, regardless of any of the adjustments discussed in the previous paragraph. The dimensions of measured inequality may therefore differ with the measure or stage of income which is used to establish the rank order. This means that empirical analysis can either rerank the data at each stage of income, or can establish one income stage as the primary ranking stage. Rather than choosing one or other of these procedures, however, it may be argued that each is appropriate for different purposes.

If the intention is to examine and compare the degrees of dispersion in any two distributions, then reranked distributions are preferable: the inequality of the distribution of, for example, net income is most accurately portrayed when the units are ranked by net income, and the use of other rank orders will misrepresent the inequality of *net income*. If, however, the intention is to examine the effect of particular policies or income sources on the income share of a specific group or quantile (such as the lowest quintile of pre-transfer income), or to examine the socio-economic, demographic or income characteristics of specific groups or parts

<sup>3.</sup> The separate importance of the ranking issue also emerges when the income concept whereby relative economic status is measured differs from that used in examining the components of the income distribution. For example, one might measure the distribution of unadjusted income among people ranked by equivalent income in order to investigate which changes in actual incomes would most help those at the bottom of the distribution of equivalent income.

of the distribution, then a predetermined rank order may be required. In the former case, the choice of this rank order will be a function of the purpose or focus of the policy evaluation, but for any examination of the characteristics of particular parts of the distribution gross income seems the best income stage by which to rank units. This is partly because of the counterfactual weaknesses of other income measures, as discussed earlier, but also because gross income is the closest to being a measure of economic status: if we were ever to adopt both comprehensive income taxation and tax simplification simultaneously, gross income is the closest currently-available measure of what the resulting effective tax base would be. As our nearest measure of comprehensive income, it is the most appropriate choice for a determinate ranking concept.

Since the LIS database allows both reranking and determinate ranking, the empirical analyses presented in this paper therefore generally rerank data when measuring inequality, but use data ranked by gross income for other aspects of analysis, such as examining the characteristics of the different parts of the distribution. The effects of reranking, both by using equivalence scales and by using different income concepts are also examined.

What then do the empirical results indicate?

#### LIS: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Table 1 gives information on the relative importance of the income sources, taxes and benefits in each country, by measuring each as a percentage of average gross income. This in a sense functions as a guide to the income and fiscal structure of each country, as represented in the relevant survey.

The data show wages and salaries accounting for around three-quarters of gross income in Canada and the USA, and less than two-thirds in Israel, Sweden and Germany, with Norway and the UK in between at about 70%. For Germany and Israel this low figure is balanced by very high levels of self-employment income -- amounting to one-sixth of gross income in each, or more than twice as

<sup>9.</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between survey data and the national accounts picture of the income and fiscal structure of a country, and such evidence as is available in respect of the LIS sample countries, see Smeeding, Schmaus and Allegreza, 1985, section IV.

TABLE 1

### THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE INCOME SOURCES, TAXES AND BENEFITS IN EACH COUNTRY

Average Value of Variable as % of Average Gross Income

Variable	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	75.7 5.4 7.2	75.8 6.7 5.8	72.0 4.5 2.7	63.1 16.7 1.1	64.5 3.7 2.7	69.9 11.1 2.7	66.1 16.8 4.4
Factor Income	88.3	88.3	79.3	80.9	70.8	83.7	87.3
Occupational Pensions	1.8	2.6	2.5	2.3	0	1.2	3.4
Market Incomes	90.1	90.8	81.7	83.3	70.8	84.9	90.6
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits Total Cash Benefits	0.9 1.4 6.7	0.0 1.3 6.8	2.2 2.1 12.9	1.4 0.6 14.5	1.3 4.4 23.6 29.2	1.2 $0.3$ $12.7$ $14.1$	2.7 0.4 5.3
Private Transfers Other Cash Income	0.0	0.6 0.6	1.0 0.1	0.2 0.0	0	0.8 0.1	1.0 0.0
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100	100	. 100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	15.2 0.0	16.5 4.5	13.6 3.3	14.8 7.7	28.5 1.2	$19.1 \\ 6.2$	23.4 5.3
Net Cash Income	84.8	79.0	83.1	77.5	70.2	74.7	71.3

Note 1: The zero figure for occupational pensions in Sweden is in fact a creation of the data-collection process, since such pensions do exist there but are treated as part of pensions in the cash transfer section of the data.

Note 2: The zero figure for payroll taxes in Canada is a result of their absence from the Canadian datatape; such taxes do exist there, varying in rates from province to province, but they are not included in the results in this paper.

much as anywhere else except Norway. Earned income therefore accounts for more than 80% of gross income everywhere except the UK (76.5%) and Sweden (68.2%), the two countries with the lowest shares of self-employment income.

Unusually high levels of property income in Canada and the USA, and above-average levels in Israel, help push these countries towards 90% in the share of gross income accounted for by factor income, with the UK and Germany around 80%, and Sweden only just over 70%. When occupational or job-derived pensions are included to arrive at market income, Canada the USA and Israel all move over 90%.

The data at this point seem already to have divided the countries into three groups:

- 1. Canada, the USA and Israel, with a very large role for market income, and transfers accounting for less than 10% of gross income;
- 2. Sweden, with a much smaller role for market incomes, and transfers worth over 30% of gross income; and
- 3. The more mixed group, Norway, Germany and the UK, where transfers amount to between 15% and 20% of gross income.

The major element of cash benefits, other cash benefits, not surprisingly follows this pattern. What may be a little more unexpected is the large role of income-conditioned or means-tested benefits in Sweden. At 4.4% of gross income, they are more than twice the proportion in the UK, the country where they are next most important, and the country where cash benefits as a whole are also second only to Sweden in relative importance. However, the relative role of means-tested cash benefits within the income support system — their share of total transfers — is similar in Sweden, the UK, the USA and Canada.

After those transfer data, it is not surprising that Sweden also has the highest tax take, with income tax alone averaging 28.5% of gross income. While Israel's income tax is a little less onerous (at 23.4%), a heavier reliance on employee social insurance contributions brings its total direct tax take to very near the Swedish 30% level. Norway and Germany take about a quarter, and the

<sup>10.</sup> In further analyses this should be disaggregated, at least into pension and non-pension benefits.

USA 20%, while Canada and the UK take around one-sixth.11

The sum of cash benefits and direct taxes as a proportion of gross income is a simple indication of the magnitude of the amount of income on which government transfer and tax policies may directly impact, and therefore of the total scope which a government currently has for changing the degree of inequality in the distribution of net cash as compared to market income. Here again Sweden stands apart: its "impact potential" is almost 60, or twice the US figure. Germany, Norway and Israel are the higher of the in-between group, at about 40, while Canada and the UK are around 35.

What effects, if any, do these ranges of differences have?

#### Comparative Income Inequality

Table 2 contains data on the distribution of gross and net cash income to quintiles of families, and of gross and net equivalent income to quintiles of persons, with Gini coefficients provided for each distribution.

The distribution of gross and net income among families is deficient as a measure of the distribution of economic welfare, but represents a conventional presentation of income inequality data, and also allows us to compare these results to Sawyer's, since these gross and net concepts are similar to his pre- and post-tax income concepts. When the distribution of gross income among families is examined, the countries divide into three groups:

- 1. Those with the highest degree of inequality: the USA, Germany and Israel;
  - 2. A less unequal group consisting of Canada, the UK and Norway; and
  - 3. Sweden, which seems significantly more equal.

Sweden has the lowest Gini coefficient, almost 3 percentage points lower than the next smallest (Norway), and 10 points below the highest, Germany. It has the largest bottom quintile share, 6.6%, (more than a third higher than Norway, and three-quarters as large again as in the USA), the largest second quintile

<sup>11.</sup> The figure for Canada is affected by the absence of any data on payroll taxes in the Canadian tape.

TABLE 2

#### THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN SEVEN COUNTRIES

Quintile shares (%) of income

Variable	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
	D	istribution	of Family G	ross Income	among Qui	ntiles of Fan	nilies
Lowest Quintile	4.6	3.8	4.9	4.4	6.6	4.9	4.5
Second Quintile	11.0	9.8	10.9	10.2	12.3	11.4	10.5
Third Quintile	17.7	16.6	18.2	15.9	17.2	18.4	16.5
Fourth Quintile	25.3	25.3	25.3	22.6	25.0	25.5	24.9
Top Quintile	41.4	44.5	40.8	46.9	38.9	39.8	43.6
Gini Coefficient (%) Revised German Gini	37.4	41.2	36.5	$\frac{42.9}{41.4}$	32.9	35.6	39.5
		Distribution	of Family 1	Vet Income	among Quin	tiles of Fam	ilies
Lowest Quintile	5.3	4.5	5.8	5.0	8.0	6.3	6.0
Second Quintile	11.8	11.2	11.5	11.5	13.2	12.8	12.1
Third Quintile	18.1	17.7	18.2	15.9	17.4	18.9	17.9
Fourth Quintile	24.6	25.6	25.0	21.8	24.5	25.3	24.5
Top Quintile	39.7	41.0	39.5	45.8	36.9	36.7	39.5
Gini Coefficient Revised German Gini	34.8	37.0	34.3	40.9 38.9	29.2	31.1	33.8
	Distrib	ution of Fa	mily Equiva	lent Gross I	ncome amoi	ng Quintiles	of Persons
Lowest Quintile	6.7	5.1	7.9	7.2	9.4	8.1	6.1
Second Quintile	12.6	11.4	13.0	12.1	14.6	13.6	10.3
Third Quintile	17.5	17.1	17.9	16.0	18.5	17.9	15.9
Fourth Quintile	24.0	24.2	23.7	21.3	23.3	23.4	23.7
Top Quintile	39.2	42.1	37.5	43.4	34.2	37.0	44.0
Gini Coefficient (%) Revised German Gini	32.7	37.1	29.7	$\begin{array}{c} 36.3 \\ 35.2 \end{array}$	24.9	28.9	38.2
	Distr	ibution of F	amily Equiv	alent Net In	come amon	g Quintiles o	f Persons
Lowest Quintile	7.6	6.1	9.0	7.5	10.6	9.9	7.5
Second Quintile	13.3	12.8	13.5	12.7	16.1	14.8	11.7
Third Quintile	17.9	18.1	18.0	16.1	19.1	18.4	16.8
Fourth Quintile	$\frac{17.3}{23.8}$	24.4	23.4	20.7	23.1	22.9	23.7
Top Quintile	37.4	38.6	36.1	43.0	31.1	34.1	40.3
-	00.0	00.0	07.0	25.5	20.5	24.3	33.3
Gini Coefficient Revised German Gini	29.9	32.6	27.3	35.5 34.0	20.0	44. <del>0</del>	00.0

Note 1: The top half of the table weights each family unit equally, whilst the bottom half weights each individual equally; income units are ranked by family gross income in the top part, by family net income in the second part, by gross equivalent income in the third part and by net equivalent income in the bottom part.

Note 2: The German data are affected by a relatively large number of zero and negative incomes in the sample; the revised Gini excludes income units with such incomes. Revised quintile shares for the data are not yet available.

for the data are not yet available.

share and the lowest income share in the top quintile, 38.9% -- though this is closer to the top quintile shares in other countries.

The central group of countries, Norway, the UK and Canada, are clearly less equal than Sweden, but more equal than the remaining three, Israel, the USA and Germany, on the three criteria which are obvious in the table -- the Gini coefficient, and the bottom and top quintile shares. Within this group, Norway has the lowest Gini and the lowest top quintile share, and a bottom quintile share higher than in Canada and equal to that in the UK. In turn, the UK has both a lower Gini and a lower top quintile share than Canada.

Within the group of least equal countries, the rankings are not so clearly defined. Even with a Gini coefficient revised downwards by the exclusion of the high number of zero and negative incomes, Germany still has a higher Gini than the USA, which in turn is higher than Israel, and the same rank order describes the income shares of the top quintiles. In the bottom quintile, however, the USA has a significantly lower share than either Israel or Germany, both of whom register bottom quintile shares closer to those of the middle group of countries.

Using these three measures (Gini, and bottom and top quintile shares), therefore, the data on the distribution of gross incomes among families suggest an almost totally determined rank ordering of inequality: Sweden as the most equal, followed by Norway, the UK, Canada and Israel, with the USA and Germany ranking as most unequal on different measures.<sup>12</sup>

So how do these numbers and these rankings compare to those emerging from Sawyer's study, which included all these countries except Israel? Since the data relate to a period about 10 years later than Sawyer's, it is not possible to say that any differences solely reflect the more refined procedures used here -- the 'real' distributions in the various countries may have changed also -- but the contrast is none the less of interest in 'updating' the impression generated by Sawyer's data. The main differences in ranking relate to the UK and to Germany. In Sawyer's analysis the UK appeared to be as equal as Sweden, and

<sup>12.</sup> In further stages of analysis in the LIS project, a range of other summary measures of inequality will be calculated on these data; the effects of using such summary measures are, however, obvious from the raw data -- the more weight given to the interests of the bottom quintile, the greater the extent to which Germany will be less unequal than the USA.

clearly more so than Norway, whilst our data suggest it is significantly less equal than Sweden, and a little less so than Norway. Sawyer's data also showed Germany to be more equal than the USA on a range of summary measures, and to have a relatively higher bottom quintile income share than our data show, but they also show Germany to have the highest top quintile share of any of the six countries, which is consistent with the picture emerging from our data. Canada's relative position is the same in both sets of data, but in respect of the actual quintile shares, it appears to be a little more equal in our data, as is also the case with Sweden, while the UK seems more unequal. The data for the USA, Norway and Germany (apart from its bottom quintile) are very similar in both studies.

When the gross and net income data in Table 2 are compared, the countries divide into two rather disparate groups: direct taxes seem to have relatively large effects on inequality in two of the already more equal countries, Norway and Sweden, and two of the least equal, Israel and the USA, whilst they have smaller effects in Canada, the UK and Germany.15 After direct taxes are taken into account, the income share of the bottom quintile rises by around one and a half percentage points in Sweden, Norway and Israel -- a rise of one-fifth in Sweden, over a quarter in Norway and one-third in Israel. In the other four countries the rises are between a half and one percentage point, relative rises of around onesixth. Direct taxes also bring about large reductions in the top quintile share in Israel and Norway, reductions of four and three percentage points respectively, with a two point drop in Sweden, but they also have a large effect in the USA, where the top quintile's share falls by three and a half points. In the other three countries the falls are between one and two points. The changes in the Gini follow the top quintile shares, with a drop of almost six points in Israel, over four points in Norway and the USA, and a little under four points in Sweden; the falls are between two and two and a half points in Canada, the UK and Germany. Direct taxes therefore reduced relative inequality, on the Gini measure, by more than 10% in Israel, Norway, Sweden and the USA.

<sup>13.</sup> The explanation may of course be that Sweden and Norway have become more equal since the early 1970s.

<sup>14.</sup> The difference in bottom quintile shares is partly explained by the German zero incomes which were discussed earlier.

<sup>15.</sup> While this discussion looks only at taxes, it should be noted that their distributional effects can properly be examined only by also examining the distributional impact of the manner in which they are spent.

If the net income data are now used not to examine the impact of taxation by comparison with the gross distribution, but to look at the picture of net income inequality, a somewhat different pattern and a different rank order emerge from that generated by the gross income distribution. Norway now moves closer to the Swedish image of a distinctively egalitarian society, creating a Scandanavian pair of most equal countries. Israel leaves the group of least equal countries, and becomes the most equal of the middle group, with the UK and Canada following (in that order). Germany and the USA continue to make up the least equal group, with Germany having a higher Gini and a larger top quintile share—but also a larger bottom quintile share.

When the net income data are contrasted with Sawyer's post-tax data, the contrasts are generally similar to those described above in respect of the pre-tax data: the UK appears less equal, the Canadian data now suggest more equality and the Norwegian data are relatively unchanged. Two differences do stand out, however. First, the LIS data show a larger equalizing tax impact in the USA: the shares of the second and third quintiles increase by more and that of the top quintile falls by significantly more than in Sawyer's data. Secondly, whereas the gross income data showed higher shares in the bottom two quintiles in Sweden and a lower top quintile share than Sawyer's pre-tax data, the net income data show a higher bottom quintile share — but at the expense of the middle quintile. If the difference between Sawyer's and the LIS data actually reflects changes over time in the Swedish distribution, these results would imply that the decline in the gross income share of the top quintile has not been accompanied by any drop in their net income position, whilst the stability of the gross income share of the middle quintile conceals a drop in their net position.

#### The Distribution of Equivalent Income

How well do these conventional measures, shares and rankings reflect the pattern of the distribution of economic welfare which the lower part of Table 2, focussing

<sup>16.</sup> It should be remembered that these USA data relate to a period when the 'bracket creep' caused by fiscal drag had left unusually large numbers of Americans facing higher marginal tax rates. Subsequent (and consequent?) cuts in the federal income tax will have changed this picture, and the enactment of legislation introducing bracket indexation reduces the likelihood of its reappearance.

on the distribution of equivalent income among persons, seeks to measure?

The effect on relative income shares of transforming the data to equivalent income is varied across countries.<sup>17</sup> In Norway, Germany and the UK, the gross income shares of the bottom quintiles rise by almost two-thirds, although those of the top quintiles are less affected; in each case the Gini coefficients drop by almost seven percentage points, a drop of almost a quarter in measured inequality. In Sweden, the bottom quintile gains by a similar absolute amount (almost three percentage points), and although its greater unadjusted share makes this a smaller relative gain, the effect of using equivalent income produces a larger fall (both absolutely and relatively) in the share of the top quintile in Sweden than in any other country. Its Gini coefficient therefore falls by eight points, so that it too has a drop of a quarter in measured inequality when gross income is transformed by the use of equivalence scales.

In Canada, the USA and Israel the effects on the bottom quintile are less marked, and again there are only slight falls in quintile shares at the top of the distribution in Canada and the USA. In Israel, the top quintile actually has a larger share of both gross and net equivalent income than of the corresponding unadjusted concepts, and its Gini coefficient is only slightly lower on the equivalent than the conventional data.

The equivalencing transformation generally has the same effects on countries at the net as at the gross income levels, but since these data are the best measure we have of the inequality of economic welfare in each of these countries, they merit a brief summary. The most notable aspect of the data is the strikingly low degree of inequality in Sweden: the Gini coefficient for the distribution of equivalent net income is only 20.5, and the quintile shares of 10.6% at the bottom and 31.1% at the top are unusually close. In Norway, the second most equal country on these measures, the bottom quintile has just under 10% of net income, whilst in the UK it has 9%. The average income of the top quintile therefore exceeds that of the bottom by less than a factor of three in Sweden, rising to

<sup>17.</sup> Although the discussion is in terms of the effects of the equivalencing transformation, it should be noted that the data also change the ranking and weighting concepts, since they are based on quintiles of persons. The effects of moving to a quintiles of persons measure with unadjusted income is shown in Table 3.

three and a half in Norway, four in the UK, five in Canada, five and a half in Israel, almost six in Germany, and more than six in the USA.

The equivalent income data therefore return us to the rank ordering of inequality suggested by the unadjusted gross income data, though with clearer gaps between the cardinal positions of some of the countries. Sweden is clearly most equal, followed by Norway, the UK and Canada. Thereafter, the order depends on the measure used: while Israel seems marginally more equal than Germany at the equivalent net income stage, the USA has the lowest bottom quintile shares, but also has lower top quintile shares than either Germany or Israel, and thus a lower net income Gini coefficient.<sup>18</sup>

The two adjustments to the gross income data in Table 2, allowing for taxes and transforming for equivalent income, produce different effects in different countries. Sweden and Norway become even more equal as a result of both changes, taxes also have a significant effect on the Israeli and the USA data, whilst equivalencing also has a major impact on the German and the UK data. Only in Canada does neither have major effects, although their joint effect is important. Such divergences bedevil conventional attempts at comparative inequality analysis, but illustrate a major advantage of the LIS database -- that it allows these various measures to be specified and tested, and their different effects examined.

#### Sources of Inequality

In order to explore the proximate reasons and explanations for the patterns of inequality in each country, this section examines the role of a range of income sources in the composition of the gross income of each quintile. For this purpose it is appropriate to use data with a determinate income ranking scheme; we use data ranked by household gross income, but with each individual weighted equally. Both as a preliminary to the examination of these detailed data, and as

<sup>18.</sup> Since the Israeli data exclude rural inhabitants, it seems likely that even this relatively high level of inequality understates the true degree of inequality in Israel. While this may seem surprising in view of the egalitarian image projected by Israel, it is consistent with Kuznets' arguments that countries at earlier stages of economic development will experience higher levels of inequality. The data in Table 4 suggest that the proximate causes of this greater inequality are the lower relative importance of cash benefits and the greater role and more unequal distribution of self-employment income.

<sup>19.</sup> Arguably, the equivalent income data would be the most appropriate focus for such an examination, as they best measure the

THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG PERSONS IN SEVEN COUNTRIES TABLE 3

Income shares (%) of quintiles of persons ranked by family gross income

Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
	Distribution	of Factor 1	ncome amo	ong Quintile	s of Persons	8
5.4 14.9	$\begin{array}{c} 4.2 \\ 12.8 \end{array}$	4.0 15.0	$\begin{array}{c} 2.3 \\ 13.8 \end{array}$	6.5 18.5	4.4 17.0	4.9 11.6
19.2 24.5	19.2 25.1	19.9 $24.9$	22.0	23.0	24.2	16.0 24.3 43.2
36.0						
	Distribution	n of Gross I	ncome amo	ng Quintile	s of Persons	1
9.5 15.6	7.5 14.3	10.9 15.6 18.7	10.7 14.7 16.2	13.7 20.5 18.6	12.0 $17.8$ $18.4$	9.3 12.5 15.8
23.0 33.2	23.6 35.9	22.9 31.9	20.1 38.2	20.1 27.1	21.6 30.3	22.7 39.8
	Distributio	on of Net In	come amon	ng Quintiles	of Persons	
10.8 16.4	9.0 15.9	12.4 15.9	13.1 15.3	$\begin{array}{c} 16.4 \\ 21.2 \end{array}$	14.7 18.6	12.0 14.1
18.8 22.6 31.4	$19.5 \\ 23.6 \\ 32.0$	$18.6 \\ 22.4 \\ 30.6$	$16.0 \\ 19.3 \\ 36.2$	$18.3 \\ 19.9 \\ 24.2$	$18.6 \\ 21.0 \\ 27.2$	16.8 $22.1$ $35.0$
	5.4 14.9 19.2 24.5 36.0 9.5 15.6 18.7 23.0 33.2	Distribution  5.4 4.2 14.9 12.8 19.2 19.2 24.5 25.1 36.0 38.8  Distribution  9.5 7.5 15.6 14.3 18.7 18.8 23.0 23.6 33.2 35.9  Distribution  10.8 9.0 16.4 15.9 18.8 19.5 22.6 23.6	Distribution of Factor II  5.4	Distribution of Factor Income amore  5.4	Distribution of Factor Income among Quintiles  5.4	Distribution of Factor Income among Quintiles of Persons  1.4

Note 1: Each part of the table weights each individual equally; individuals are ranked by family gross income in each part.

Note 2: The German data are affected by a relatively large number of zero and negative incomes

in the sample.

Note 3: Gini coefficients cannot be calculated for these data, since the income unit (the family) is not congruent with the unit weight (the individual).

the third perspective on measuring inequality which was discussed earlier, we first look at the distribution of unadjusted income over quintiles of persons.

Table 3 sets out the quintile shares of factor, gross and net income in this determinately-ranked distribution. In general, the shares of gross income follow the pattern already noted, though with a lesser degree of measured inequality. However, the bottom quintile share in Germany comfortably exceeds that in Canada or Israel, and almost equals the bottom quintile share in the UK, so that the country rank orderings of inequality would be a little less clear on this measure. This German gross income share is more than four times as large as the factor income share of these individuals, a much greater increase (albeit from a much lower base) than in the other countries. In the countries where gross income is most equally distributed, Sweden, Norway and the UK, the gross income share is more than double the factor share of the bottom quintile, whereas in the USA, Canada and Israel, the factor income share is more than half of the gross share. In fact, as the data show, the Canadian and Israeli bottom quintile factor shares are greater than those in Norway or the UK, and the USA factor share is also greater than that in the UK. This highlights the importance of transfer incomes in distinguishing the more from the less equal countries, a topic which is explored more fully in the discussion of Table 4 below.

The distribution of gross income in Sweden, as represented in Table 3, also highlights an unusual statistical consequence of Sweden's family structures and relative egalitarianism — that family gross incomes increase less rapidly than family size in the middle of the distribution. While it is a characteristic of income distribution data that family size and family income are positively correlated, the average value of the latter usually increases faster. This is not the case in Sweden, with the result that the income share of the middle quintile of persons is lower than that of the second quintile.

Table 3 also demonstrates a relatively greater than previously-noted

distribution of economic welfare. However, the effect of the equivalencing transformation of the data means that the impact of the various income sources would be conflated with the impact of applying equivalence scales. Tables 18 to 24 in the appendix provide details for each country on the contribution of each income source to the unadjusted gross income of each quintile of persons -- with the persons ranked by equivalent income; in other words, they show how the make-up of the actual income of those in each quintile of economic welfare. It should be noted that these data cannot be taken to represent the shares of each equivalent income source in equivalent gross income, since the average equivalence factor applying to gross income in any quintile will not necessarily be the same as the average equivalence factor applying to any source of income.

degree of equality in the shares of net income among non-reranked persons: only in the USA is the bottom quintile share under 10%, and only in Germany and Israel is the top quintile share significantly above 30%. The Swedish data are, however, the most notable in this part of the table: they show a ratio of less than 1.5:1 in the shares of the top and bottom quintiles -- 24.2% compared to 16.4% -- and they also show that the effect of taxes further increases the reversal of the relative average position of quintiles, with the second quintile now having a larger share of net income than either the third or the fourth. Whilst this result would vanish if the data were reranked by net income, it focusses attention on the extent to which the Swedish tax system causes income status switching -- the nature of the data organization meant that this result could technically have occured in any quintile in any country, but it only appeared in the Swedish data. Table 6 will return to this issue.

Table 4 breaks down gross income by both source and quintile in order to examine the composition of each quintile share, relative both to other quintiles in the same country and to similar quintiles in other countries. Each data item in the table indicates the percentage of total gross income which goes to each quintile in a particular form or type of income.

When the first quintile in each country is examined, an immediate difference is the proportion of gross income going to each in the form of wages and salaries. The Israeli and US figures of around 3% are exceeded only by Sweden and Canada, and are significantly greater than those for the UK or Germany. Although each of self-employment income, property income and occupational pensions are quite small at this stage, when they are added to wages and salaries (to form "market income"), Canada and Israel emerge as the only two countries where more than 5% of gross income goes to the bottom quintile in the form of market income. It is, however, the share going to the bottom quintile as cash benefits which best predicts and determines the overall degree of inequality. With the exception of the German data, the bottom quintile cash benefit share correlates with the overall judgements on inequality made earlier in this paper: 9.1% in Sweden, 7.6% in Norway, 6.7% in the UK, 4.2% in Canada, 3.4% in

TABLE 4 THE QUINTILE AND INCOME SOURCE COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOME

Element as a % of total gross income

Variable	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Quintile 1							
Wages and Salaries	3.6	3.0	2.4	1.5	3.6	2.9	3.1
Self-Employment Income	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.7
Property Income	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.4
Occupational Pensions	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.5	0	0.4	1.1
Total Cash Benefits	4.2	3.2	6.7	8.3	9.1	7.6	3.4
Gross Income	9.5	7.5	10.9	10.7	13.7	12.0	9.3
Quintile 2							
Wages and Salaries	11.3	9.7	10.4	10.5	11.7	12.5	8.4
Self-Employment Income	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.1
Property Income	1.1	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.5	0.6
Occupational Pensions	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.5	0	0.4	0.7
Total Cash Benefits	1.9	2.1	2.8	3.1	7.4	2.9	1.5
Gross Income	15.6	14.3	15.6	14.7	20.5	17.8	12.5
Quintile 3							
Wages and Salaries	15.1	15.2	14.5	12.6	11.7	14.4	11.8
Self-Employment Income	0.8	1.0	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.6	1.5
Property Income	1.1	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.6
Occupational Pensions	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0	0.2	0.5
Total Cash Benefits	1.2	1.0	2.4	1.8	5.3	1.6	1.2
Gross Income	18.7	18.8	18.7	16.2	18.6	18.4	15.8
Quintile 4		•					
Wages and Salaries	19.4	19.9	18.4	16.6	15.3	17.7	16.8
Self-Employment Income	0.9	1.3	0.8	1.1	0.7	2.2	3.8
Property Income	1.3	1.0	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.6
Occupational Pensions	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0	0.1	0.4
Total Cash Benefits	0.9	0.8	2.6	1.7	3.9	1.1	1.0
Gross Income	23.0	23.6	22.9	20.1	20.1	21.6	22.7
Quintile 5	06.2	98 A	26.3	21.9	22.1	22.4	25.9
Wages and Salaries	26.3	28.0	$\begin{array}{c} 20.3 \\ 1.5 \end{array}$	13.8	0.9	5.9	9.6
Self-Employment Income	2.5	$\frac{3.5}{2.7}$		0.5	0.4	0.9	2.2
Property Income	2.9	2.7	0.9		0.4	0.3	0.7
Occupational Pensions	$0.4 \\ 0.8$	0.6 0.8	$\begin{array}{c} 0.4 \\ 2.6 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.4 \\ 1.6 \end{array}$	3.6	0.1	1.2
Total Cash Benefits							
Gross Income	33.2	35.9	31.9	38.2	27.1	30.3	39.8

Note: The quintiles are composed by ranking persons according to the gross income of their family, so that each quintile contains different numbers of families, but equal numbers of persons. The income and benefit shares are based on the family totals in each quintile. Each figure indicates the percentage of total gross income going to a particular quintile via each income source. The gross income figures include private transfers and other cash income which are not shown in the details.

Israel, and 3.2% in the USA. The 8.3% share recorded in Germany is out of line in terms of the overall pattern of inequality, but is consistent with the high share of gross income going to the bottom quintile in that country; as noted earlier, the source of the high degree of total inequality in Germany is at the top rather than the bottom of the income distribution.

The main determinant of the quintile shares, and of the rank order of countries, in the three middle quintiles is wage and salary income; other sources of income explain deviations from this pattern, rather than create patterns of their own. In the second and third quintiles, the rank order of gross shares follows that of wages and salaries, except that the higher amounts of cash benefit income in Sweden and the UK give them larger gross shares than would have been predicted from the wage and salary data. In the fourth quintile, cash benefits no longer have such an effect (although they remain larger in Sweden and the UK than elsewhere), and the only reordering from the wage and salary pattern is caused by the relatively large amount of self-employment income in Israel.

The shares of the top quintiles, and thus an important aspect of total inequality, cannot, however, be understood by examining wages and salaries. The two countries with the largest top quintile shares of gross income, Germany and Israel, have relatively low top quintile wage and salary shares -- Germany, in fact, has the lowest of these seven countries -- but they have exceptionally high selfemployment income shares. Almost 14% of total gross income in Germany, and almost 10% in Israel, is self-employment income which goes to the top quintile. In Table 1 it was noted that self-employment income was unusually large in these two countries, but these data show the massive extent to which, particularly in Germany, this income goes to the top quintile. It can now be seen that the high degree of income inequality in Germany (which was also evident for the top quintile in Sawyer's study) is due to the large and very unequal role of selfemployment income there. This also explains a part of the greater inequality in Israel. It also contributes to the extent to which the Norwegian distribution is less equal than the Swedish: self-employment income is both three times more important in Norway, and almost 90% of it goes to the top quintile, compared to less than a quarter in Sweden.

The analyses thus far have focussed on measuring the degree of income inequality in various end-state or static situations, and the contributors to those states of inequality. The next sections of the paper examine a different aspect of income distribution -- the extent to which the rank order of individuals, their economic status, changes under different definitions or measures of the distribution.

#### Equivalence Scales and Rank Order

The earlier analyses showed that the use of equivalent income generally reduces the degree of measured inequality, and has a greater effect on the measurement of inequality at the bottom of the income distribution than at the top. But it is important to note that those data had been reranked once transformed into equivalent form; the apparent change in inequality would have been greater with data where the rank order was unchanged. This indicates that the argument for using equivalence scales is not just that it tells one more about the true dimensions of economic inequality, but that it provides a more accurate picture of the composition and characteristics of the various parts of the income distribution. This conclusion is demonstrated later by the contrasts between the images of the two types of distribution shown in Tables 7 to 10, and is consistent with Sawyer's conclusion in respect of using per capita income:

Although the change observed in moving from a household distribution to a per capita distribution does not yield drastic changes in the decile shares, it does have a substantial impact on the identity of the people in the various deciles (1976, p.18).

Since perceptions of which groups in society are low or high income, and of the distributive impact and effectiveness of tax and transfer programs, are more likely to be based on unadjusted than on equivalent data, the differences in these rank orderings may be of considerable importance for the evaluation of policy.<sup>20</sup> In order to investigate the degree of rank order change caused by the use of

TABLE 5

#### THE EFFECT OF INCOME EQUIVALENCING ON THE RANK ORDER OF PERSONS IN THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION

% of persons in different deciles of the distributions of gross income and of equivalent gross income

Variable	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Up 3 or more Deciles Up 2 Deciles Up 1 Decile In Same Decile Down 1 Decile Down 2 Deciles Down 3 or more Deciles	8.7	6.6	9.2	8.9	13.6	12.9	8.6
	9.1	11.0	8.1	11.6	10.1	7.0	9.2
	15.2	15.8	16.5	12.4	17.7	14.1	15.6
	26.9	28.9	26.2	28.4	20.5	22.2	31.3
	22.9	21.6	23.8	19.2	11.7	23.2	17.6
	11.5	10.8	10.4	11.2	10.9	11.6	9.5
	5.8	5.2	5.7	8.4	15.6	9.0	8.2

Note: The data show the percentage of persons whose gross income decile changes when one moves from a measure of family income to one of equivalent family income.

1	Further data o	n stayers -	- those whos	e decile rem	ains unchan	ged	
% who stay in: Decile 1 Deciles 3 to 8 Decile 10	62.7 16.6 53.0	66.1 18.3 55.8	65.5 15.0 50.7	71.7 16.7 54.6	63.3 10.6 47.7	60.0 10.3 52.6	52.9 22.9 63.4
% of stayers in: Deciles 1 & 10 Deciles 1, 2, 9 & 10	43.0 63.0	$\frac{42.2}{62.1}$	44.3 65.6	44.4 64.7	54.0 69.0	50.7 72.2	37.1 56.1

Note: As the data demonstrate, fewer people experience rises than falls -- in each country about one-third rise whilst around two-fifths fall -- but there are a greater number of large rises (which in a sense 'make space' for the greater number of smaller falls).

equivalence scales, Table 5 shows the percentage of persons who are in different deciles of the distributions of family gross income (among quintiles of persons) and of equivalent gross income. It indicates a very high degree of movement—only one quarter of individuals are in the same decile on both measures. The percentage who move three or more deciles varies from 11.8% in the USA to a very high 29.2% in Sweden.

The lower half of the table looks at "stayers" in terms of their original location. A small majority of those originally in deciles 1 and 10 remain in those deciles, but in the middle of the distribution only one-sixth of households do so—and this figure drops as low as 10% in Norway and Sweden. Therefore, while the poor tend to be poor on either measure (and the rich rich), there is considerable movement in the middle income groups in all the countries. Policy arguments, proposals or analyses which discuss distributional impacts in terms of "raw" income data may therefore have very different, and perhaps perverse, effects on the distribution of economic welfare. An awareness of these rank order shifts suggests a need for considerable care in designing and targetting policies which affect the distribution of income.

#### Equity and Rank Order

As noted earlier, changes in the rank order of an income distribution due to the addition of transfer income or the removal of taxes can be important for determining the importance of a particular choice of a primary ranking concept. They are also important for examining the policy issue about the choice available to a government as to whether its interventions are intended to "shuffle" the income distribution -- that is, to change rank orders -- or simply to "compress" it -- that is to narrow the extent of inequality without changing the rank order of individual income units. This is the issue to which Plotnick refers as "horizontal equity": "a horizontally equitable distribution is one that preserves the initial rank order of the units" (1984, p.4).

Plotnick sets out the view that rank preservation is an important aspect

<sup>20.</sup> The arguments underlying these assertions are set out, with examples, in O'Higgins (1985b).

of redistribution policy and analysis, going so far as to argue that:

The degree to which differences in initial well-being should be narrowed is debatable, but once this is resolved, what social purpose would be promoted by reversing ranks during the transformation? None -- if the economic game is regarded as a fair process. .... Unless the socially optimal distribution is one of full equality, those earning more initial well-being should surely have greater final well-being than those earning less. What logic could justify otherwise? Thus, any reversals incidental to the redistributive process would seem to lower social welfare (1984, pp.4-5).

One need not accept the fairness or appropriateness of any particular initial rank ordering to accept that the issue of rank order changes is an important aspect of the process of income distribution and redistribution, and one unduly neglected in empirical research. But how should well-being be defined and measured in examining rank order changes? Whilst social policy equity can be more properly judged in relation to changes in equivalent income rank orderings, popular perceptions of tax and transfer equity are more likely to be based on actual income. Similarly, if rank preservation is justified on the basis of the 'economic game' being (or being seen as) a 'fair process', then actual incomes are the relevant measure. In these analyses, we therefore examine incomes unadjusted by equivalence factors.

Table 6 indicates the rank order changes between factor and net cash income, and between gross and net cash. Apart from its relevance to horizontal equity, the top half of Table 6, showing the moves from factor to net cash income, can be thought of as measuring the net effect of direct taxes and cash transfers -- the implicit negative income tax schedule of the tax-transfer system. It shows that only between one quarter and a half of persons remain in the same decile, though most of the changes are of one decile. Sweden again stands out as having the most changes, and is the only country with any significant number of people changing three or more deciles. One thing which, not surprisingly, emerges from the data is the extent of shifts in the bottom deciles, reflecting the upwards

#### TABLE 6

### THE RANK ORDER OF PERSONS IN THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION UNDER DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF INCOME

% of persons who change deciles of the distribution

Variable	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
	Movii	ng from Fa	ctor Income	to Cash In	come		
Up 3 or more Deciles Up 2 Deciles Up 1 Decile In Same Decile Down 1 Decile Down 2 Deciles Down 3 or more Deciles	1.9 3.7 14.5 52.4 26.5 1.0 0.1	3.6 4.3 11.5 49.6 29.8 0.8 0.5	4.7 6.0 14.4 37.9 29.9 6.8 0.4	6.9 5.3 13.8 35.5 27.1 9.3 2.1	8.6 9.6 14.9 27.7 19.6 14.5 5.1	3.5 5.0 16.0 42.3 28.1 4.5 0.6	3.9 5.3 15.6 43.9 23.8 4.6 2.9
	Movie	ng from Gr	oss Income	to Cash Inc	ome	·	
Up 3 or more Deciles Up 2 Deciles Up 1 Decile In Same Decile Down 1 Decile Down 2 Deciles Down 3 or more Deciles	0.0 0.4 11.7 75.9 11.7 0.3 0.1	0.0 0.1 11.8 78.4 9.1 0.2 0.5	0.2 1.1 13.6 69.2 15.5 0.4 0.1	0.2 4.4 20.9 54.1 15.8 2.8 1.7	0.2 4.0 23.3 49.2 17.9 3.5 1.9	0.2 1.9 16.9 62.4 16.7 1.5 0.4	0.0 2.7 21.3 57.7 12.0 4.3 2.0

Note 1: The German data in the upper part of this table are approximate, because the large numbers of persons living in families with no factor income made it impossible to identify a factor income level which separated the first and second quintiles ranked by factor income. The data displayed are in the middle of the range of possible actual values, a range which extends less than 10% (not 10 percentage points) on either side of each value in the table. Note 2: The relatively larger number of negative net cash incomes in the German data account for about one-third of those dropping by 3 or more deciles in each part of this table. The 5% of Swedes who drop 3 or more deciles are drawn fairly evenly from factor deciles 4 thru 10; most drop just 3 or 4 deciles.

movements of retired households in receipt of social security pensions, and their replacement by poorer working households. In Canada, for example, factor decile 2 loses 64% of its members, 36% moving down to replace those leaving the bottom decile, and 28% moving up. In Sweden, factor decile 2 loses 79% of its members, 26% moving down to replace those leaving factor decile 1, and 53% moving up; 26% of those in factor decile 3 even move down to cash decile 1.

Rank order changes from gross to net cash income capture the effect of direct taxes on the income hierarchy. As might be expected, these effects are smaller -- direct taxes tend to compress rather than to shuffle the distribution. Between 50% and 75% of individuals remain in the same decile, with least change in the USA and Canada and, again, most in Sweden. Stayers are never less than 60% of any decile in Canada, and, as elsewhere, moves are mainly in the middle deciles. Stayers are never below 70% in the USA, but almost all (99.8%) of those dropping 3 or more deciles drop from decile 10 -- i.e almost 5% of that decile's membership drop 3 or more deciles, and about 1% go to the bottom decile. In the UK and Norway, stayers never drop below 51% and 49% respectively, but in Germany they go as low as 38%, and are below 50% in 6 deciles. Israel is similar, in that stayers drop to 38.5% in one decile, and are below 50% in 4 deciles; most (89%) of the 2% who fall 3 or more deciles fall exactly 3 (from deciles 5 to 9). In Sweden, stayers fall to as low as 36%, and are below 50% in 7 deciles. Even in Sweden, however, most changes are of one decile and only 2% of households move more than three deciles.

Although the majority of the changes identified here are of only one decile, the fact that the rank order of between a quarter and one half of individuals is affected to this extent is surprising and merits further investigation. It may, for example, be the case that the changes are related to the deliberate effects of policies on families of different compositions, particularly since the data in Table 6 relate to unadjusted rather than to equivalent income.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21.</sup> Some of the movement may also be a function of the use of a relativist measure such as deciles, since a small number of large shifts may induce a large number of consequential small "shakedown" shifts in order to keep the numbers in each decile equal. This may be especially important in relation to the larger number of shifts in the Swedish data, since in a relatively more equal (and hence, dense) distribution the number of such consequentialist shifts will necessarily be greater. This feature of the use of rank orders led Plotnick to argue that "a measure that examines differences in |actual and rank-preserving| well-being .... is probably superior to one based on rank differences" (1984, p.5).

The overall impression given by the data suggests that Sweden not only has relatively high tax and transfer shares in family income, and higher levels of inequality-reducing redistribution, but also alters the relative positions of a greater proportion of its population during that process of redistribution. It is, therefore, very successful on measures of vertical equity, but fares less well on the narrower interpretations of horizontal equity.

#### FAMILY CHARCTERISTICS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION

This section focusses attention on a set of questions not yet examined in this paper -- what are the family compositions and characteristics of those in the various parts of the distributions, and how do these differ from country to country?

While presenting data for each quintile under each of the various possible measures of distribution is not feasible, Tables 7 to 10 examine a range of characteristics of the lowest and highest quintiles of individuals, with income measured in both unadjusted and equivalent forms.

Table 7 gives data on the distribution of the main types of family in the bottom quintile. When the data is not adjusted by equivalence scales, the quintile is dominated by single adult families -- only in Israel does this group account for less than half of all families. In the other non-Scandavian countries, they account for around 60% of families, in Norway this figure rises to 70%, whilst in Sweden it reaches almost 90%. These single adults are predominantly single women, who account for around 40% of all families in this quintile in Canada, the USA and the UK, and around 50% in Germany, Sweden, and Norway. Of the remaining family types, single parents are greater than 10% only in the USA, and couples with children reach 10% in only two countries -- Canada and Israel.

When the data are recast in equivalent income form, there is a sharp switch in this relative balance between family units with and without children. Single females remain the most common family type in the bottom quintile in every country except Israel, but their relative dominance is generally reduced. They now generally make up between 30% and 40% of families, whilst all single adults account for less than half of the family types in all the non-Scandanavian

TABLE 7

#### FAMILY COMPOSITION OF THE LOWEST INCOME QUINTILE

Family type as a % of total families in the quintile

Family Type	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Unadjusted Quintile			-				
Single Male Single Female Couple Couple and Child(ren) One Parent Family Other with Child(ren) Other	20.5 37.1 17.3 10.0 8.4 1.3 5.4	20.1 38.0 14.8 8.5 12.5 1.2 4.8	14.7 40.8 27.5 5.6 5.5 0.4 5.4	12.4 52.7 24.7 2.5 3.0 0.8 3.8	37.6 50.3 8.2 1.2 2.7 0	21.7 46.8 17.0 4.3 9.6 0.7	8.8 30.4 29.3 13.9 2.9 3.7 11.0
Equivalent Quintile							
Single Male Single Female Couple Couple and Child(ren) One Parent Family Other with Child(ren) Other	14.5 30.3 12.1 21.5 10.5 5.2 6.1	13.6 29.4 11.9 18.4 17.4 4.0 5.4	10.4 38.1 24.1 14.5 6.3 1.5 5.0	8.2 41.4 22.6 13.6 3.9 5.1 5.2	29.1 39.3 13.2 12.3 6.1 0	16.9 40.2 14.5 14.7 12.0 1.5	4.8 21.4 20.8 25.0 3.6 13.1 10.7

Note: The unadjusted quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the lowest family gross incomes. The equivalent quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the lowest equivalent gross incomes.

countries. The one country where there is only a minor drop in the single female share of the bottom quintile is the UK. Single parent families now amount to more than 10% of families in Canada, Norway and the USA (where at 17.4% of families they are only marginally less frequent than couples with children). The incidence of couples with children more than doubles compared to the unadjusted data (except in Israel, where they were already more frequent than in any other country), so that they now account for between 12% and 25% of bottom quintile families in the various countries.

The perception of a relatively larger presence of children in the bottom quintile is further strengthened by the data in Table 8, which measure the percentage of persons in the bottom quintile who live in families with particular characteristics. Using equivalent income, those living in families with children are least commonly found in the bottom quintile in Sweden, but they still account for 42% of the quintile. In Canada and the USA, they amount to two-thirds, and in Israel they reach almost three-quarters of the bottom quintile.<sup>22</sup>

The elderly are most obviously relatively worst-off in Germany and the UK; in the UK both possible measures -- those in families headed by an individual aged 65 or over, and those in families headed by somebody who is retired -- are over two-fifths of the quintile, while in Germany they are over one-third.<sup>23</sup> This contrasts sharply with the picture in Sweden, where they do not exceed 10% on either measure, and is consistent with the differences in the relative situations of the elderly revealed in Hedstrom and Ringen's (1985) paper.

A notable feature of Table 8 -- and a consequence of the relative affluence of the elderly in that country -- is the exceptionally high proportion of the bottom quintile in Sweden which is occupied by persons in families headed by a fully employed individual; their figure of 78% is more than twice the corresponding figure in any other country and presumably reflects the already-noted lower importance of market incomes in determining income status in Sweden.

The data in Table 9 identify couples without children as those most fre-

<sup>22.</sup> To avoid undue repetition, the contrasts between the equivalent and the unadjusted data will generally be left for the reader for the remainder of this section, and only the more striking parts of the equivalent data will be discussed.

<sup>23.</sup> The large difference between the two Norwegian figures on these measures of the elderly is repeated in Table 10.

TABLE 8

#### FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS IN THE LOWEST INCOME QUINTILE

% of persons in the quintile in families with each characteristic

Family Feature	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Unadjusted Quintile							
Have Children	39.5	44.3	24.2	13.3	9.5	30.4	42.9
Owner Occupiers	45.1	49.6	37.1	62.6	14.8	30.4	61.7
Have Earnings	55.9	54.6	33.4	19.1	48.1	47.5	59.9
Retired	30.2	25.9	55.8	61.9	52.0	13.9	36.3
Head Aged 65 or over	29.7	29.2	54.7	61.5	47.7	51.7	39.8
Head Fully Employed	22.6	16.7	14.1	8.1	11.1	17.1	21.9
Receive Unemployment Pay	15.2	5.4	1.6	1.9	8.8	0	0
Av. Family Size	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.5	2.2
Av. No. of Earners	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5
Equivalent Quintile							
Have Children	64.5	67.6	46.7	46.2	42.0	56.8	73.2
Owner Occupiers	53.8	49.8	34.8	46.1	54.2	40.4	62.4
Have Earnings	67.0	63.6	42.8	46.2	95.5	59.6	72.4
Retired	19.0	15.8	45.4	36.1	6.5	6.9	22.3
Head Aged 65 or over	18.7	18.6	43.8	37.8	10.0	35.6	26.5
Head Fully Employed	30.2	24.0	21.0	33.4	78.1	27.7	33.5
Receive Unemployment Pay	20.9	7.3	3.2	2.7	5.3	0	0
Av. Family Size	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.6	2.0	3.6
Av. No. of Earners	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5

Note: The unadjusted quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the lowest family gross incomes. The equivalent quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the lowest equivalent gross incomes. Fully employed is defined as working full-time, full-year.

TABLE 9

### FAMILY COMPOSITION OF THE TOP INCOME QUINTILE

Family type as a % of total families in the quintile

Family Type	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Unadjusted Quintile							
Single Male Single Female Couple Couple and Child(ren) One Parent Family Other with Child(ren) Other	2.8 1.0 20.5 31.7 0.8 20.1 23.1	3.5 1.1 24.1 29.9 1.2 19.8 20.5	1.1 . 0.3 19.6 29.0 1.0 22.9 26.1	1.4 0.4 23.0 33.3 1.1 16.8 24.0	1.5 1.3 40.6 56.3 0.5 0	1.7 0.4 21.0 71.2 4.4 1.3 0	1.3 1.3 15.9 52.9 0.0 16.6 12.1
Equivalent Quintile							
Single Male Single Female Couple Couple and Child(ren) One Parent Family Other with Child(ren) Other	18.1 10.4 33.4 15.4 0.8 5.5 16.4	18.5 9.3 34.9 15.0 0.9 5.8 15.6	11.0 6.3 39.6 13.8 0.8 6.9 21.6	14.3 10.0 35.1 17.5 1.4 3.1 18.5	23.4 11.3 50.2 14.3 0.9 0	19.9 12.7 32.6 26.9 7.3 0.5	6.5 5.6 30.7 37.7 0.5 6.0 12.6

Note: The unadjusted quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the highest family gross incomes. The equivalent quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the highest equivalent gross incomes.

quently found in the top equivalent quintile; in the majority of the countries they constitute one-third of the families in that quintile, but this rises towards two-fifths in the UK and exceeds a half in Sweden. Single adults without children are also common in top quintile in Sweden, amounting to more than one-third of families, whilst they are least prominent in the top in the UK (17%) and in Israel, where they account for only one family in eight.

By contrast, couples with children exceed one quarter of top quintile families only in Norway (27%) and in Israel, where they are particularly well represented at 38%, and only in Norway do single parent families show in the top quintile in any significant numbers -- over 7%.

It is worth specifically noting the major effect of the equivalencing procedure on the measured well-being of couples with children in this quintile. They formed more than half the top quintile in Sweden, and almost three-quarters in Norway, on the unadjusted data measures, but these figures are reduced to one-seventh and one quarter, respectively, on the equivalent measures. Elsewhere, except in Israel, equivalencing halves the relative presence of couples with children in the top quintile.

Table 10 casts further light on the position of those with children by indicating that in the majority of countries only one-third of individuals in the top quintile live in families where children are present. Their position is less favourable in Sweden, where the corresponding figure is only one quarter, but rather better in Norway and Israel, where it exceeds a half. The data also show that the elderly are not very prominent in the top quintile -- the proportion of persons living in families headed by somebody who is retired is greater than 5% only in Sweden, and the percentage where the head is aged 65 or over exceeds 10% only in the two Scandanavian countries.

The data in Tables 7 to 10 therefore show that in addition to differing in the degree of inequality, and the frequency of rank order changes, the seven countries differ considerably in the relative economic status of various family and demographic groups. Whilst non-elderly adults without children seem to do disproportionately well in each of the countries, they appear to be less relatively

TABLE 10 FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS IN THE TOP INCOME QUINTILE

% of persons in the quintile in families with each characteristic

Family Feature	Can	USA	UK	Ger	Swe	Nor	Isr
Unadjusted Quintile			<del>- 1</del>				
Have Children	64.8	65.4	65.2	62.6	72.1	87.6	81.9
Owner Occupiers	88.7	93.0	69.4	69.9	70.5	67.7	90.6
Have Earnings	99.5	98.9	99.5	99.2	98.4	99.8	98.9
Retired	0.9	1.2	0.4	1.9	<b>2.3</b>	0.2	1.0
Head Aged 65 or over	4.2	4.3	3.9	4.3	3.8	4.4	3.9
Head Fully Employed	87.7	86.1	86.2	89.6	88.3	72.2	86.6
Receive Unemployment Pay	19.4	8.1	18.3	0.7	5.4	0	0
Av. Family Size	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.9
Av. No. of Earners	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.6
Equivalent Quintile							
Have Children	35.7	36.3	33.9	34.2	27.1	53.6	61.3
Owner Occupiers	77.0	85.2	71.6	54.3	54.3	46.1	89.7
Have Earnings	97.5	97.0	98.2	95.9	95.7	98.3	97.6
Retired	3.3	3.5	2.0	4.5	6.5	1.5	2.8
Head Aged 65 or over	6.9	7.9	6.0	8.4	10.0	10.1	7.2
Head Fully Employed	84.7	82.2	$\bf 85.2$	84.4	<b>78.2</b>	74.0	84.0
Receive Unemployment Pay	14.6	7.0	12.7	1.5	5.3	0	0
Av. Family Size	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.8
Av. No. of Earners	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.5

Note: The unadjusted quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the highest family gross incomes. The equivalent quintile is made up of the families which contain the 20 percent of individuals with the highest equivalent gross incomes.

favoured in Israel, and rather more so in Sweden and the UK. However, Sweden and the UK are at opposite poles in the status of their elderly, who do well in the former but are relatively worst-off in the latter country. Couples with children are most likely to be found in both the bottom and top quintiles in Israel, and those with children also seem relatively favoured in Norway. The extent to which these patterns and differences are a function of inter-country differences in the definition and practices of their family structures requires further analysis before the more narrowly distributive reasons for the differences are examined, but the data suggest a fruitful source for understanding the impact of alternative distributive processes on the economic welfare of groups with varying social and demographic characteristics.

#### CONCLUSIONS

In concluding a paper of this nature, it seems appropriate to comment both on what the exercise has shown about comparative income distribution and on its implications for the use of a comparative microdata set like the LIS database.

The income distribution results largely speak for themselves by now. They allow one with a considerable degree of confidence to note an overall pattern in the inequality of income and economic welfare, with a rank order in which Sweden is the most equal, followed by Norway, the UK, and Canada, while among the less equal countries Israel is generally more equal than either Germany or the USA, whose relative inequality depends on the measure which is chosen. But these data allow a more detailed explanation of these results, noting, for example, the role of cash benefits in increasing equality in Sweden and the UK, and in aiding the bottom quintile in Germany, and the important part played by self-employment income in contributing to the high top quintile shares (and thus to the greater inequality) in Germany and Israel, and in rendering the Norwegian distribution less equal than that of its Scandanavian neighbour. They also point up the unusually high frequency of rank order changes in the economic status of individuals in the Swedish tax and transfer process, and allow the distributions in various countries to be compared in terms of the relative locations of different

social and demographic groups. In so doing, the results demonstrate the most important point about the database -- its actual value for empirical analysis.

The wealth of the database, however, also emphasizes two points which, whilst generally true about comparative research, acquire a more visible importance with good data. First, methodological issues need to be treated both more explicitly and more carefully; the range of approaches to the data is considerable, and provides an unusual array of choice for a researcher. Secondly, the data raise a wide range of questions whose proper interpretation requires the availability of a considerable degree of knowledge and awareness of the institutional features of the various countries. This suggests that an income microdatabase could usefully be complemented by access to a database focussed on aspects of social structure and institutional provision. The sequel -- LIS 2?

#### APPENDIX TABLES

The tables which follow give a greater degree of detail about the distribution in each country. They are intended to be self-explanatory, and are not discussed either here or in the main body of the paper.

TABLE 11 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: CANADA

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	$\mathbf{Q}2$	Q3	Q4	<b>Q</b> 5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	4.7 6.8 11.3	14.9 13.5 15.5	19.9 15.7 14.9	25.6 17.4 17.7	34.8 46.6 40.5
Factor Income	5.4	14.9	19.2	24.5	36.0
Occupational Pensions	20.4	23.1	18.1	17.7	20.7
Market Income	5.7	15.1	19.2	24.3	35.7
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	14.5 60.1 47.6	20.1 17.9 21.1	23.4 12.2 12.7	22.4 6.1 9.8	19.6 3.7 8.9
Total Cash Benefits	<b>46.2</b>	20.5	13.7	10.4	9.1
Gross Income	9.5	15.6	18.7	23.0	33.2
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	2.3	11.4	17.8	25.4	43.1
Net Cash Income	10.8	16.4	18.8	22.6	31.4

TABLE 12 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: USA

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	$Q_2$	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries	4.0	12.8	20.1 14.6	26.2 19.4	36.9 52.3
Self-Employment Income Property Income	$\begin{array}{c} 2.7 \\ 8.0 \end{array}$	11.0 14.1	14.0	17.0	46.9
Factor Income	4.2	12.8	19.2	25.1	38.8
Occupational Pensions	12.2	26.2	20.0	17.5	24.0
Market Income	4.4	13.1	19.3	24.8	38.3
Child Benefits	0	0	0	0	0
Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	$\begin{array}{c} 67.1 \\ 35.7 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 21.1 \\ 27.3 \end{array}$	6.8 $14.3$	$\begin{array}{c} 3.5 \\ 11.7 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.4 \\ 11.1 \end{array}$
Total Cash Benefits	40.6	26.3	13.1	10.3	9.6
Gross Income	7.5	14.3	18.8	23.6	35.9
Income Tax	1.1	7.0	14.3	22.4	55.2
Payroll Tax (Employees)	4.5	13.8	21.4	26.9	33.5
Net Cash Income	9.0	15.9	19.5	23.6	32.0

TABLE 18 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: UK

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	3.3 7.2 18.6	14.5 21.9 16.2	20.1 18.3 16.2	25.6 18.4 16.0	36.5 34.2 33.0
Factor Income	4.0	15.0	19.9	24.9	36.3
Occupational Pensions	32.9	25.3	14.2	11.2	16.4
Market Income Other Cash Benefits	4.9 41.3	15.3 15.6	19.7 13.1	24.4 14.7	35.7 15.3
Total Cash Benefits	39.0	16.5	14.2	15.3	15.0
Gross Income	10.9	15.6	18.7	22.9	31.9
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	$\begin{matrix} 3.6 \\ 3.3 \end{matrix}$	13.2 16.0	18.8 21.4	24.6 26.0	39.6 33.1
Net Cash Income	12.4	15.9	18.6	22.4	30.6

TABLE 14 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: GERMANY

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	2.3 1.7 16.1	16.7 2.6 17.8	20.0 6.6 10.4	26.3 6.6 12.4	34.7 82.6 43.3
Factor Income	2.3	13.8	17.1	22.0	44.7
Occupational Pensions	19.7	20.6	18.1	25.2	16.4
Market Income	2.8	14.0	17.2	22.1	43.9
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	4.0 66.9 53.7	20.8 9.5 18.6	28.1 7.5 9.7	25.3 9.7 9.0	21.7 6.4 9.0
Total Cash Benefits	50.0	18.5	11.2	10.4	9.9
Gross Income	10.7	14.7	16.2	20.1	38.2
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	1.9 2.9	9.0 19.9	14.3 21.7	$21.4 \\ 26.2$	53.5 29.3
Net Cash Income	13.1	15.3	16.0	19.3	36.2

TABLE 15 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: SWEDEN

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	5.6 10.6 23.9	18.1 20.1 25.1	18.2 26.0 22.9	23.7 18.4 11.7	34.3 24.9 16.4
Factor Income	6.5	18.5	18.8	23.0	33.2
Occupational Pensions	0	0	0	0	0
Market Income	6.5	18.5	18.8	23.0	33.2
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	4.6 40.6 30.8	11.8 30.0 25.3	26.0 12.1 18.7	28.6 10.6 12.9	$29.1 \\ 6.8 \\ 12.4$
Total Cash Benefits	31.1	25.4	18.0	13.2	12.2
Gross Income	13.7	20.5	18.6	20.1	27.1
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	7.2 10.6	18.9 20.1	19.0 26.0	20.8 18.4	34.2 24.9
Net Cash Income	16.4	21.2	18.3	19.9	24.2

TABLE 16 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: NORWAY

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries	4.1	17.9	20.6	25.3	32.1
Self-Employment Income Property Income	$\begin{array}{c} 2.3 \\ 19.8 \end{array}$	11.0 17.9	14.0 14.9	19.7 $14.6$	$\frac{53.1}{32.7}$
Factor Income	4.4	17.0	19.6	24.2	34.9
Occupational Pensions	32.5	31.4	16.7	9.4	10.1
Market Income	4.8	17.2	19.5	24.0	34.6
Child Benefits	11.0	20.9	23.0	23.3	21.8
Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	$\begin{array}{c} 55.2 \\ 58.4 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 23.9 \\ 20.6 \end{array}$	12.7 $10.4$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.6 \\ 6.2 \end{array}$	3.6 4.5
Total Cash Benefits	54.2	20.7	11.5	7.7	6.0
Gross Income	12.0	17.8	18.4	21.6	30.3
Income Tax	3.8	14.4	16.9	22.9	41.9
Payroll Tax (Employees)	4.5	18.0	20.1	24.8	32.6
Net Cash Income	14.7	18.6	18.6	21.0	27.2

TABLE 17 QUINTILE SHARES OF INCOMES, TAXES AND BENEFITS: ISRAEL

% of variable received by each quintile

Variable	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Wages and Salaries	4.7 4.4	12.7 6.8	17.9 9.2	25.4 $22.4$	39.2 57.1
Self-Employment Income Property Income	9.9	12.5	12.7	14.7	50.2
Factor Income	4.9	11.6	16.0	24.3	43.2
Occupational Pensions	33.7	20.2	14.4	11.5	20.0
Market Income	6.0	11.9	15.9	23.8	42.4
Child Benefits	11.4	21.8	24.0	22.0	20.7
Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	58.3 55.7	13.5 16.0	14.4 9.6	4.7 6.9	9.1 11.8
Total Cash Benefits	41.3	17.8	14.5	11.8	14.6
Gross Income	9.3	12.5	15.8	22.7	39.8
Income Tax	1.7	7.2	12.2	23.5	55.3
Payroll Tax (Employees)	6.2	13.1	17.4	27.5	35.7
Net Cash Income	12.0	14.1	16.8	22.1	35.0

TABLE 18

# COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: CANADA

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Ways and Coloning	39.3	66.5	78.0	83.2	79.1
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income	5.7	5.2	4.7	3.8	6.7
Property Income	4.3	6.0	5.8	5.8	9.4
Factor Income	49.3	77.7	88.5	92.8	$\boldsymbol{95.2}$
Occupational Pensions	1.8	2.4	1.8	1.5	1.8
Market Income	51.1	80.2	90.3	94.3	97.0
Child Benefits	3.3	1.9	1.2	0.7	0.2
Means-Tested Benefits	13.3	$\overset{1.5}{2.5}$	0.9	0.3	0.1
Other Cash Benefits	30.5	14.2	6.7	4.0	2.1
Total Cash Benefits	47.1	18.6	8.8	5.0	2.4
Other Income	1.9	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.6
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	2.7	9.1	13.0	15.8	19.7
Net Cash Income	97.3	90.9	87.0	84.2	80.3

TABLE 19

### COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: USA

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	44.9 3.3 2.8	66.5 5.6 4.1	77.4 5.3 3.9	82.3 5.5 4.1	77.6 8.6 8.1
Factor Income	51.0	76.2	86.6	91.9	94.3
Occupational Pensions	2.0	3.2	3.2	2.5	2.3
Market Income	53.0	79.4	89.8	94.4	96.6
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	$0 \\ 18.7 \\ 25.3$	0 1.9 16.7	0 0.4 8.4	0 0.1 4.5	0 0.0 2.7
Total Cash Benefits	44.0	18.6	8.8	4.6	2.8
Other Income	3.1	2.0	1.4	1.0	0.7
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	1.0 3.0	5.9 4.3	10.4 4.8	14.6 4.9	$\substack{24.2\\4.3}$
Net Cash Income	95.9	89.8	84.8	80.4	71.5

TABLE 20

## COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: UK

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	$\mathrm{EQ}2$	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	19.1 5.9 2.5	61.2 6.4 2.3	74.0 4.0 2.1	79.4 3.7 2.0	81.9 4.3 3.6
Factor Income	27.5	69.9	80.1	85.0	89.9
Occupational Pensions	3.8	3.8	2.4	2.0	2.1
Market Income	31.3	73.7	82.5	87.0	91.9
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	5.1 13.6 48.2	4.9 2.7 17.2	3.2 1.4 11.7	1.8 1.0 9.3	0.5 0.4 6.4
Total Cash Benefits	66.9	24.8	16.2	12.1	7.3
Other Income	1.8	1.5	1.3	0.9	0.8
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	2.6 1.0	9.7 3.1	12.7 3.6	14.3 3.7	17.3 3.5
Net Cash Income	96.4	87.2	83.7	82.1	79.2

TABLE 21

### COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: GERMANY

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries	34.0	56.2	70.8	77.5	60.3 31.0
Self-Employment Income Property Income	$\begin{array}{c} 2.8 \\ 0.8 \end{array}$	4.5 0.8	$\begin{array}{c} 6.5 \\ 1.1 \end{array}$	5.8 1.1	1.2
Factor Income	37.6	61.5	78.4	84.4	92.5
Occupational Pensions	1.5	2.2	2.0	3.0	2.3
Market Income	39.1	63.7	80.4	87.4	94.8
Child Benefits	4.2	3.3	2.2	1.1	0.3
Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	5.1 50.3	$\begin{array}{c} 0.9 \\ 31.8 \end{array}$	0.4 16.8	$\begin{array}{c} 0.2 \\ 11.1 \end{array}$	0.0 4.8
Total Cash Benefits	59.6	35.9	19.4	12.5	5.1
Other Income	1.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax	3.8	8.0	11.5	13.6	20.0
Payroll Tax (Employees)	5.2	8.1	9.3	9.7	6.6
Net Cash Income	91.0	83.9	79.2	76.7	73.4

TABLE 22

### COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: SWEDEN

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	28.7 6.7 2.8	48.5 3.8 3.3	61.8 4.2 2.2	$73.1 \\ 2.5 \\ 2.1$	76.7 3.2 3.1
Factor Income	38.2	55.5	68.2	77.7	83.0
Occupational Pensions	0	0	0	0	0
Market Income	38.2	55.5	68.2	77.7	83.0
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	2.7 12.8 46.3	2.5 $7.6$ $34.4$	1.7 6.0 24.2	$0.9 \\ 2.9 \\ 18.5$	0.3 0.9 15.8
Total Cash Benefits	61.8	44.5	31.8	22.3	17.0
Other Income	0	0	0	0	0
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	12.5 2.1	20.5 1.2	25.5 1.3	29.7 0.8	37.0 1.0
Net Cash Income	85.3	78.3	73.1	69.5	62.0

TABLE 23

### COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOMES: NORWAY

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	29.0 4.2 2.7	62.1 9.9 2.4	72.0 9.2 2.4	78.6 9.8 2.3	75.5 14.7 3.2
Factor Income	35.9	74.4	83.5	90.7	93.4
Occupational Pensions	1.2	1.5	1.3	0.9	1.2
Market Income	37.0	75.9	84.8	91.7	94.6
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	3.3 1.5 55.6	2.7 0.6 19.6	$1.8 \\ 0.3 \\ 12.2$	0.9 0.1 6.6	0.3 0.0 4.4
Total Cash Benefits	60.4	22.8	14.3	7.6	4.7
Other Income	2.6	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.6
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	$\begin{array}{c} 4.5 \\ 2.3 \end{array}$	12.1 5.4	16.3 6.3	20.0 7.0	25.4 6.9
Net Cash Income	93.3	82.5	77.4	73.0	67.7

TABLE 24

# COMPOSITION OF GROSS INCOMES OF QUINTILES RANKED BY EQUIVALENT GROSS INCOME: ISRAEL

variable as % of equivalent quintile unadjusted gross income

Variable	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5
Wages and Salaries Self-Employment Income Property Income	39.7 6.1 0.9	58.6 13.0 2.5	71.5 10.5 2.8	73.3 15.1 2.8	65.5 22.0 6.6
Factor Income	46.8	74.1	84.9	91.1	94.1
Occupational Pensions	5.2	4.8	5.0	2.5	2.7
Market Income	51.9	78.9	89.9	93.7	96.8
Child Benefits Means-Tested Benefits Other Cash Benefits	11.1 3.1 30.6	7.1 0.4 11.1	3.6 0.6 4.8	2.1 0.1 3.1	0.8 0.1 1.9
Total Cash Benefits	44.8	18.7	9.0	5.3	2.8
Other income	3.2	2.5	1.1	1.0	0.4
Gross Income	100	100	100	100	100
Income Tax Payroll Tax (Employees)	4.8 3.5	11.9 6.1	16.8 5.8	22.8 5.8	30.8 4.9
Net Cash Income	91.7	82.0	77.5	71.4	64.3

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